








“Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophic 
thought has done its best, the wonder remains” 
– A.N. Whitehead
The aim of the Immediations book series is to prolong the wonder sustaining 
philosophic thought into transdisciplinary encounters. Its premise is that concepts 
are for the enacting: they must be experienced. Thought is lived, else it expires. 
It is most intensely lived at the crossroads of practices, and in the in-between of 
individuals and their singular endeavors: enlivened in the weave of a relational 
fabric. Co-composition.
“The smile spreads over the face, as the face fits itself onto the smile” 
 – A. N. Whitehead
Which practices enter into co-composition will be left an open question, to be 
answered by the Series authors. Art practice, aesthetic theory, political theory, 
movement practice, media theory, maker culture, science studies, architecture, 
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Introduction: 
Thinking beyond interactivity
Imagine you are out walking in the street. To go for a walk is 
to create, through the endless flow of interaction, bodily and 
spatially. With each step – and within each step – perceptual, 
sensorial and social possibilities are opened up, assemblages 
of forces gathered, altered and reconnected, complexities 
multiplied, memories activated. The moment is saturated 
with affectual relations and intensities (Lorrainne 2005, 73–4). 
With the fall of the same step, previous possibilities perish, 
simultaneously propelling the endless opening of fresh 
possibilities of connection (Manning 2009, 38–9).
Try to map all the relations that go to make up one instant, one 
occasion: within your body, between body and world, mind and 
body, object and object – all the various ‘machinic’ combinations 
producing experience. You will have to consider subatomic, 
atomic and molecular forces with their general disregard for 
what we view as discreet bodies. You will want to account for the 
way the texture and gradient of the terrain shapes movement, 
rhythm and posture; how sensory perception, vision, hearing and 
touch and so on begin to ready the body for the next step; how 
the force of physical habits and body memory shape patterns 
of movement in the moment. Also present will be all the events 
of relation that have gone into making each tree, stone, person 
and sound you are interacting with, affecting your body more or 
less forcefully. Then there are the mental forces – ‘inextricably 
intertwined’ with the physical (Whitehead 1978, 325) – memories, 
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anticipations, evaluations, random associations made and 
forgotten, affects that will subtly or bluntly alter you, the myriad 
mental processes that sit behind conscious perception, yet 
nevertheless shape and reshape your body. Beyond that instant, 
in the next occasion, the concrescence of all these forces creates 
anew this simple act of walking the street. It is a constant, 
complexly enmeshed act of creativity: when we look honestly, all 
things, as Whitehead says, are vectors of relations (1978, 309).
Such an everyday act is saturated with complexity and invention, 
and is rich with potential. But now imagine you are in a gallery, in 
some interactive installation. Things happen as you move around 
– sounds, lights or video. Perhaps triggered by your presence, 
the work pretty much does its own thing and its actions seem 
somewhat random, or perhaps it continues to develop as you 
engage, with a concentration on a demonstration of how your 
actions affect its workings. Either way, this type of work often 
lacks the complex, intertwined-ness of body and work, the 
perceptual nuance, the fluidity, the surprising originality of 
connection and thickness of experience of a simple walk outside.
In general in this book my intention is to focus on a productive 
move towards exploring positive developments in the field, and 
so the critique of the poor state of interactive art is painted with 
broad strokes. I will, however, begin with a brief description of a 
here-unnamed work I encountered early in the process of writing 
that contrasts with this imagined walk and illustrates some of 
the problematic areas that concern me. This particular work 
formed part of a large exhibition of a broad range of interactive 
works. Inside the gallery were various pieces that responded to 
touch, movement or other interactions with the audience, with 
shifts in sound or video projections and so on. These included 
a couch that purred as you stroked it, a series of pot plants 
that made sounds as the audience moved amongst them, and 
a digital ‘mirror’ that reflected a greatly aged version of the 
participant’s face. All were at least mildly amusing works, if a 
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little one dimensional in their aesthetics and outcomes, with very 
direct and limited links between the actions of the viewer and the 
changes in the works these gestures triggered.
The particular work that affected me most negatively was 
situated in a bare shipping container outside the main gallery. 
It was set up as a very small rave club that would respond 
to audience members’ dance moves to produce sound. It 
was silent and empty, other than a large speaker system, 
when I entered the space as the exhibition opened on a chilly 
10-degree morning. The young invigilator then approached and 
enthusiastically encouraged me to begin dancing in order to 
trigger sounds. As I hesitated she became more forceful in her 
pleas for participation. I hovered near the door, unwilling to make 
a fool of myself in the service of as yet unheard music. Eventually 
the invigilator gave up in disgust and began to throw herself 
around the room as the very loud beats began, still pleading 
with me to join in. Needless to say I beat a hasty retreat, having 
not only not participated but having been made to feel guilty 
for my lack of enthusiasm and willingness to sacrifice dignity 
for the sake of this artist’s work. The sense of obligation and 
potential humiliation of the experience was certainly powerful 
compared to the mild amusement of the works inside the gallery, 
however it was mostly a feeling of distaste for the genre that was 
evoked for me. It was closer to the uncomfortable duty of a work 
presentation than the more open-ended exploration and play 
that one might wish from an art-experience, whether as a solitary 
pleasure to be enjoyed in one’s own time, or as a collective 
investigation with a feeling of relational connection and trust.
My concern with this work is not only that the interactive 
component (movement triggering sound, with the sound’s 
volume and speed relating in some way to the size and 
speed of the gestures) was somewhat limited in its aesthetic 
imagination, with little variation in reaction from participant 
to participant or over time within one interaction (although 
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I think this is a valid criticism of the work). The distributed 
agency frequently attributed to interactivity is often lacking 
in these linear, prescribed constructions of relation. At best, 
as Brian Massumi argues, the interactive experience might 
seek to expand awareness of the processes of perception and 
relation (2011, 45), yet too often remains programmatic and 
replays the same standardised reactions, lacking in subtle and 
surprising combinations of associations, sensations, affects and 
prehensions. This is not to suggest that the role of interactive art 
is to mimic life, but rather that many such works display a paucity 
of life’s rich, heightened experience of connection and potential.
My larger critique, however, is an ethical one, deeply concerned 
with the politics of an enforcement of power relations that 
instrumentalise bodies and seek control rather than explore the 
possible expansion of expressive capacities. While there was 
certainly a series of relations established between the viewer or 
participant and the artwork in this example, these were highly 
problematic. The piece demanded ‘work’ from the participant, 
prescribing the types of relations and interactions that would 
be recognised by the technology and requiring a high level of 
energy from this viewer in order to produce itself (replicating the 
neoliberal dynamics of society that require the constant donation 
of immaterial labour). The participant was clearly in the service 
of the artist, not collaborating in any meaningful way. ‘Choice’ 
here became limited to opting in or out, with little possibility of 
nuanced and singular participation. Like many interactive art 
experiences, this event did not work to enhance my ‘life-world’ 
through any exploration of further potential combinations of 
bodies and artwork components, but instead replicated the 
dominant power relationships of society through obligation, 
control of gestures and the limitation of expression.
The limitations of this work made me wonder: what would 
happen if we were to radically shift our notions of what 
interactivity is or might be? What would happen to ‘interactivity’ 
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if we expanded the concept of it greatly and explored its 
essentially environmental or ecological potential? What would 
happen if we stopped limiting interactive potentials to human 
subjects, or to these subjects in conversation with an artwork 
across the abstracted and artificial divide of the ‘interface’? What 
if we shifted scales – and worked across scales – and thought 
also the potential for interactive or relational development 
between, for example, an algorithm and a sensor, a sound 
vibration and a foot, an affect and a perception and so on?
In highlighting this example I don’t mean to suggest that 
interactive art should be ‘nice’, or that it should promote a 
bland positivity. Certainly there must be a place to explore 
tricky, slippery or challenging relations and propositions in 
art. However, there is a difference between the relational 
entanglement created by a work such as this example that offers 
only a heightened precarity to the individual ego in the face of 
obligation, and one based on a collective ‘positive’ extension 
of potential. The relationality that the neoliberal world already 
offers us is one of shared ecological, social, economic and 
psychic precarity that certainly creates a connectivity between 
people, but this is chiefly one of a shared vulnerability not an 
enjoyment of collective potential. Nor would it be enough for 
such a work to merely deterritorialise and delocalise or create 
and capitalise on speculative movement or reconfigurations of 
these already toxic connections (Guattari 2008, 33). Capitalism 
already operates successfully in this field of speculative and 
preemptive control, and, as I argue in Chapter One, the politics of 
relation in interactive work too often homogenise and constrict 
experience and orient the participant towards these dominant 
power structures. Nor can we truly imagine a work that would 
help us to ‘escape’ from such networks. Rather, to remain ethical, 
relational works need to pay attention to and care for what 
else might be going on: for the differential seeds or ‘isolated 
and repressed singularities’ (Guattari 2008, 34) that might 
suggest transversal movements and other, hidden potentials. 
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Such potentials, rather than re-individualising and controlling 
yet another aspect of living, might, as I advocate throughout 
this book, instead be situated in an emphasis on Whiteheadian 
‘novelty’ that is enjoyed at an ecological level and not on a level of 
individualised or subjective human enjoyment.
Terms such as positivity, collective enjoyment, novelty and 
connection may well raise alarm bells. They will remind 
some readers of exactly the empty promises of consumerist 
entertainment already on offer, and the bland, identity-based 
and resolutely neoliberal iterations of relational aesthetics 
available for consumption at any major gallery. Here perhaps the 
concept of affirmation better describes the particular direction 
I am seeking to head towards in this discussion. Affirmation 
is speculative, seeking not to confirm the already-prescribed 
and thought relational possibilities, but to experiment freely 
and immanently (Manning 2016b, 201). Affirmation seeks to 
potentialise, thus it moves towards an increase in intensity or 
differentiation in the event (novelty) rather than homogenisation. 
To be clear, affirmation is of the event, not pitched at the level of 
an individual, subjective positive or negative emotional response. 
The event enjoys its expressions of novelty, which involve 
both the explorations of new conjunctions and disjunctions. 
An affirmative interactive practice might seek to expand and 
explore how components of an event can interact. This does not 
necessarily imply a concern for any individual component; rather 
it might seek to affirm ongoing ecological differentiation.
Affirmation pitches discussions at a very different level to that of 
criticism. In the context of this book, it will become apparent to 
the reader that the works are not ‘critiqued’ in the negative sense 
of this term. That is, they are not there to be evaluated against 
some predetermined criteria of the new face of interactivity 
that the book might, from the outside, be mistakenly seen to be 
proposing. Their role is not to have the opinions or judgments 
of the author bestowed upon them, but, as Brian Massumi has 
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written of this affirmative and ‘immanent’ style of critique, to 
perform a ‘dynamic evaluation that is lived out in situation’ 
(2010, 338).1 This is ‘eventful’ and seeks to engage with and 
acknowledge the singularities of a particular situation rather 
than resort to generalisations. Rather than leading to a shoring 
up of established positions, immanent critique might instead 
‘foster unforeseeable differentiations’ (Massumi 2010, 338). In 
the context of the various discussions of artworks within this 
book, their inclusion implies neither any attempt to ‘assess’ or 
qualify the art, nor a ringing endorsement for all aspects of each 
work. Nor does it imply any assumption that these works form 
a ‘canon’ of important, new or ideal interactive models. Rather, 
they are there because there are some aspects of them that 
might productively help both the author and reader to think 
through the various concepts in their particular intersection 
with a singular art event, and potentially to lead such thinking 
into both unexpected and ever more diverse readings of the 
conceptual material at hand. Such thinking happens in the middle 
of the majoritarian events and theories, as minor undercurrents 
or dérives. It suggests a particular attention to what else might 
be happening: to transversal events that begin to split, fracture 
or unsettle expected outcomes or thoughts. In line with this, the 
aspects of the artworks that are examined are often incidental to 
their main focus. For example, in Chapter Five I discuss aspects 
of Nathaniel Stern’s Compressionism, focusing on the particular 
and awkward assemblages and rhythms of bodies, spaces and 
technical objects, rather than on the undoubtedly beautiful 
photographic outcomes of these performances. Similarly, in 
discussing Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s Re:Positioning Fear: Relational 
Architecture 3 in Chapter Eight I focus on an accidental incidence 
of disruption to the original work that overlaid the existing event 
with new tonalities and intentions.
Affirmation is performative or processual, and thus in this 
book the interrogation of the concept of relation is performed 
through the lens of what is broadly termed ‘process’ philosophy. 
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Process is a creative event of formation of an entity through 
the ‘transformation of the potential into the actual’ (Guattari 
and Rolnik 2005, 311). Whitehead terms the placement of 
process as primary within thinking a shift from the ‘material’ 
to the ‘organic’.2 Process philosophy’s focus is ontogenetic, 
concentrating on how events (which here includes objects, 
relations and forces) come into being, rather than with the states 
they pass through (Massumi et al 2009, 37). Philosophically, this 
entails a shift from a hylomorphic view of the world as composed 
of discrete objects and subjects enduring in relative stability 
over time and which then interact with each other, to a view of 
the world as an ongoing, continually unfolding series of events 
of relation. This is an expanded notion of relation as emerging 
within an art event, concerned not with its demonstration or 
metaphoric representations, but with the power of conjunctive 
and disjunctive relational forces to creatively differentiate. That 
is, with the capacities of entities to affect and be affected in 
order to advance events. Thus it replaces ideas of transcendence 
– where development is focused on the achievement of an ideal, 
pre-described form – and focuses instead on the drive towards 
novelty and further differentiation.3 As Whitehead puts it, this 
is a novelty conditioned by its relationship to past events – ‘an 
urge towards the future based on an appetite in the present’ 
(1978, 21).4
In this approach, all relations need to be considered for their role 
in forming events, and thus William James’ ‘radical empiricism’ 
forms an important base here, in asserting that only that which 
is experienced and all that is experienced must be admitted into 
its construction of the world (2010, 18). In this expanded model, 
thoughts and concepts are events in and of themselves, rather 
than projections or representations, and are as much a part of 
this enaction as objects. As such a process philosophy approach 
not only eradicates ideas of preformed or ideal subjects, it 
also, as Whitehead notes, ‘abolishes the detached mind’ (1978, 
56). Relations that connect experiences, as James states, ‘must 
Introduction 19
also be admitted’ as real and a place ‘found’ for them in the 
system (2010, 18).
As Massumi notes, an implication of this system is that most 
of these relations exist only as potential, and therefore the 
virtual must also be considered as ‘real’ (2008, 39–40), with 
both actualised and potential relations being crucial to an 
understanding of the ability of relations to develop openly. 
Thus, expanded empiricism provides, as will be argued in the 
first chapters of this book, a path to ‘thinking beyond’ the purely 
mechanical and overt interactive elements between stable 
objects, and into a richer and more complex series of formative 
forces operating within a field; while still grounding thinking in 
lived experienced and avoiding the traps of transcendence and 
representation.
With this position of the primacy of forces, an expanded and 
open definition of what constitutes a body is possible. The 
body referred to here is not limited to the subject, or to a 
fixed or post-individuated stable entity, but is itself ‘a process 
of intersecting forces (affects) and spatio-temporal variables 
(connections)’ (Braidotti 2002, 21). That is, bodies not only have 
capacities to interact with external forces and entities, but 
also are in themselves formed from the ongoing meeting and 
conversation of forces, and are therefore ‘continuous’ with the 
external world (Whitehead 1968, 21), as they also have ‘internal 
resonances’ and plays of forces (Simondon 1992, 305). Bodies 
are creative systems or emergent ecologies themselves, always 
more than any stable subjectivity, which might be better seen 
as a partial resolution in ongoing individuation that has always 
the potential for further movement. Rather than define a body 
by its representational qualities, the term body is here defined, 
as Massumi has described it, by ‘what capacities it carries from 
step to step’ (c2001, 4): in other words, by its performativity and 
its abilities to interact within an ecology of which it is an active 
participant (Grosz 1994, 194).
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Within this process-orientated view, not only bodies but also 
other entities – including inanimate objects – can also be defined 
by their abilities to interact with their environment, and they too 
can be thought of as complex negotiations of relational forces or 
events in themselves (Whitehead 1978, 73, 41). If entities all have 
their own capacities to affect and be affected by other forces and 
entities (Whitehead 1978, 856, 230), they are therefore always 
capable of further changes, of influencing and being influenced. 
This gives an opportunity to consider the interactive potential 
of not only human bodies, but also the affective capacities of 
all components of an art event’s ecology. This thinking has the 
potential to greatly expand interactivity within a system, and 
suggests an obligation to begin to think about how non-human 
components of a system have capacities to interact with each 
other. In other words, it implies the necessity to consider a larger 
ecology at work, rather than focus purely on artwork-participant 
relations while assuming that other relational forces and 
objects will remain fixed or are less important to the developing 
relational meshwork.
Here we might, for example, begin to consider the emergent 
relations (and collective becomings) of and between a speaker 
vibration, a floor and a diffracted sound wave as examined 
in Chapter Seven. Or we might pay attention to the relations 
between movement, shadows, a light sensor and an electrical 
current, and so on, whilst at the same time thinking about their 
connections to various bodily assemblages – sense organs, 
surfaces, forces of movement. This, I argue, has scope to expand 
notions of interactivity through thinking the potential of much 
more complexly intermeshed and collectively emergent tensions 
within an art event, activated through acts of prehension and 
transduction across its many registers. At the same time, the 
implications of these ideas potentially move the discussion on 
interactivity beyond ‘new media’ artworks.5 As will become 
apparent both from the choice of works and the aspects of these 
works discussed, interactive potential should not be limited to 
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works obviously mechanically interactive in their enaction, nor 
to work necessarily involving ‘technologies’ in the most obvious 
sense of the term. This positions the actual artworks discussed 
and the implications of the discussion within a wider framework 
and history of relational and participatory artwork.6
Through these discussions on an expanded and heterogeneous 
relationality I develop a concept of emergent self-organisation in 
interactivity, which I term a ‘gathering’ ecology. This broadened 
concept of interactivity emphasises an event’s ability to move 
towards the generation of its own outcomes out of emerging 
difference within relations. This self-motivated or ecological 
gathering is always on the level of the virtual – a gathering of 
potential – as much as it is an actual entanglement of relations. 
While in general, process philosophy is always concerned with 
the becoming of events, this extends becoming in the sense 
that it concerns not simply the idea of the becoming of an event 
within a field, or even that the field is co-emergent with the 
event. Here the very rules and potentials governing these acts of 
organisation are emerging or gathering as one, although this is 
a fragmentary, heterogeneous whole. In this sense I argue that 
there is a shared immanence running through an entire ecology, 
and autonomy of any component entity is always emergent not 
only with other entities that parasite it, but with the subjective 
forces of the ecology with which it nests.
In developing this concept I utilise several related or overlapping 
concepts that argue for the primary role of intensive 
differentiation in the becoming of events. In Chapter Three this 
entails a close examination of Whitehead’s concept of ‘feeling’, 
a complex and abstracted ontology of relation that is for him 
at the basis of all becoming.7 Here, in order to become, an 
emergent entity selects ‘datum’ from other actualised entities 
and from the virtual plane, intensively valuating and patterning 
these feelings as ‘one complex feeling’ (Whitehead 1978, 22) 
that constitutes its very ‘concrescence’, or event of becoming. In 
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rethinking interactivity the particular usefulness of this system, 
which I outline in much more detail in the chapter, is that in 
this act of feeling an entity has autonomy from what has come 
before, in that it selects and incorporates only some of the 
possible information from the actualised world and some of the 
potentials. It therefor self-generates novelty in the world, but is 
at the same time always relational. There are many similarities 
between this Whiteheadian concept and Gilbert Simondon’s 
system of individuation, and in the later chapters of this book 
this connection is explored through the idea of transduction 
in relation to micro-perception and sound, interfacing and 
generative software programming. Transduction, as ‘the 
foundation of individuation’ is for Simondon a process whereby 
an entity (again, in the broadest sense) generates itself through 
an intensive gathering of incompatible external forces into an 
intensive communication ‘without loss, without reduction, in 
newly discovered structures’ (2009, 12). Feeling and transduction, 
which cut across forces and forms to generate new intensive and 
extensive relations, are at the core of the thinking my exploration 
of the capacity of differential operations within an art event to be 
activators of co-causal relation within interactivity.
In thinking difference, particularly from the pragmatic 
perspective of the construction and interrogation of interactive 
artworks, the third key philosophical tool, which is examined 
in Chapter Four and put to use throughout the book, is Michel 
Serres’ concept of the parasite. This he defines as the essential 
noise in any system of relations.8 The parasitic disruption to 
relation that produces new relational connections from within 
an existing system is proposed as a mechanism for intensively 
generating change while also drawing elements into more 
complex interdependence. The parasite, which Serres argues 
is always present within relations (2007, 79) (and which both 
Whitehead and Simondon also argue to be constitutive of 
becoming in the form of the held and productive intensive 
differentials of an entity), problematises simple connections 
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with its ever-present potential to further differentiate. It 
transforms stable systems into evolving systems of co-causality.9 
Again, all these concepts are affirmative in their focus on the 
processes of speculative advance towards future novelty. They 
are speculative in that the outcomes are not prescribed, and 
positive in that such advance does not erase difference but 
intensifies it. Thus difference here is not oppositional or negative, 
but a dynamic creative force for both extensive exchange and 
intensive development, binding heterogeneous elements into the 
production of the event (Deleuze 1994, 57).
While a discussion that takes process-based ideas of the 
emergent and intertwined nature of all events is necessarily one 
about relation, enthusiasm for the ‘relational’ must be tempered 
by a closer consideration of the nature of these relations. As I 
argue in Chapter One, the politics of relation in interactive work 
too often homogenise and constrict experience and curtail open 
experimentation. To remain ethical, relational works need to 
instead concentrate on enabling expressive capacities,10 and to 
position heterogeneous elements in dynamic or productively 
noisy relation. Here within the writing I identify and emphasise 
the imperative to give particular attention to how the various 
components of an art event begin to gather and intertwine in 
each other’s and a collective creative advance. Amongst this 
search for an ethical ‘equality’ of interactive potentiality, we 
must consider the ‘technical equality’ that Simondon calls for, 
which implies ‘equal technical participation, even as it assumes 
difference’ (Combes 2013, 92).11 In this sense the ‘health’ of the 
whole ecology – in sustaining and extending its expressive 
capacities – is always a premium consideration in an ethical 
interaction. It is a question of how ecologies as sets of ‘complex 
dynamics of relations in a given situation’ (Bertelsen 2012, 
41) begin to form through interactions – not only between 
participant and work, but between all material, conceptual and 
affectual components.
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This interest in the ethics of emergence must also, it seems 
to me, be extended to include the emergence of thought and 
concepts, and in this the book adopts a particular methodology 
that could also be termed transversal. If the task of this 
discussion is to utilise an affirmative experimentation across 
conceptual and practical registers to examine the creative role of 
differentiation within interactive art events, then here this entails 
a methodology of multiple readings, multiple configurations 
of concepts, and multiple propositional relational encounters. 
This is proposed as a potential politics: an ethics addressing 
immanent construction. This is an ontogenetic approach to the 
text, practicing a tactical and parasitic method of research that 
could be described as a ‘meta-modeling’ or ‘study’.
Stefano Harney and Fred Moten have proposed the term ‘study’ 
as a type of collective learning without end that is resistant to the 
academic disciplining through policy, reward and identity (2013, 
67–8). Study is the experience itself – something already going on 
– sometimes underneath or inside or in spite of the structuring of 
knowledge and thinking that it destabalises. Study does not ‘call 
to order’ along the lines of an established hierarchy or knowledge 
(Harney and Moten 2013, 125–6). In this it suggests that we must 
be careful about not only the content of what is studied, but the 
methodologies employed, recognising that they are not simply 
organisational, but can, as Manning states, have a deleterious 
disciplinary affect on thought in constraining it to the already-
known (2016b, 34). Rather, Manning says, study and associated 
becoming-methodologies such as research-creation might allow 
us to think beyond the known and to instead experience the act of 
knowledge becoming out of the unknown (Manning 2016b, 30–1). 
Just as process philosophy asks us to think objects and subjects 
as experiences or events, study asks us to consider the larger 
generation of the conditions of knowledge’s emergence. Study, 
in this sense is not a usual kind of methodology – rather it might 
be thought of as a becoming-methodology immanent with the 
problem that we wish to think: a tactical approach.
Introduction 25
A tactic is open-ended and opportunistic. It reuses elements 
of a system (as both feeling and the parasite move towards 
novelty but are formed from a reconfiguration of already present 
relation), ‘without taking over [the system in] its entirety’ (de 
Certeau 1988, xix). The tactic therefore destabilises from within 
as a minor movement, without necessarily imposing new order. 
It remains essentially per-formed. A tactic (such as an immanent 
critique) is always singular, forming in relation to the specific 
set of conditions within which it arises, and must be reinvented 
for each new set of events. Various tactics also fold into and 
complicate one other, so that the range and exact terrain of their 
productive operation can never be fully defined. In this regard, 
tactics must be reinvented through practice, avoiding the rigidity 
of sets of rules or manifestos, being co-composed with events 
in which they seek to intervene. In Chapter Two, the concept of 
the tactic is utilised to think the re-invigoration of interactive 
systems from within, through concepts of molecularisation 
and drift. In Chapter Four the parasite as a tactic is proposed 
as molecularising in its production of difference or movement 
(Guattari and Rolnik 2005, 311) within a dominant form of 
interactivity.
A ‘tactical’ approach is clearly in line with a process philosophical 
view of the world, centered on propositions, the gathering of 
forces and the immanent nature of events, rather than outcomes 
and closure. A methodology consistent with this impetus within 
a process-philosophy stream must also address a tactical use of 
process philosophy. That is, concepts must be reinvented and 
investigated for and within each singular occasion, not relied 
on as established truths. A concept itself always individuates 
with and within a field, and if it has a distinct ‘consistency’ that 
‘renders its components inseparable within itself ’, then this is 
at best a ‘fragmentary whole’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 19, 
16, emphasis in the original). Here, as Serres states, rather than 
assuming the possibility of a ‘universal method’, one should 
instead seek to compose ‘an appropriate method from the very 
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problem one has undertaken to resolve’ (Serres and Latour 
2011, 91). Within this style of inquiry the invention of knowledge 
is, as Simondon notes, ‘neither inductive or deductive, but 
transductive ’, corresponding to a discovery of the dimensions or 
field of inquiry in conjunction with the specific question (2009, 11, 
emphasis added).12
Thus a tactical approach avoids the use of models, but rather 
immanently and speculatively models the problem at hand. For 
Guattari models are problematic in that they are ‘reductions of 
a diagrammatic space made of intersections and disjunctions’ 
(Parisi 2013, 4). As Manning and Massumi argue, models are 
‘prescriptive templates’ that limit and control the discourse on 
actual events, which have potential beyond their iterations (2010, 
28). In a related discussion, Janell Watson outlines two essentially 
negative ways that modelling circumvents discourse. Firstly, she 
criticizes the way models encourage the tendency to analyze 
actual events only in relation to a perceived ‘norm’ rather than 
thinking outside the restrictions of such ‘dominant social order[s]’ 
(Watson 2008, 1). Secondly, by prescribing processes, models 
necessarily curtail possible outcomes – that is, they reduce the 
freedom of the virtual to a limited set of possible outcomes 
(Watson 2008, 2).
In this book I have a desire to open up space for multiple 
potential analyses, and Guattari’s concept of metamodelling, 
which bypasses ‘the imperative of representation’ (Parisi 2013, 
4), is thus proposed as a suitable methodology for creating a 
‘becoming’ model of inquiry. Metamodelling, Guattari states, 
is ‘to render palpable lines of formation, starting from no one 
model in particular, actively taking into account the plurality 
of models vying for fulfillment’ (cited in Manning and Massumi 
2010, 25).13 Metamodelling, as Guattari says, places the emphasis 
on the way ideas interact or have the potential to interact to 
produce new associations (1995a, 59). To establish a model for 
the analysis of interactive art risks the exclusion of elements 
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that do not fit, such as aesthetic qualities, an under-discussed 
area of much interactive art criticism. Fixed models might also 
imply the creation of a ‘check-list’ of necessary elements that 
an artwork must contain to be called interactive; the bracketing 
into stabilized categories of problems and solutions; and the 
uncritical promotion of potentially insidious social norms.
In contrast, the process of metamodelling abandons attempts 
at establishing set models, accepting potential in all possible 
models – providing, Guattari states, they ‘abandon all 
universalizing pretensions’ (cited in Watson 2008, 3). Rather 
than creating a ‘didactic program’, metamodelling involves a 
disentangling of oneself from systems of modelling that ‘pollute 
our ways of thinking’, creating instead a contingent critical 
‘bricolage’ of possible approaches to be utilised for the particular 
analysis at hand (Watson 2008, 3).
In this sense, metamodelling clearly experiments with a 
re-energising and reconnecting of existing elements (whether 
conceptual or physical). Metamodels are resolutely singular – 
that is, they allow the possibility of constructing a usable model 
for any given situation by ‘taking bits and pieces of other models 
in an attempt to solve a specific, singular problem’ (Watson 
2008, 8). This requires embracing increasing complexity and 
contingency. It demands a preparedness to act contingently 
and cobble together usable discourses as necessary, and it also 
requires one to allow this assemblage to perish after the event,14 
starting afresh each time. Thus, in relation to interactivity, this 
methodology enables the taking of any productive path of 
critique necessary to accommodate new input (and the jumping 
from path to path), rather than setting up fixed criteria for 
interactivity and either ignoring contradictory information, or 
dismissing artworks for not living up to established definitions. I 
want to suggest, as Manning and Massumi do, that this freedom 
to adapt and change direction – to critique immanently and 
speculate affirmatively – be viewed as a positive move, which 
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might ‘energize new models of activity…[and] offer a potential to 
escape or overspill readymade channelings into the dominant 
system’ (2010, 7).15
Metamodelling might be seen as being both speculative and 
pragmatic, in that it refuses methods or models imposed from 
without and instead encourages ‘a rigor of experimentation’ 
(Manning 2016b, 38). It might also be transversal, seeking to 
invent new associations and collective potentials. A particular 
methodology of use here is that of a ‘research-creation’ 
framework, which seeks to create resonating lines of inquiry 
through writing on concepts and artistic experimentation. At 
its best,16 research-creation might, as Manning writes, exhibit 
a ‘transversality’, proposing ‘new forms of knowledge, many of 
which are not intelligible within current understandings of what 
knowledge might look like’, therefore staging ‘an encounter 
for disparate practices, giving them a conduit for collective 
expression’ (2016b, 27). Research-creation is of particular 
interest here as the writing of this book (perhaps inevitably 
given my own practice as an artist working within participation 
and interactivity) has been centrally informed by this history of 
my continued practical wrestling with the problems of how to 
turn a general idea of a relational work into an actual work that 
engages with technologies and bodies in more expansive and 
ecological ways. At many points these struggles with various 
artworks threw up possibilities that shifted or troubled my 
theoretical ideas and which suggested new possibilities for 
philosophical enquiry. To give one simple example out of many, 
Chapter Nine, while always informed by reading and writing 
on the subject of generative algorithms, could not have been 
conceived of or written in its current propositional form without 
my deep engagement with the practical task of trying to write a 
software patch that in some way enacted the concepts proposed. 
The concepts at this early stage were ‘extra-linguistic’ (Manning 
2016b, 27), tenuously co-emergent with some confluence of 
code, software, hands, instinct, sounds, maths and the enabling 
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constraints of the sensors and shapes of the artwork as it began 
to take form. In parallel, and at many other times, reading 
and writing on the subject opened the beginnings of practical 
experiments. This is particularly true of the concept of the 
parasite, and my ongoing attempts within artworks to create 
parasitic (and therefore conjunctive and disjunctive) relations of 
connections between various components of such works.
In this way while the book is a ‘study’ of the problem of 
interactivity, it also seeks to work beyond being something to be 
studied, and instead to become ‘the occasion for study’ (Harney 
and Moten 2013, 109). This a transversal approach that is an 
ongoing, open and collective activity. This collectivity of study 
might be more than a collection of subjects, and rather might 
include collective, diverse activities of ‘thinking through’ such 
as parallel making and writing (research-creation), a continued 
problematisation and multiplicitous approach to the questions 
(a metamodelling), and the continued intensive movement of 
these questions (a tactical molecularisation). Here, in ‘the crafting 
of problems greater than their solutions’ (Manning 2016b, 10) 
this study seeks not to conclude to a single point, but rather to 
build ‘machines’ to explore the potentials of parasitic actions and 
feeling, and to push the limits of interactivity, attempting to allow 
such speculative thinking and immanent connection of ideas on 
the part of the reader as well as the author. This is a mode of 
study in which we might find, as we read, that we (collectively) 
have already been in the middle of. This study, as Harney and 
Moten argue, is a place where ‘the incessant and irreversible 
intellectuality of these activities is already present’, and where 
the recognition and participation in this multi-leveled approach 
might allow one ‘to access a whole, varied, alternative history of 
thought’ (2013, 110) about interactivity.
1
Interactivity and relation: 
The myth(s) of interactivity
‘Interactivity is a very dubious idea.’
Woody Vasulka
In this chapter I want to chart some of the criticism surrounding 
the term ‘interactivity’, and the move towards the concept of 
‘relational’ art. The intention of this critique is to move towards 
more of a productive engagement with the expanded potential 
of interactive art rather than to dwell on its past crimes. This 
problematic history has led many writers and artists to move 
away from the term interactivity and towards one of relationality 
to distinguish themselves from the narrow scope of these works.
One of the first difficulties we encounter in discussing 
interactivity might be that the term itself has no readily agreed 
upon definition. While some authors use it derogatively to 
condemn programmatic, simple to-and-fro exchanges of an 
object-orientated communicational model (Massumi 2002, 
xv)17, others use the same term to imply a much wider range 
of participatory experiences that might be broadly termed 
relational. In Towards an Aesthetic of the Interactive, Alan Peacock 
defines interactivity as ‘experiences that include a feedback loop 
and mutually (self-) modifying sequences and choices within 
the sequences that form a particular from many possibilities’ 
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(2010, 1). Simon Penny also argues for the necessity of feedback 
loops and demonstrably developmental aspects in design, 
stating that ‘the fundamental requirement of an interactive 
system is that it correlates in a meaningful way data gathered 
about its environment (usually a user’s behavior) with output’. 
Without this, he says, there is no perception of interaction (Penny 
2011, 80). These definitions, while somewhat limited compared 
to the more complex and subtle combinations of forces available 
for consideration within a relational model, do capture a 
popular idea of interactive art. Here interactivity is conceived 
of as modification over time of the work itself, and possibly 
the behavior of the participant, in a way that is perceptible and 
comprehensible to the participant.18
As Nathaniel Stern points out, these definitions of interactivity 
tend to concentrate on explanation of the fact that ‘a given 
piece is interactive and how it is interactive, but not on how we 
interact’ (2009, 240)19. That is, Brian Massumi says, there is a 
concentration on function, rather than quality, that limits the 
debate (cited in Lozano-Hemmer 2000, 201). This is tied to a 
focus on the representation of interactivity that fixes relation 
to preconceived models rather than allowing the immanent 
production of new ways of experiencing (Murphie 1996, 4–5).
Many writers and artists therefore prefer to move from the 
term interactivity to one of relationality to escape such narrow 
definitions. In this light Erin Manning proposes that the relational 
is ‘active with the tendencies of interaction, but not limited to 
them’ (2013, 29). Others have attempted a reconditioning of the 
term, and continue to use interactivity while implying a much 
wider range of qualitative potentials, believing, as Kelli Fuery 
states, that a prescriptive view ‘must be resisted, and it can be 
resisted…if we view interactivity as an unstable and uncertain 
process’ (2009, 45).20 Limited and functionally based discussions 
of interactivity do, however, still contain some pertinent critique, 
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even if in some cases they fail to grasp the potential of a wider 
reaching and more qualitatively based discussion.
Proponents of interactivity have promoted the existence of some 
qualitative – and indeed moral – judgment of difference between 
‘interactive’ and ‘non-interactive’ forms. Simone Osthoff argues, 
for example, that Lygia Clark’s work utilises the viewer’s own 
energy, synthesising mind and body to explore the sensorial, and 
thus replaces the object with the experience. This experience, 
Osthoff argues, essentially differentiates the interactive 
experience from the type of engagement that painting and 
sculpture allow (279–80). Perhaps here there is an implication of 
an essential moral superiority in interactive artwork, echoed by 
Victor Stoichita’s statement that in Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s work 
we ‘are no longer before the (interactive) work, we are in the 
work’ (Lozano-Hemmer 2007, 129). Similarly, both Pierre Levy’s 
assertion that interactivity ‘actualizes the decline of totalization’ 
(2001, 131), and Roy Ascott’s claim of ‘moving beyond the object’ 
from observed effect to participation, consider participatory art 
to be somehow in opposition to more ‘traditional’ forms that 
might distance one from the process (2003, 237, 328).
What then are our expectations of the functioning of interactive 
art? That it expands the range of art experiences available to 
the audience, offering levels of ‘free choice’ and embodied 
experience seemingly unavailable in more traditional art forms? 
That it will be participatory on some level unavailable in the 
supposedly more passive enjoyment of traditional forms; or that 
it will be experiential rather than representational?
The question of (free) choice is, as Alan Peacock argues, one on 
which the success and failure of interactivity commonly balances, 
stating that ‘decision making of some kind is a necessary 
condition of the interactive’ (2010, 3).21 But are there levels of 
experience in which there is really open-ended decision-making 
or ‘free will’ in generative or interactive art? Can interactivity 
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really offer more choice than, for example, a painting? Can 
it offer as many options to the viewer, either in the way they 
assimilate content or in the choices of level of involvement in 
the work? An exhibition of paintings might offer the viewer 
relatively free reign in their manner of experiencing the space: 
the choice to skim over some works, view them in any order, dip 
in and out of concentration and so on – all fairly banal choices 
that one would take for granted. Interactive works on the other 
hand, as Massumi cautions, often dictate prescribed and limited 
actions in order to achieve results, creating ‘a kind of tyranny to 
interaction’ (2008, 1, 3). Such interactive works can then enclose 
us, as Louise Poissant says, ‘into a schema of manipulation rather 
than propos[ing] a real space for dialogue’ (2007, 245)22. In these 
situations, Mona Sarkis argues, the participant in interactive art 
remains a passive ‘user’, assembling the artist’s vision without 
any real free choice (1993, 13). Thus she claims the interactive 
possibilities of technologies promoted by their producers are 
often ‘adopted in a careless and uncritical manner by…artists and 
philosophers’ (Sarkis 1993 13).
It should therefore not be taken for granted that participation 
in interactive art events necessarily grants freedom from the 
normative viewer–artwork paradigm. Rather, participation 
potentially co-opts art practice into the construction of 
mutable, exploitable bodies (Stern 2012, 26–7). As Manning 
pointedly states:
To be forced to play is like being forced to touch. Not 
only does it potentially do violence to the complex 
relational field in co-composition, it also presupposes 
an already homogenous arena of engagement 
(2013a, 129).
These contentious elements of interactivity and control might be 
broadly thought of as three problematic and overlapping ‘social-
assemblages’: productivity, linearity, and histories of control and 
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power embedded in the technologies. Behind these assemblages 
lies the issue of the naturalisation of a representationalist or 
essentialist modelling of experience.23 Critiques of these aspects 
of interactivity link it to bio-politics, consumable entertainment, 
demonstrability and its didactic applications. Here interactivity, 
in failing to escape such discourses might become the ‘dubious 
idea’ of Woody Vasulka’s comment.
Productivity and exchange
The productive structuring of interactive art experiences is 
situated within the history of the commercialisation of its 
aesthetics and technologies. While we might commonly think 
that artists repurpose commercial technologies into more artistic 
production, Penny argues that there is an historical dialogue 
between the two that is largely ignored. The ‘techno-formalist’ 
concerns (Penny 2009, 4) at the center of 1990s’ media art 
explorations laid much of the groundwork for gaming interfaces, 
for immersive training systems utilised by the militarily and 
commercial sectors (such as flight simulators), and for social 
media platforms on the internet (Penny 2009, 21). These non-
art world technical advances – combined with new media works 
themselves – were, according to Penny, ‘informed by the previous 
thirty years of “art and technology”, installation art, performance 
art and video art’ (2009, 11). He proposes that not only do artists 
recommission technologies of control, but that many of these 
more prescriptive and troubling applications have arisen, if 
inadvertently, out of artistic experiments in manipulation.24
The concentration on technical advance, alongside the necessary 
collaboration with companies and research laboratories invested 
in the commercial applications of such advances has lead, as 
Penny points out, to the adoption of a certain philosophical 
stance that has leant itself to the development of interactive 
systems based on the dynamics of consumerist exchange.25 
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These applications promoted certain Platonic ideas about the 
division of mind and body, naturalising ‘“objective external 
real”, “sense-data” and “representation”’, and the thinking of 
participants as ‘users’ or consumers (Penny 2009, 22). Here, 
Penny argues, the concentration on a distancing vision, produces 
a ‘scopophilic obsession with the eye and vision…[producing] 
a technology of the phallic gaze, the conquering eye, in which 
the holistic nature of embodied being [is] elided’ (Penny 2009, 
22). As such, certain power structures have become a largely 
unquestioned norm of interactivity: stable systems of objects 
and bodies exchanging via an interface; users responding to 
already-formed sets of information; systems that draw attention 
to their mechanics through reward for behavior; and a focus on 
representations and exchanges of content within predefined 
parameters rather than co-emergence (Manning 2009, 63). 
This might be a focus on ‘being – as a generalized ontological 
equivalent’ rather than ‘manner of being’ (Guattari 1995a, 109). 
Such a conception of interaction, Stengers argues, implies 
‘terms that make a difference for one another, but a difference 
that does not modify their identity’ (2011, 514),26 and thus, in 
this context, an interactivity that fails to challenge the roles of 
consumer and consumable object that might perhaps begin to be 
questioned by more open-ended relational works.27
Participatory works sometimes claim to escape this paradigm 
through a certain freedom from representational content28 – 
aiming for visceral experience over narrative, contemplation or 
reflection. While in one sense it is true that a painting’s content 
is constructed by the artist prior to the encounter with a viewer, 
even in the most didactic, narrative-driven image, there presents 
the possibility, one could argue an inevitability, for a freedom 
of association, for the viewer to link elements to memories. 
For example, a viewer might make personal and cultural 
associations, such as colours reminiscent of a flag, facial features 
associated with a friend, lighting effects that trigger memories 
of a half-forgotten film, muscle memory or a prehension of 
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movement made conscious through an association with a figure’s 
awkward pose. This association is not simply a reliving of old 
memories, but an actualisation of potential that creates new 
thought in the event of artwork and viewer, matter and memory. 
These subtle connections are exactly the kind of ‘interaction’ that 
fits with Manovich’s argument that the notion of interactivity 
must become inclusive of notions of psychological processes, 
and mental as well as physical or temporal connections 
(2001, 56–7).
Many artworks might therefore be read in this psychological 
sense as loosely ‘generative’ – not ‘mechanically’ as in some 
participatory works,29 but in that the event or experience still 
emerges from the combination of viewer and work that in its 
singularity inevitably begins to escape the confines of the artist’s 
control. Interactivity, however, can often struggle to allow such 
excessive layering and complicating of dialogues. Productive 
interaction is often lacking the multitude of potential connections 
and struggles to become excessive, to outstrip function and 
destabilise orderly systems of exchange.30
The ‘tyranny’ of interactivity is that it is based not just on 
required participation, but also on the reduction of such 
participation to the parameters of linear, programmatic and 
productive exchanges. The ‘connection’ promised through 
interactive participation can often remain at a level of relation 
that stays safely within systems of information exchange, 
harnessing participation into the circulation of flows of desire 
within capitalism (Massumi 1992, 200–1). Here the dynamics of 
interactivity can be seen to contribute to the construction of 
exploitable bodies within such a paradigm (Stern 2012, 26–7). 
There is a danger here that these problematic dynamics might 
work not only to construct the body as a kind of databank of 
new information to be fed into the workings of the system, but 
that as such systems become ‘naturalised’. That is, productive 
and limited exchange becomes the anticipated relationship with 
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a work to which participants then moderate their actions and 
expectations. As discussed below, this relationship becomes 
an internalised response to the environment and bodies are 
problematically performed as data or ‘immaterial labour’ to be 
exploited (Foucault 2010, 206–13).
It is perhaps then no wonder that interactive technologies 
form the basis of much entertainment industry spectacle, and 
interactive systems and displays sit so comfortably in didactic 
museum displays. Ironically, the very participation that in art is 
intended to free the viewer from constraints instead operates 
very effectively to contain, direct and lecture them.31 As Massumi 
argues, to utilise such technologies in a becoming and emergent 
fashion, they need to be freed from ‘exchange-value’, to move 
beyond ‘prodding a participant to gain a response’, and take 
on a more speculative nature that allows an excess to emerge 
(2008, 9)32. The artist involved in developing interactive systems 
might be charged here with an obligation to think beyond these 
co-optable dynamics of relation that so easily lend themselves 
to dominant power structures, and develop more complex 
ecologies of relation that begin to resist or at least question 
productivity and spectacle.
Linearity: riding the interactive train
Interaction can become trivial, as Roy Ascott suggests (2003, 
378), in a closed, linear system with finite data – a flicking of 
an ‘on’ switch with the viewer’s presence, or a prompting of a 
software program to jump to the next prearranged scene, as 
in a video game. Preprogrammed events here lack emergent 
qualities that might help shape the actualized events through 
the immanent creation of further potential (Manning 2009, 
74). The lack of physical or psychological tension created 
by such experiences is often in hollow contrast to everyday 
lived experience, as the excess of the virtual is replaced 
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by the probable, while open-endedness is replaced by 
specific purposes.
What space for contemplation does the interactive installation 
allow? Perhaps the curse of interactive art is that often the 
viewer must either abandon midway through boredom, endure 
to a set endpoint, or at least move through in a set direction. 
That is, the experience remains essentially linear, ‘prepackaged 
and predigested’, as de Mèredieu states (2003, 213)33. Levy 
argues that ‘cyber art’ systems of interactivity operate against 
the totalising forms of traditional media, allowing new and 
greater potentials for coproduction (2001, 115–6, passim). 
Similarly, Ascott claims that interactivity offers empowerment 
and greater participation in the workings of the art event (2003, 
284). Here the experience can be rather like the participation 
in riding a train: certainly we are bodily involved in the 
machinations of travel, but with limited entrance and exit points 
and heading inexorably in a prescribed direction. It is a kind of 
roller-coaster experience that contains a certain level of visceral 
thrill and manipulation without allowing any greater level of 
co-authorship of the experience (Poissant 2007, 245). The risk is 
that our movements loose their incipient qualities, and the many 
and varied levels of potential participation are instead reduced to 
a role of merely ‘performing the software’ (Manning 2009, 63).
Interactivity here becomes ‘Pavlovian’, as both Penny and 
Lozano-Hemmer have noted: a ‘trivial’ modality based on an 
action and reward system (Penny 2011, 78; Lozano-Hemmer, 
Boucher and Harrop 150).34 As de Mèredieu comments, the 
predetermined nature of such interactive systems ‘confines the 
spectator’s actions and reactions to a well mapped art path’, and 
the ubiquity of such forms as ‘an art trapped in prefabricated 
“networks” [running] the risk of being transformed into a kind 
of global, collective “art in kit form”’ (2003, 230–1). While some 
artists may argue that interactive works have moved beyond 
this paradigm,35 many would argue that this issue is still pressing 
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today as much work continues to focus on the performance of its 
mechanisms rather than an investigation of a ‘becoming’ of such 
mechanisms (Fuery 2009, 43–4)36.
While these issues with escaping linearity arise partially from the 
use of technologies created for specific, productive purposes, 
it would be wrong to simply attribute this, as Wood does, to 
any inherent or inescapable properties of such technologies 
(2007, 16). Rather, we might see this issue as arising more 
specifically out of the technologies being primarily harnessed 
to represent relation within the interactive encounter (in itself 
a ‘productive’ use). This tends to promote the demonstration of 
interaction over experiential emergence (Murphie 1996, 5) and 
to instrumentalise the user to represent the potentials of the 
technologies (Penny 2011, 73, 87).
This is not to say that the comprehension of relational factors 
in itself denies a rich involvement in immediate sensorial 
experience,37 but that the desire to clearly demonstrate to the 
participant that they are indeed interacting with and causing 
change or growth in the artwork can prevent the riskier task 
of enabling the performative exploration of emergent relation. 
Such relations may or may not reach a level of perceptible 
representation, and may indeed remain at the level of the 
virtual. In the sacrifice of the uncertainty of emergent relation 
for demonstrable connection, what is lost is the ‘elasticity’ of 
the larger potentiality of the event. Relations are then often 
made rigid and linear to ensure the pay-off of a quick and 
simple explicated exchange for the participant. This focus 
on demonstration imposes ‘self-completing lines through 
representations that trace existing conditions and attempt to 
repeat them’, as Andrew Murphie argues of representation 
and virtual reality (1996, 6),38 through its need, even anxiety, to 
facilitate the perception of an interactive experience. As artist 
David Rokeby notes, the
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‘Simplified representations [of interactivity] replace 
the relationships to which they initially referred. This 
substitution turns the interesting ambiguities of 
control and subjectivity in interactive art into serious 
issues of control, manipulation and deception’ (NDb).39
This serves to bring, once again, the modality of interactivity 
back to the language of gaming, where ‘unprescripted’ potential 
is replaced by variations of the possible (Massumi 2002, 9).40 
Exploration of ‘becoming’ in any larger sense, which is essentially 
non-linear, is replaced by the rehearsal of the already formulated 
and comprehended (Braidotti 2002, 118).
Histories and networks of control
It is certainly true, as Manning warns, that the sensory 
technologies at the base of many interactive works have 
‘problematic pasts, both as displacers of the corporeal body 
and in assemblages of control’ (2007, 118). As I have argued 
above, Penny presents a potentially even more troubling history 
where artists must share some of the burden for the ways their 
technological experiments have been put to use. Mark Dery 
optimistically advocates that the repurposing of such oppressive 
technologies within artworks is a potentially political act that 
displaces the power dynamics by making art with such tools 
of control (1996, 14). More pessimistically systems in which an 
artist employs these tools to control the interactions between 
bodies and artwork could be thought to mirror the political 
utilisation of surveillance by governments to create systems of 
control. Therefore in such systems the work could still be said to 
celebrate the power of the technology.41 Indeed, Penny argues, 
while these technologies are deployed in novel ways, they 
retain many of their original functions, including the potential 
for control inherent in the representation of relation (whether 
body–technology, body–body, or body–subject) (2003, 268)42. 
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Such representational modes of production can be linked to 
the reinforcement of the status quo – static systems of discrete 
subjects incapable of escaping a pre-constructed mode of being.
There is no doubt that these technologies have at least 
the potential to reproduce such power relations, and it is 
disingenuous for artists to simply assume that art can avoid such 
pitfalls without a close examination of whether there has been 
a true shift in the dynamics.43 However any argument that such 
technologies necessarily have only the capability to produce 
these power relationships seems flawed. Despite the undoubted 
links between surveillance and interactivity, this would tend 
toward a ‘technological determinism’, as Murphie and Potts 
argue, framing understanding of technologies as objects capable 
of independently creating certain relations of power within 
society, rather than considering them for their functions within 
certain contexts (2003, 13, 32).
Whether inherent or not, surveillance might be thought to 
‘capture’ the body, both in the flattening of the experience of 
a body to a fixed identity or subjectivity, and the fixing of it 
within a readable space.44 The reduction of the potential of a 
body in some virtual reality (VR) immersions to a representation 
divorced from the complexity of embodied sensory immersion 
in the world leads, Dery argues, to a ‘static body’ locked into 
‘observation mode’ (1996 234–5). This is, Penny states, a ‘thinning 
out’ experience in an action of ‘standardization, reductivism, 
efficiency [and] instrumentality’ (2013, 7–8). Although these 
critiques are both specifically aimed at virtual reality, while 
interactive art events utilise the same structures to fix or 
interpret bodies,45 they will remain subject to the danger of 
falling into similar power relationships, despite their claims 
to a greater level of embodied participation than other forms 
of art. Such representational use of bodies denies their ever-
individuating nature, and can contribute to disengagement with 
the corporeal – the separation of images from body that is part of 
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the operation of surveillance.46 These are not inherent properties 
of the components of the art assemblage, but arise because the 
components combine to produce similar problematic network-
control paradigms. It is through the performance and repetition 
of these ‘specific bodily acts that bodies are reworked and that 
power takes hold of the body’ (Barad 2007, 63).
Matteo Pasquinelli’s analysis delves further into the problematic 
and essentially neoliberal aspects of network culture and the 
digital. He interrogates the ‘post-Fordist’ move to immaterial 
labour and charts ways in which, far from escaping capitalist 
systems of exchange, creative commons and immaterial 
property always have material property implications that 
both remain exploitative of labour and absorb innovative and 
‘revolutionary tendencies’ (2008, 87–9, 23–4).47 Pasquinelli argues 
that far from freeing bodies, the rise of the digital has lead to 
a new sphere of exploitation as digital machines parasitize 
the labour of living bodies: a new dynamic model of ‘cognitive 
capitalism’ applicable across dimensions or modes (2008, 97).48 
What happens, we might wish to ask here, when an interactive 
work demands the labour of the viewer for its operations? How 
might the enthusiastic turn in major art events and galleries 
towards relational aesthetics be at the very least inadvertently 
creating exploitative relations that, rather than questioning 
power, work to enhance its operations on highly personal levels, 
both physically and cognitively. Are there other ways in which a 
participant might be engaged that do not reinforce existing (or 
indeed invent new) methods of inequality?
Certainly as a beginning point, where any technologies of 
control (including capitalist exchanges) are concerned, we need 
to interrogate, interrupt or shift the kinds of power dynamics 
that are enacted and the networks that are constructed. Within 
this we need to question the ways that such technologies 
encourage the replacement of embodied experience with 
representational models, and the imposition of normative 
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subject–object relations. Here it is not enough to simply claim 
that the end product differs from the original design aims of 
those technologies. More detailed and critical examination, 
particularly of the larger structures and systems within which 
such technologies are operating, is required.
It is important that artists investigate ways to escape the 
mechanics of the production of exchange, subjectivity and 
networks of control, in order to allow a rethinking not just of the 
component parts or productions of these machines, but also 
of the ways in which these parts form problematic relations. 
This is an interactivity that moves beyond the performance of 
a mechanism, as Fuery suggests, becoming itself immanently 
interactive as a technique for the processes of individuation 
(2009 43–4).49 As Deleuze notes, it is never enough to trace a line 
away from something, but rather lines of flight need to continue 
to be generated for the work to remain performative (Deleuze 
and Parnet 1987, 29).
Art as event: a relational model
The arguments above begin to suggest some of the problematic 
ethics of interactivity that are present not just in individual 
explorations of the genre, but whenever the underlying 
structuring of the production of the experience is unquestioned. 
Rather than dwell on these points at length or critique individual 
works, the purpose here is to propose potential tactics for 
the thinking beyond those kinds of relations identified in the 
previous section. Here, more than a critique of specific iterations 
of the modality, I would suggest that the issues raised are the 
inevitable outcome of an essentialist system of interactions, 
which attempts to stratify the reality of co-emergent change 
(Massumi 2002, 207).
Thus it is not enough to simply demand more from the 
interactive artist and critic: more complexity, more imagination, 
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more inventive solutions, citing that it is a relatively ‘young’ art 
form and arguing for its inherent qualities. More imaginative 
creativity will always have its place, but the issue underlying 
the limitation of interactive artworks lies primarily, I would 
argue, in a philosophically limited conception of an object, a 
subject, and a work of art. It is this thinking that underlies the 
narrowness of both the invention and critique of interactive art 
– a narrowness in the selection of evidence as Whitehead might 
argue, which, in its attempts to reduce the field of discussion to a 
manageable stability, succeeds only in denying the actual nature 
of the event.50
What happens to interactivity when rethought through the 
prism of a process philosophy? As Barad states, a ‘dynamic 
conception of matter is an unsettling of nature’s presumed fixity 
and hence an opening up of the possibilities for change’ (2007, 
63). If we encourage an ecological approach that emphasises 
co-emergence and inter-dependence, could we rediscover a 
fluidity and layered inventiveness and begin to both think and 
construct interactive art differently?
From material to organic thinking
Massumi argues that interactivity describes a simple back and 
forth between two elements that remain discrete (in Lozano-
Hemmer 2005, 201),51 reflecting a material view of the world in 
which the viewer is a stable subject and the artwork is a stable 
object. Seen through process philosophy, however, the scenario 
is very different as these stable and persistent subjects and 
objects are replaced by entities that are themselves processes 
(Whitehead 1978, 41, 309).52 For Whitehead these actualised 
entities are atomic. That is, they do not change in themselves; 
rather they exist only in the instance of their becoming, perishing 
in actualisation to be replaced by new actualisations, an endless 
advance towards intensity and invention. Viewed in this way, 
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‘objects’ are ‘cuts’ in processes of concrescence of complex 
events of relation, while ‘subjects’ (or ‘superjects’ in Whitehead’s 
preferred term) arise out of experience, rather than interacting 
with the world in a transcendent manner (Whitehead 1978, 155).
This can be related to Simondon’s concept of individuation – 
an ongoing process of development of an entity that always 
‘contains latent potentials’. Individualisation is here thought 
of as a ‘cut’ in this ongoing process (Simondon 1992, 300). 
Individuation is not, however, a single process of development, 
but rather ‘overlapping phasings happening in non-linear 
time’. A ‘dephasing’ or cut occurs when events ‘tune toward…a 
discrete iteration, a remarkable point’ that is a ‘shift in level from 
individuation to individual’ (Manning 2013a, 17–18).
Such concepts can begin to challenge how we think of, make 
and experience interactive art. They imply the need to view 
art objects, events and subjects as produced through, and as 
a result of, the complex play of forces. This does not deny that 
objects, bodies and subjects exist prior to the art event, but that 
further potential can be activated through the event relational 
engagement. Here relationality immerses entities in a field that 
might be quite distinct from the back and forth conversational 
model of the interactive paradigm (Manning 2013a, 130). The 
processual is crucial in this expansion of interactivity, in that 
it opens the forming relations and the entities they initiate to 
a multiplicity of becoming that necessarily outstrips any unity 
of subjectivity.53 It brings into play the ongoing, overlapping 
individuations – states of constant generation rather than 
progression to one particular endpoint. These processes of 
individuation are, as Massumi says, forward looking and rich with 
potential (cited in Manning 2013a, xi).
Manning poses a question about life in general that applies 
here to participatory art: ‘what if, instead of placing self–self 
interaction at the centre of development, we were to posit 
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relation as the key to experience?’ (2013a, 2). As in life in general, 
the artwork here is the encounter: art as an event of relations. 
This notion of relationality, as Massumi says, addresses objects 
and bodies from the point of view of their ability to change and 
respond – ‘a coming together in a fusional event…a telescoping 
into a potential becoming’ (in Lozano-Hemmer 2005, 4).
The relational is an immediate ‘emergent process’, where 
something new occurs out of the relations (Manning and 
Massumi 2011, 8; Couze 2010, 139). Thus when Lozano-Hemmer 
insists that his work is not interactive but ‘relational’ he means 
that the focus is not on the fixed or mechanical elements of 
interaction, but on the potential for establishing relations that 
always have an immanent, virtual quality to them (Gorschluter 
2009, 103).54 This approach allows him ‘to think of the computer 
and technology as potential language with which you can make 
relationships emerge, as opposed to preconceiving the outcome’ 
(Lozano-Hemmer, Boucher and Harrop 2012, 152).
A number of artists have attempted to move beyond the 
potentially limiting paradigm of interactivity by adopting a 
relational approach. As noted in the introduction, there is a 
‘prehistory’ to the discussion of a relational model, notably 
in philosophical writings and texts produced by artists Roy 
Ascott and Lygia Clark, and scientist-artist Gordon Pask that 
emerged in the earliest days of discussion on ‘interactivity’.55 
As Ascott states: ‘now that we see that the world is all about 
process, constant change, we are less surprised to discover 
that our art is all about process too’ (2003, 157). His concept of 
‘telematic art’ (Ascott 2003, 231) proposes a move away from the 
object to the examination of process – an art that explores an 
‘interconnectedness’ of interweaving fields and forces, able to 
evolve in an unpredicted, heterogeneous manner – an art that is 
a state of ‘perpetual play’ (158–9, 11).
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Gordon Pask’s work, according to Usman Haque, shows an 
interest in unspecified goals that moves it beyond the realm of 
much contemporary interactive art (2007, 58)56. Haque argues 
that Pask’s artworks and his elaborate ‘conversation model’ of 
interaction demonstrate an interest in an active, shared field 
and ‘mutually constructive’ relationships (2007, 55).57 In his own 
dense and complex writing Pask emphasises the importance 
of creating work where both technical systems and human 
participants might cooperatively adjust their relational capacities 
in an emergent ecology (1961b, 230–4; 1961a, 102).58
Clark’s writing provides a more lucid understanding of the scope 
of a process-based view of the world, and the relational potential 
of an art practice. Clark writes of her work as non-object based 
– ‘an experience that does not leave a trace’ but is an act that 
‘contains…its own becoming’ (cited in Suchan 2008, 6).59 She 
writes of dissolution of the space between subject and object, a 
‘vibrating body’ affected by worldly forces (cited in Martin, Ruiz 
and Rolnik 2000, 73, 104), and ‘relational objects’ designed to 
instigate affectual connections that might ‘launch the spectator 
into unforeseeable becomings’ (Clark cited in Suchan 2008, 
12, 10). Here Clark calls for art to evolve beyond ‘the simple 
manipulation and participation of the spectator’ and for it to 
engage in ‘the process of bringing the participant’s freedom of 
action to light’ (Clark cited in Suchan 2008, 12, 10).
A relational approach is explicitly adopted, at least theoretically,60 
by a number of more contemporary artists. In the field of 
architecture Greg Lynn could be cited, particularly his calls for 
a practice based on theories of complexity that engage with 
multiplicities to escape both identity and contradiction (1998, 
161). One might also cite the more far-reaching explorations of 
emergent body-space by Arakawa and Gins discussed later in this 
book,61 and Penny writes as a new media artist about the shift 
towards an enactive, performative approach to participation 
(2011, 83). This ‘performative ontology’ Penny says, expands 
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interactivity towards that of ‘machine ecology’ (2011, 94–5, 
100). Similarly, Nathaniel Stern describes the body and world 
as ‘implicit in one another’, a ‘per-formed’ rather than ‘pre-
formed’ relationship – a body which is emergent ‘through its 
active relations to other matter-and-matters in progress’ (2011, 
233; 2012, 34). As such, for Stern the creation of relation is 
‘continuous; it is embodiment’s…always ongoing formation’, and 
he compares this to the ‘more finite’ possibilities of interactivity 
that are responsive but restrictive (2012, 8). Likewise, Rokeby 
argues for a complex interactivity that resonates between 
participant and artwork (cited in Penny 2011, 84).
Participation, Manning states in summing up ‘relational’ art, 
differs from the programmatically interactive in its tending 
towards the virtual and gathering of forces from the field. 
Manning writes that it is not about ‘the plan of the movement 
or the partitioning of the individual bodies in space. It is the 
relational force that persists from the collective movement’s 
incipient cueings and alignings, the incipient priming gathered as 
a force field not of the bodies per se, but of the active intervals 
their relational movement creates, intervals that in turn propose 
multiplicities in the moving’ (2013b 342).
While it is not the purpose of this discussion to provide such a 
critique, these concepts of the relational in art should be noted 
as easily distinguishable from the ‘relational’ as conceived 
in ‘relational aesthetics’, which, as Stern remarks, considers 
and limits itself only to relations between already constituted 
subjects (2012, 48). The embodied relational approach referred 
to here, while it still considers the social as a force contributing 
to the individuations of the body and subject, must also consider 
a much broader spectrum of relational possibilities. Similarly, 
an embodied model of relation is in marked contrast to artists 
such as Stelarc, for instance, who invests in the transcendence 
of the body through the bio-technological melding. Stelarc, 
Dery argues, upholds a Cartesian distinction between body and 
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mind, reducing bodies to the position of machinic commodity 
and making them the ideal subject for power (1996, 232, 
164, 154–235).62
A relational model(ing)
The operational politics of the relational are, on the other hand, 
improvisational, fluid and emergent, as Manning states (2009, 
41),63 a ‘becoming’ connectivity that moves with and is attentive 
to the force of the field with which one co-emerges (2013a, 212–
3). The event of the connections and their co-emergence with 
bodies is co-causal.64 This describes the way relations develop 
between the body and the work as a ‘mutual incipiency’ that is a 
process of change and response (Massumi in Lozano-Hemmer 
2005, 201). This may be considered as self-evident information, 
for if, as process philosophy proposes, all things are events 
of relation, are not all artworks thus composed, regardless 
of the artist’s intentions? The way many interactive works 
operate, however, is to attempt to stabilise such unfoldings, 
erase the connections to the virtual – the future potential for 
‘immergence’65 – and establish enduring actualised connections 
and representations of connections.
The shift in emphasis to the relational concerns affording an 
emergent or potential event that may occur or is occurring. A 
work might still be thought of as existing beforehand, as an 
object or proposition for an event, but it exists as an event only 
in a temporal relationship – or rather as a nexus of relationships 
– with the viewer, enfolded and unfolded through interaction, 
and each nexus of relations creates a singular event.
As a ‘proposition’ the potential event of art-objects/spaces 
and bodies can move beyond obstacles that ‘delimit the event 
according to pre-constituted interiorities’ to act instead as 
‘propositions for an ecology of participation’ (Manning 2013a, 
114, 185). Embodied enaction of an event is always directed 
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towards the ‘next’ – further potential differentiations – the 
continuing evolution of the event (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
1992, 205), and therefore open always to the pull of the virtual. 
Such events create body-artwork assemblages – contingent 
networks of interconnections with multiple, unplanned, 
potentially contradictory variables of relation.66
The participant’s concentration shifts to the buildup of energy 
and rhythm between and within body and work; how the event 
moves beyond a mapping of simple cause and effect and into 
something that enables its own generative tendencies (Massumi 
2008, 13). Such complex multiple actions and potential relations 
might catalyse a singular experience, moving beyond what 
can be articulated. Thus what is felt or perceived here in the 
moment might be intensities of pure sensation, a building of 
energies expressed through ever reconfiguring combinations 
of movement, sound, image, posture, and so on – while also 
including potentially contradictory affectual relations that push 
and pull at the body.
A relational art event might begin to concentrate on enabling 
the conditions for new connections to arise, a richer palette 
that might include slippery, hard to define, conjunctive and 
disjunctive forces: affects, inarticulate sensations, micro-
perceptions, and emotional tonalities. Such fuzzy and 
inarticulate forces, which can never be fully compressed into 
productive perception, might move the work further away 
from any prescribed outcomes, outstripping functionality as an 
inarticulate remainder affecting the body beyond cognition. This 
philosophical stance of relationality, O’Sullivan states, points 
(perhaps optimistically) away from ‘consumption’ and towards an 
‘art practice as a process…always producing’ (2006, 24).
Interactivity and relation 51
Bridge: Into the midst: immersion immersive
While in theory it is easy to agree on a general shift to relational 
modelling, it remains problematic for the practising artist 
engaged with an interactive or ‘relational’ art to structure 
fluidity and maximise open-ended potentiality in more 
practical terms. This is particularly true when working with 
interactive technologies designed with other outcomes in 
mind. An example of some of the practical issues involved in 
attempting this shift to the relational can be seen in Into the 
Midst, a five-day, collaborative research-creation workshop and 
public presentation in the SATosphere – the Society for Art and 
Technology’s interactive and immersive projection dome in 
Montreal, Canada.67
The project sought to explore alternative potentials of a space 
constructed with seemingly rigid divisions between the artists’ 
technical and spatial control of events and the viewers’ lack of 
control of the space.68 Key to the usual operation of the dome 
was that the scale of the space and the configuration of the 
seating constrained its use to an undoubtedly spectacular, but 
somewhat passive, viewing space. The design encouraged all 
viewers to recline while focusing their attention on relating to 
the surround sound and giant images that wrapped around and 
cocooned them.
The Into the Midst artists hoped to activate more varied 
experiences within the space, with general tactics including 
encouraging attention to the edges of the space, the projection 
of images and sounds that disrupted the smooth illusion of 
immersion, and creating opportunities for participants to directly 
relate to one another beyond simply sharing the viewing of 
the projections.69 Thus the series of interventions that were 
employed within the space were designed to disrupt the habitual 
configurations of relation between audience members, artists 
and audience, and the audience and the spatial dynamics of 
the dome. In these aims the artists in the project sought not to 
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simply ignore or diffuse the various technical mechanisms built 
into the space to provide spectacle, but to reuse them in a more 
speculative and unconventional manner (see Figure 1.1).
However despite the concerted efforts to extend the potential 
of the dome’s mechanisms in its public presentation, the 
normative paradigm of the dome as a space for relatively passive 
consumption of immersive imagery continued to overwhelm the 
efforts of the artists. The event too easily became an extension 
to, rather than an interruption of, the ‘entertainment’ space and 
habits that such places tend to encourage.
The lure of the projected imagery continued to centralise the 
viewers’ focus. The design of the space seemed to suggest 
that it primarily concerned itself with a relationship between a 
relatively passive subject and events predicated on ‘out of body’ 
experiences (such as spectacles of virtual travel reminiscent of 
nineteenth-century panoramas), rather than with any embodied 
potential that might be exploited within such a large area. The 
(deliberately) ephemeral interventions failed to sufficiently 
Figure 1.1 Senselab collaborative project, Into the Midst: Immersion Immersive 
(performance documentation), Society for Art and Technology, Montreal, 2012. 
Photo: Hannah Buck
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disrupt these dynamics to allow new configurations to arise 
and disturb the stratification. The lack of differentiation in the 
layout and clear divide between projection space and viewing 
space were all elements that contributed towards this rigid 
structuring.70
My own participation in this project crystallised some of the 
key issues around the difficulties in moving the interactive 
experience beyond habitual divisions of artwork and subject, 
and in enabling relations to operate outside the (again habitual) 
paradigm of the passive consummation of the demonstration of 
the spectacular.
It proved extremely difficult to utilise the technologies built into 
the space without creating a work that ended up principally 
demonstrating the undoubtedly impressive capacities of the 
technology. Potentially disruptive transversal relations that 
might have interrupted the centralised focus were too easily 
overwhelmed by the force of attraction of the overhead light 
show and the 36-speaker surround-sound system, and those 
viewers who attended the public showing found themselves, for 
the most part, adopting this passive position within the space, 
despite the various activities designed to disrupt this action. Even 
the artists involved found it difficult to not succumb to the lure 
of the projected spectacle above, despite our shared interest in 
moving beyond this experience.
Technologies of interaction demonstrated in this project that 
they have the potential to control and limit relation when not 
carefully constructed to operate otherwise, and that habits of 
operating within a known paradigm can be hard to shift, even 
for those with such intent. Here it became evident that the 
construction of relation in and of itself can still easily conform 
to dominant and perhaps constrictive paradigms, and that 
any ethical platform of emergent relation must find new ways 
to interrupt the habitual means of engagement. Participants’ 
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bodies similarly needed to be addressed in individual ways, 
and encouraged to engage on multiple levels, rather than as a 
generalised ideal. The kind of dominant relation between fully-
formed subject and work that the SAT’s dome space assumes 
as primary also needs to be put into question by relations that 
allow movement of differing kinds and scales of connection and 
disconnection to emerge.
For me, this project highlighted that, as Penny notes, there is, 
at times for all of us, a considerable gap between the theory 
and practice and between broad intention and outcomes 
(2011, 72).71 While the relational model previously outlined is 
the one pursued within this research, much of this theory on 
broader philosophical level only begins, at best, to address the 
more practical concerns of how to enact such systems within 
a participatory framework. How to structure a work to allow 
for multiple, surprising outcomes, and how to create organic 
movement – the complex flow of prehension, synthesis and 
perishing, pursued endlessly by further such creation – remains 
a question. These issues are at the heart of this research, and the 
next chapter begins to address these more forward-looking and 
practical concerns in detail: considering the question of ‘how to’ 
think beyond interactivity and constructing some of the potential 
tools that might be required to realise such an aim.
Here chaos in itself does not seem to be an answer, and nor is 
mimicry of the everyday. Rather, it is that particular ‘thickness 
of experience’ – the surprise of unusual connection and 
revelation that the art event can offer – which needs to be 
retained without losing the kind of underlying complexity and 
entanglement gained from everyday experiential involvement in 
the environment.
2
Thinking action and event
Introduction
The creation of a chaosmos is what interactive art 
and art with new technologies should head towards, 
as only then can outcomes be protected from chaos 
without turning interaction into a choice of alternative 
stratified options.
Andrew Murphie
A reimagining of interactivity along relational lines introduces 
the possibility of a ‘minor’ interactivity. This involves a continued 
activation or problematisation of the major form, in order to 
avoid a return to any oppressive stasis. Here the concept of the 
assemblage and the notion of art as an event and as a machine 
are introduced to enable a closer investigation of something 
at the heart of this research: the creative power of noise or 
interference in relation and its role in increasing the self-
organising capacities of the interactive event.
This rethinking must also involve more practical tools that allow 
an interrogation of singular instances of relation. It must be 
remembered that ‘relation’ in itself is not an answer, since, as I 
have argued, much interactive work is relationally oppressive in 
working to fix and contain relational difference and generation 
along programmatic lines. As Claire Bishop points out in her 
critique of current trends in socially relational art, relational 
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works are quite capable of enforcing the status quo through 
blind promotion of social inclusiveness in the works while ‘the 
structural inequalities of society remain uninterrogated’ (2009, 
241). It is important therefore to think of relational propositions 
that might allow a certain freedom to reinvent or mobilise 
existing relation – to produce potential movement.
Minor interactions
As Simon O’Sullivan argues, ‘minor’ and ‘major’ are not polar 
opposites. Rather, the minor can be thought of as a reactivation 
of the components of a system from within (2006, 71), allowing 
the system to become something other than its major or 
established form. The ‘becoming-minor’, for Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, is therefore a tactic with which to pervert or 
trouble the structure of an oppressive system in order to explore 
ways to allow the oppressed qualities of the major to oppose its 
oppressive qualities (1986, 10)72. The minor, as O’Sullivan says, 
breaks with the habitual formations, and challenges dominant 
regimes of the form to allow further movement or open change 
in the system (2006, 69). In this sense, ‘becoming’ is always 
minoritorian, as Erin Manning states (2015, 3), in that it is about 
the activation, movement or further individuation beyond a 
stable form.
Using the concept of the minor suggests a thinking of the 
relational potential of interactivity that, rather than being 
oppositional or reactive to the critiqued dominant paradigm, 
seeks to explore the further potential of the components of 
the systems, utilizing the same elements but with a different 
structural logic. That is, if the major or normative form of 
interactive artworks tends towards control and signification 
of subjects and objects, subordinating the wider relational 
potential, then the becoming-minor of interactivity might be a 
turn towards the relational that encourages these controlled 
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forces or qualities to flourish. Here the expressive, expansive 
pull of relations might be utilised to problematise the major 
structure.73
This might re-energise interactivity’s potential, giving rise to an 
uncertainty within what was fixed in order (Murphie 1997, 68), 
and allowing new productive capacities to be explored. It is not 
about the production of a new stabilised ‘form’ of interactivity 
but the production of the conditions that enable continued 
agitation of the elements (an ‘expressive machine’) (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1986, 28). Thus the minor here does not designate 
specific productive outcomes, but rather the ‘revolutionary 
conditions’ in which continued exploration might be produced. 
It is, as Massumi states, directional in that it moves away from 
stasis, but not ‘directed-to’ any particular endpoint (1992, 103, 
18). Potentially, this disturbs any stabilisation and instead 
emphasises the productive nature of disorganisation itself. It 
allows for consideration of the particulars of an event, and the 
relations and entities co-composed with it, rather than following 
any established path (Murphie 1997, 72–3). In this, it has specific 
disruptive implications for fixed or linear interactivity. The move 
to the relational here is a tactic with which to reactivate and 
charge (interactive) structures with new potential.74
Molecularisation and the assemblage
The concept of molecularisation is closely linked to the minor, as 
an opening up of stratified relation. The ‘becoming-molecular’ 
of a system is the decentering of a formally stabilised whole 
into parts. This both decentres the system and allows new 
communications or exchange between components (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1986, 50, 41): a hyper-differentiation that encourages 
new potentials, intensities and complexities to arise.75 In a 
‘molar’ configuration, as Brian Massumi says, a set of entities 
are molded to a prescribed set of connections, becoming a 
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‘disciplined’ or ‘dominated’ group of individuals that have a fixed 
identity imposed upon them. As Massumi notes, the molecular 
still exists within this molar regime, but it is controlled and 
free relational movement is contained (1992, 55). A molecular 
configuration of the same entities allows local activations: 
transient and improvised connections to take place (and perish).76 
Thus, becoming-minor is also always becoming-molecular 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 272), an increase in movement or 
intensity within a stratified system.
Within the paradigm of interactive art, the ‘molar’ perspective 
might be seen, firstly, as the discrete body of the viewer taken 
as a whole, and the artwork similarly viewed as one idea or 
fixed assemblage of components. Secondly, it might be the fixed 
relations between work and viewer that prescribe the types of 
relations and outcomes possible between them. Thirdly, the 
molar position might also prescribe the event overall according 
to a preconceived notion of interactivity. A molecular approach 
to the same art event would open up the potential of new 
ways of relating inside these ‘wholes’, filling the systems with 
fluctuations, uncertainties and tentativeness that are its opening 
up to new singular expressions (Guattari and Rolnik 2005, 162).77 
Here the site(s) of interaction might become mobile and multiple, 
delimiting the resultant events of interaction. Pragmatically, any 
such artwork will be composed of both molar and molecular 
components or tendencies, and the aim might be to encourage 
an increase in potential for internal movement and change.78
In this sense, as Deleuze and Guattari state, molecularisation 
tends towards the creation of ‘machinic’ assemblages (1986, 37) – 
collections of entities functioning immanently and pragmatically, 
rather than being ‘subordinate to the laws of resemblance’ 
(Massumi 1992, 192). Assemblages do not create fixed bonds 
between components; rather the entities are linked through 
shared collective potentials (Guattari 1995a, 35). An assemblage 
is ‘ad-hoc’ in that it is composed of available material, and it is 
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dynamic – as all its relations remain active – a ‘volatile mix’ of 
forces, part and materials (Bennett 2010, 24–5). Assemblages 
maintain the individual qualities of components and the 
differences between them – rather than repressing these for 
the sake of the whole – while at the same time collectively 
and potentially producing or becoming something else. The 
assemblage is an organisation of relations, though not reducible 
to this, and is also multiplicitous: it has an internal dynamism that 
always keeps its relational fields open to potential recombination 
(Buchanan 120, 129). In this one might say, as Bennett does, that 
the individual components and the assemblage together exhibit 
‘agency’ (2005, 31–2), and components are ‘molecularised’ in an 
assemblage in that they are able to individually modulate their 
relations while maintaining collective coherence.
Importantly for this argument, assemblages are able to 
operate without resolving or erasing internal tensions. In fact, 
such internal differences might be seen to drive both creative 
organisation and production of the assemblage. These tensions 
saturate the assemblage with intensive potential for derivation 
from any realised or emergent form, as they relate ‘difference 
to difference’ and maintain an adaptive potential: ‘a capacity to 
further differentiate differences’ (DeLanda 2005, 23–4).
Here relation can be considered to exist not only between stable 
objects and subjects, but also within and across such idealised 
forms, initiating and potentialising them. Now the room for 
continued movement within the seemingly continuous whole 
begins to become apparent – the infinite gaps and discontinuities 
that can be activated to drive change within the event.
Within an art-event-as-assemblage, such internal modulation 
provides an open-endedness that enriches, rather than 
destroys, the now mobile whole. What also becomes apparent 
is that the privileging of viewer-work relations is no longer 
necessary. Instead, any discussion of relation can – indeed 
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must – consider all relations as being equally open to change. 
This includes relations between various body organs, between 
these organs and technical entities, and between and within 
technical entities themselves. This decentering of the human 
in favour of a wider approach to relation is essential in order to 
more fully consider the forming of the larger ecology of the art 
event. It acknowledges the dynamic role that all the elements 
bring to bear on the playing-out of relational forces across the 
various scales and assemblages in which the interactive event 
is activated.
Differential machines
Guattari’s concept of the machine provides a useful way of 
conceiving of an artwork or event as a productive assemblage. 
From this basis the mechanics of self-organisation might be 
examined. Machines, Guattari tells us, are any system that 
produces an effect.79 There are, for example, social, logical, 
biological and linguistic machines, and machines that are 
combinations of these systems, such as cities (Guattari, 
1995b, 9).80 There are also machines that are conglomerates of 
technical objects and, as Murphie describes, machines that are 
assemblages of technical objects-plus-bodies such as the ‘car-
driver’ machine that produces travel (1996, 89). The ‘machinic’ 
is therefore not the mechanical (a fixed technical system), nor 
is it specifically linked to the technical (non-organic), but is a 
productive assemblage, another configuration of the non-
unified subject (Braidotti 2002, 254). Its cohesion (such as it is) 
is achieved through a shared potential (Maturana and Varela 
1980, 77). Like assemblages, machines can be broken down into 
smaller machines, or sets of components held together through 
some kind of productive relation (Murphie 1997, 265).81 Machines 
act molecularly in resisting the collapse back into any irreducible 
whole, or series of wholes, through their continued potential 
activation of relation. A machinic connection or relation might 
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therefore be one that is pragmatic, flexible and local, always with 
further potential iteration or expression available to it.
This thinking gives us three very useful ideas that help to expand 
any technologically based concept of the machine in a decidedly 
non-humanist direction.
Firstly, the need to understand the role that the wider ecology in 
which technical objects are embedded in (or unfold from) has in 
determining what potential is actualised. Technology, as Andrew 
Murphie explains, is always only one aspect of a larger notion of 
the machinic, requiring a larger physical/social field within which 
to operate (1997, 80).82
Secondly, as Guattari describes, technical machines inherently 
contain potential beyond their immediate actualization – 
‘ontogenetic elements’ (1995b, 8). Thus they are held together 
not so much by any physical bond, but by a shared potential, an 
‘assemblage of possible fields’ (1993, 35)83 that develops through 
the process of ‘concretisation’ or interdependence.
Thirdly, that we must consider machines not through utility or 
representation, but in terms of their productive capabilities. 
Guattari’s conception of the machinic shifts the discussion of 
the assemblage from: ‘what is it composed from/what is it an 
aggregate of?’ to ‘what does it produce?’.84 That is, machines 
are performative, concerned with ‘matters of practices, doings 
and actions’ (Barad 2007, 135). Within a machinic assemblage, 
Manuel DeLanda explains, components explore their capacities 
to connect with other component, their abilities to affect and 
be affected, which is separate (if related) to their ‘intrinsic 
properties’.85 Such machines are necessarily multiplicities, with 
‘no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system’ (Deleuze 
1994, 182), preserving internal differences between components. 
Their potential lies in a productive ‘opening out to heterogeneity 
and alterity’ (Murphie 1996, 92).
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An interactive art assemblage might be usefully viewed as 
machinic. This places the focus on how the work as a machinic 
whole is composed of various smaller machine components 
– bodies, technical entities and combinations of parts of these 
entities – that interrupt, modulate or transduce forces they come 
into contact with or are subjected to (Deleuze 2004, 219). The 
larger art assemblage or machine is then brought into existence 
and organised through these productive and provisional 
relationships between these smaller parts and by their shared 
modulation of a particular force.86 Each component within an 
assemblage productively affects and is affected differently by 
any force, increasing internal difference or molecularity.87 Thus 
interaction with and transduction of forces is here the process 
by which such ‘an activity sets itself in motion’, and at the same 
time generates ‘processes of modification’. These transductions 
instigate further individuation of the machine while at the 
same time potentially reconfigure its internal relations 
(Simondon 1992, 313).
In the work A Chorus of Idle Feet, analogue sensors were set 
up in a public walkway that were capable of transducing the 
movement of bodies through the space to produce variations in 
the syncopation of sounds.88 Here, various components might 
be thought of as forming assemblages, expressing a capacity to 
connect and produce modulations in forces, and then combining 
to produce more such machines built on intensive differentiation. 
Body, movement and light together expressed the capacity to 
produce shadows in the space – becoming a shadow-machine 
modulating light – while light sensors modulated the flow of 
electrons in a light-light sensor-electron machinic assemblage.89 
While these were capacities of the two machines, when 
combined they began to make a machine that transduced the 
force of movement to the flow of electrical current, as shadows 
produced changes in electrical resistance in the sensors. This 
machine, in turn, combined with other components to form 
another machine that expressed its capacities to connect 
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movement into changes in sound pitch, rhythm, tempo or 
tone. For example, this machinic assemblage combined with 
an assemblage that converts electrical resistance to computer 
code such as MIDI signals that control sounds on a computer (an 
electrical flow-MIDI code-vibration machine). These machines 
were productively transducing movement into modulation of 
light waves, light waves into modulations of electrical current, 
and flow of electrons into modulated flows of sound waves. 
All these component machines then nested within a larger 
assemblage that collectively transduced the force of movement 
into these sound waves.
In the same work, other sensors (such as proximity and 
movement detection sensors focused on particular areas of the 
walkway, detecting changes in the position or number of bodies 
present), linked with the capacities of the movement to produce 
variations in the spatial distribution of bodies, which linked into 
larger productive relation with software triggering more sound 
pulses. This again nested within a larger machine, producing 
modulations in syncopation of the sounds as they combined.
Here all the components provisionally came together as an 
expressive machine, producing an emergent quality of rhythmic 
syncopation. This was a collective expression formed through 
interaction of all parts to create an event that retained the 
dynamic qualities of modulation of the machinic assemblage. As 
such it was concerned with the ‘viscosities’ of the transduction 
of various forces through the system: the styles and speeds 
of affectation of components by forces and visa versa. The 
work operated through an ongoing production of both internal 
connections and differences in the flow of forces. It was a 
‘fuzzy aggregate’ composed of counterpoints, inequalities 
and tensions in the processing of forces between the parts 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 328–9). Here the larger machinic 
assemblage obtained a level of consistency in production (it 
continued to express relations between movement and sound 
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rhythms) not through the submission of internal difference 
and organisation, as in a molar system, but precisely because 
it was internally flexible enough to accommodate intensive 
modulations. The initial force of movement driving the event 
was also molecularised, being transduced by various component 
machines into multiple new and potentially competing forces 
(see Figure 2.1).
What such a machine begins to produce is an event that is an 
exploration of its collective expressive capacities through the 
transduction of forces. At the same time, these explorations 
produce the machine itself. Thus, the two are, to some extent, 
co-produced, becoming implicit in each other’s actualisation 
and potential: a ‘concretisation’ or structural unity and 
interdependence of components of the assemblage (Simondon 
1980, 21). Such a shift in an interactive art-machine begins 
to move it away from the limited capacities of individual 
Figure 2.1 Andrew Goodman, A Chorus of Idle Feet, 2010. Digital video still. Allans 
Walk ARI, Bendigo.
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components, and from prescribed notions of either outcomes 
or of particular, pre-thought or fixed relations. This manner of 
thinking about machinic expressions performs a molecularisation 
onto the interactive event described. It splits the larger art 
machine into a series of smaller nested machines. Each has their 
own internal logic of working and are co-causally relational to 
other entities that their workings affect and are affected by. This 
understanding opens up a potential for thinking through both 
an increased movement of relations within the machine, and 
movement or transduction of the forces it modulates.
Overall this remains a fairly simple example. When considered on 
their own, most components of this interactive event – such as 
each individual light sensor – remained relatively predictable in 
their transduction of forces. However as forces were immanently 
transduced through multiple nested components over time, 
thus developing more and more relational entanglement, the 
assemblage evolved complexity at a higher level and began 
to generate potential beyond the capacities of these smaller 
components. My point here is that novelty might be achieved not 
through designing more technologically complex components, 
but through ‘self-conditioning emergence’ (Massumi et al 2009, 
40). This requires a rethinking of the philosophical basis of 
design strategies so that relatively simple components might 
interact with one another to increase internal differences in 
the assemblage.
Structuring action and flow:  
drift, autopoiesis and concretisation
These concepts of the minor, molecularisation, assemblage 
and machine form something of a basis from which to explore 
self-organisation in the participatory artwork, in essence being 
propositional to an event of the production of relation. From 
this point, in this chapter I address the questions of how an art 
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event generates its own ‘satisfaction’90 through consideration of 
the concepts of drift and concretisation. This is extended in the 
next two chapters through the question of how the drive towards 
novelty might be maximised in the event through the key 
concepts for this book: a more detailed examination Whitehead’s 
concept of ‘feeling’ as a productive differentiation from what has 
been, and the noise or parasite within relation.
Propositional invitations
To think of a relational art event in an open-ended fashion, we 
might think of the practicality of building it out of propositions. 
These propositions might be multiple, possibly contradictory. If 
sound ‘A’ can happen, or sound ‘B’ can occur, but not both sounds 
together, the sound that is not actualised still has, as Whitehead 
says, a creative role to play – both as a ‘giveness’ that shapes 
paths of potentiality, and as a continuing link to the virtual. The 
negated proposition remains a link, both to what might have 
happened or might in the future happen, and to the unrealised 
potential of an entity that ‘vibrate(s) against the conformal’ 
(1978, 188).
An entity, Whitehead states, ‘feels as it does feel in order to be 
the actual entity it is’ (1978, 222). The propositions composed 
within the art event are launching points, ‘lures towards feelings’ 
(259). These feelings are the prehensions (220) in which the drive 
toward ‘satisfaction’ is the realisation of some potentiality for the 
entity.91 A feeling here is the potential for affectual connection, 
that is, an entity’s potential capacity to be affected by, and affect 
other forces, entities or events. Thus, an inanimate entity might 
be seen as capable of a feeling (affecting and being affected 
by forces), and of driving towards its own satisfaction, as a 
sentient being.
A sensor, for example, might have the proposition of a tendency 
to notice movement. This movement may not happen. It is a 
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potentiality, constrained by the given: its position, the mechanics 
of its construction, and so on. It has ‘sensitivity’ towards 
searching for this movement, a potential capacity to form a 
machinic connection with this force, the incoming sense data 
that drive its completion. It reaches a point of satisfaction of an 
occasion when it expresses this capacity for connection, whether 
it senses movement or not. These are exclusive potentials – and 
in any occasion, only one potential can be actualised while the 
other remains virtual.
Even simple and linear propositions are, in themselves, never 
fully conclusive. Any actualisation is only a singular iteration 
of that proposition’s potential, and does not preclude further 
iterations arising. In this sense, although the outcome is 
conclusive for the particular event that actualises, the conclusion 
to a proposition is only approached, never realised. Thus while 
the individual event of the movement being sensed reaches 
satisfaction or an end-point, the proposition retains potential for 
further actualised iterations (DeLanda 2005, 75).
In a system with multiple exclusive and inclusive propositions, 
the outcomes become decidedly more non-linear and the 
virtual more evident as a factor within the system. The ‘other 
alternatives are there all the time, coexisting with the one that 
happens to be actualized’ (DeLanda 2005, 75, emphasis in the 
original) and creating a tension or problematisation that pulls 
the event towards further ‘incompossible’ actualisations. This 
increase in intensity is the line of flight from the prescribed 
event, in that it is a qualitative increase in relational potential 
within the system.
Propositions guide the dynamics of an event, though not in a 
prescriptive manner, creating tendencies (Bennett 2010, 103) and 
providing ongoing invitations or lures toward the potentialities 
of the event they condition. They instigate a ‘second phase’ of 
the virtual: that of a ‘real’ rather than the ‘general’ potentiality 
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(Whitehead 1978, 65), conditioning the potential by inclusion of 
the circumstances of the emergent event.92 This is a gathering 
of, and complex negotiation between, the various individuated 
propositional potentials of all the machinic components, and it 
creates a collective propositional potential.
Thus while we might think of the artwork as a single entity or 
event, it is perhaps better viewed as a ‘society’93 of entities, 
divisible into multiple, overlapping and simultaneous events or 
entities, each seeking and competing for its own satisfaction. 
During actualisation, the event is always at a point of unfolding, 
facing multiple potential paths towards various satisfactions. 
These multiple and fluid assemblages – eyes/brain/image, ears/
noise/speakers/current, software/sensor/movement data and so 
forth – are each divisible again, each seeking resolution of their 
feelings. This philosophical stance emphasises that art events 
are composed from the ground up. It provides an understanding 
that the concrescence of forces builds towards an endpoint of an 
actual event, discovered and motivated within the occasion itself 
by complexities of virtual and actual forces.
Seeing art as a propositional event begins to deflect the 
emphasis away from any final representational form, and to 
instead emphasise the ongoing role of the internal tension of 
the negated propositions and emergent differences in enriching 
the virtual of the event. Within interactive art, this suggests an 
experience focused on emergent qualities of relations in and of 
themselves. Here interactivity might begin to distinguish itself 
from goal-orientated ‘gaming’ directed towards solving a puzzle, 
moving through levels or controlling a space, and also from 
‘didactic’ works directed towards a learning outcome, whether 
based on perception or content. Instead it might move into 
riskier areas, concerning itself with the setting of conditions that 
allow events to begin, and accepting the inherent danger that 
some desired and interesting outcomes and directions may not 
always eventuate.94
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Self-organisation
How does the art event ‘choose’ which prehensions it follows 
through to satisfaction, and which entities will actualise? 
How can we think of this without falling back into prescriptive 
models? Having set itself into motion through its propositional 
structuring, and gained through feeling its own collective 
movement, the event is no longer beholden to any external 
intentions or drive – it must sort itself out internally. But it does 
not strive to be the best event it can – the most efficient, original 
or surprising. That would again imply some kind of transcendent 
motivation, a ‘neo-Darwinist’ thinking that assumes that entities 
or events are invested in, and capable of, striving for some 
preconceived ideal form or an outcome of maximum efficiency 
(Bogue 2003, 69–73).95
Rather, we could say, it ‘drifts’. This implies a system, as 
Francesco Varela says, that ‘makes do’, seeking the ‘viable’ rather 
than the ‘optimal’ (1992, 205).96 Such a system is ‘pragmatic’: its 
motivation is to find a satisfaction, not the satisfaction.97 That is, 
it makes do with what it has, and cobbles together a solution. 
As Ronald Bogue states, systems self-organising through drift 
emphasise change or creativity over ‘fitness’ (2003, 74–5)98. They 
experiment with ‘assemblage[s] of heterogeneous forms for no 
other reason than that they are possible’ (75). Processes of drift 
enable systems to be truly interactive, as they are composed 
through that activity, rather than being representative of 
determined function or outcome (Varela 207, 209). Here drift is 
a molecular modelling of an event gathering and accentuating 
relational intensity within the emergent system, rather than 
containing such relational play in order to serve a central or 
molar design aim.
In drifting, a system demonstrates an agency that is clearly not 
attributable to any one (or indeed all) of its component parts that 
might then direct the unfolding of events. Rather any agency – if 
agency is viewed simply as the modulating and distributing of 
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forces and relations – can be seen to be a collective expression 
of the event itself. Julian Yates terms this ‘agentive drift’, an 
agency that is a ‘dispersed or distributed process in which we 
participate rather than a property which we are said to own’ 
(2002, 48). Here drift is the dynamics of relations as they gather, a 
collective individuation with its own emergent and global virtual 
and actual organization (Bak 1997, 121; Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch 1992, 65).
Drift does not imply that such systems operate through random 
or chaotic connections, but that they create systems of intensive 
and local connection. For Murphie, this is a chaosmic interactivity 
that sits between chaos and stratification (2005b, 42). This might 
replace a system organised through a single dominant relational 
pull towards a future ‘useful’ and externally projected outcome 
– as much interactive art is designed – where differences 
becoming suppressed or flattened to serve a larger or dominant 
purpose. Systems in drift may lack or mitigate external 
motivation, but they gain a set of competing heterogeneous and 
intensive motivations. This encourages an immanent expressive 
exploration of the multiple potentials of relation within the 
assemblage through the play of subtle and complex dynamic 
modulation of internal forces.
In A Chorus of Idle Feet, changes to a small assemblage within 
this interactive system could be seen to affect the productive 
workings of many component assemblages, and the event 
as a whole. A change in light, for example, would affect the 
way electrons passed through the assemblage of a particular 
sensor, while also affecting other assemblages linking the 
sensor to sound vibrations emitted through speakers.99 These 
vibrations potentially affected the larger assemblage of the art 
event by combining and diffracting with other sound waves 
being emitted, producing local shifts in the expressions of the 
speaker systems.100 These might then affect both the rhythmic 
pulls of combinations of sounds, and the affective tonalities 
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of the event.101 Thus the productive expressions of the other 
component sensor-machines – those that were not directly 
affected by the changes in light – were potentially still altered 
through a series of complex implications that were relational, but 
not entirely predictable. In such a system, localised agitations or 
changes to flows affected surrounding assemblages and had a 
run-on effect, potentially spreading through and shifting much 
of the system’s workings. Each component remained primarily 
responsive to its local connections, with no prescribed aim or 
outcome dictated by the original movement. A larger movement 
or circulation of forces in the system was created through 
emergent difference – contagious and rhizomic – instigating 
and gathering new combinations and potential combinations of 
co-dependent relations that the systems needed to negotiate.102
As a system operating through drift this was an open or 
dissipative system, ‘in which momentary deployments of forces 
produce[d] systemic orderings, local eddies or drifts’ (Yates 2002, 
50). The system here sacrificed self-preservation as it drove 
towards creativity through the continued recombining of forces 
(Whitehead 1978, 103–5).103 Such changes did not necessarily 
force a collapse in the system,104 as there was a degree of 
consistency or dynamic equilibrium within the assemblage.105 
That is, it was a ‘dynamic whole’ with an ability to accommodate 
intensive changes, without necessarily causing destruction to the 
ability of the machines to communicate productively, even as it 
caused variations to the productive outcomes of the event.106
Drift has lured into being a system that is productive in a 
machinic sense, but not at all about a directed, idealised or 
maximised productivity. As each component assemblage 
responded to changes in its local systems of forces, there was 
a flow-on of repercussions that was not always entirely linear 
or predictable – an excess and freedom of relation that may, as 
Massumi and Manning state, reorientate exchange. Such systems 
are therefore principally about self-production, the experience 
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of the components gathering together, an ‘emergence of [a] field 
of relation’ (Manning and Massumi 2014, 128). It is also always a 
‘minor’ act that is a reorganization of available entities into new 
relationships, and more than the inclusion of new factors.
A system in drift is involved in a process of increased 
‘concretisation’. As Simondon thinks the concept, concretisation 
is a process exclusive to technical (as opposed to ‘natural’) 
entities. However here I would argue that it is possible to see 
it more generally as a process by which a set of entities are 
brought into increased co-causal relationship with each other. 
For Simondon concretisation involves a system in which each 
component ‘is part of a system in which a multitude of forces 
are exercised and in which effects are produced that are 
independent of the design plan’ (1980, 31). In this, concretisation 
relates directly to a process of drift in what Simondon terms a 
‘natural object’. That is, both set up circular, coherent systems 
of distributed agency expressing potentials rather than being 
driven by external factors (Simondon 1980, 40–1). Such systems 
attain some level of structural unity, Simondon states, with 
each element co-determining, becoming implicit in what other 
elements become. It requires that the component parts develop 
a ‘plurality of function’ and negotiate their operations, rather 
than fulfilling a predesigned or ‘ideal’ function (Simondon 1980, 
20–1).107 It is precisely because of the presence of potential 
indeterminacy – a flexibility of future relations, rather than 
a fixed and linear set of actualised relations – that machines 
are able to develop such self-organizing capacities (Simondon 
1980, 13–14).108
While the components in a machine retain their individual 
potentials, it is the shared potentials that they develop through 
machinic operations – their shared ‘associated milieu’ – that 
forms a base for their collective individuations through drift.109 
This is the drawing of elements from a field as a ‘system of 
virtualities, of potentials, of moving forces’ (Simondon 1980, 
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51) into a field of relation. These processes of drift do not just 
happen within established concrete assemblages. Rather, the 
drift itself can be seen to draw disparate components into 
productive relation. Creating dynamic systems of drift must 
strive to be not simply making connections between component 
parts through actualised systems of feedback and (flexible) 
causal chains, but also need to enable conditions for the 
continued disruption of relations.110
In the example above, the light sensor-machine began to 
exhibit an ongoing potential to form a relationship with, for 
example, the sound waves produced by the pressure sensor-
electron flow-computer-speaker assemblage that moderated 
both expressions of vibration. It was not limited in the ways or 
number of actualisations of the expression of this relationship; 
nor was it limited to this particular multiplicitous set of light 
sensor-machine to pressure-sensor machine relations. Entities 
gathered from a field of potential relation, into an actualised 
relation with each other, retaining potential for different 
future individuations.111 It is at this level of potentiality that 
such a system continues to exhibit its molecular or minor 
nature. Such a gathered, collective, virtual milieu it is always 
sensitively balanced on the point of reorganisation – that is, a 
deterritorialisation and a reterritorialization.
Relational art events capable of drift might take many forms, 
creating many differing events. For interactivity, this does 
not mean that drift drives towards making events necessarily 
different. Such systems are indifferent to the quality or quantity 
of difference they generate. Importantly, they are indifferent to 
the demonstration of change and relation that haunts so many 
interactive works – the problematic focus on representation over 
open exploration. Systems in drift settle where they settle. On 
some days, the events generated in a work may be markedly 
variable, on others the work might seem to settle around the 
same outcomes. The artist must relinquish some control over 
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this, leaving or encouraging it to work itself out: it does what it 
does, whether disappointing on one occasion and surprising the 
next. Perhaps this is the most challenging shift in thinking for an 
artist: creating a place for the participant in an event that is an 
‘active ecology’ without, as Manning says, ‘necessarily putting the 
participant in the role of direct activator of change’ (2013a, 130).
Thinking in terms of drift requires designing interactive systems 
that are composed of components capable of retaining flexibility 
in the order in which they affect other entities, the ways in which 
they affect entities, and the direction in which such affectual 
relations operate. What is required is the invention of ‘techniques 
for the proliferation of drifts’, rather than the placement of a 
specific drifting in the event (Manning 2013a, 200).
None of this is to promote self-organisation as the be-all and 
end-all, as it is of course a dominant characteristic of capitalism, 
subsuming all to an equivalence of exchange (in this sense it is 
molar while still self-organising).112 Here an ethics of interactivity 
and self-organisation needs careful consideration. This leads to 
the key questions of this book: how to propose systems that can 
continue to express creative potential of differentiation, while 
maximising their relational interdependence. It is in seeking 
practical solutions to this issue that the next two chapters 
examine the capacities of entities to express feeling, and the 
potential of noise within relation to act as a force of intensive 
differentiation.
3
Once more with feeling: Whitehead’s 
concept of feeling and a trans-human ethics
Each task of creation is a social effort, employing the 
whole universe.
Alfred North Whitehead
Whitehead’s world is one of worlds, plural.
Andrew Murphie
Introduction
The turn towards the relational as outlined in the previous 
chapters is still far too general and abstract for the practical 
task I wish to explore in this book – that of a pragmatic thinking 
through of how the relational might be utilised across a number 
of scales of activity in applicable artworks. For Whitehead, as 
Andrew Murphie notes, ‘relation’ is a term abstracted from the 
held ‘contrasts’ that are constitutive of an entity’s becoming 
(2016, 21).113 Here what we might generally call ‘relations’ are 
rather ‘the gathering together, maintenance and creation [of] 
new contrasts – differential intensities’ (Murphie 2016, 21). In 
this view the world is composed of these gatherings of feelings, 
intensity and differentials (Murphie 2016, 21), and Whitehead’s 
schema investigates such gatherings in detail. In this chapter I 
wish to outline this system of prehension (positive and negative 
feeling) – emphasising the role of intensity in Whitehead’s 
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ontology. In the next chapter I refine it for my purposes through 
the use of Serres’ concept of the parasite as a particular way 
of conceiving of these held and productive differentials that 
Whitehead argues are the constitutive dynamics of relation. 
These concepts will then be put to use in the following chapters 
as the basis of a rethinking of interactivity along the lines of 
differential ecologies.
If interactive art has had a tendency to present rigid models with 
very prescribed and contained notions of relational potential, 
Whitehead’s concept of ‘feeling’ perhaps offers a way to think 
beyond this. This might be particularly useful in assisting a 
move beyond the predictable or prescribed result and into a 
realm that is more open-ended and process based. It might 
also assist a move towards an expanded concept of interactivity 
or participation that thinks both of the relative freedom of 
the participants in this encounter, while also considering all 
the various components of the artwork and their freedom 
of expression. Thus, as Murphie proposes, there is a need to 
develop a ‘syntax of feeling’, through which we might ‘open up 
the world to itself, or, more correctly, open up the possibility of 
participating differentially in the dynamic ecologies of the world’ 
(2016, 12). In this sense such a concern might broadly be thought 
of as post-human, though perhaps the term ‘trans-human’ is 
more suitable,114 since the interest here is the expansion of the 
human beyond fixed identity, alongside the expansion of the 
potential of the field and all participant components of an event 
to co-produce novelty or ‘individuate’.115 I will refer to this as an 
ethics, in that it seeks a right for all components to fully express 
their capacity to ‘feel’. This is a concept I return to later in the 
chapter and which permeates the more general rethinking of 
interactivity in the book as a whole. In this chapter the concept 
of feeling and its trans-human implications are, after a more 
general discussion of Whitehead’s theory, read first through 
thinking the potential of inanimate entities (rocks) to feel, 
secondly through the implications of Charles Darwin’s study of 
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worms for ideas of the location of a non-human ‘intelligence’, 
and lastly through a discussion of the induction drawings of 
Australian artist Joyce Hinterding.
The Whiteheadian concept of ‘feeling’, as Judith Jones states, 
repudiates the idea ‘that existing objects have determinate, 
sharp existential boundaries’ (1998, 162). This is replaced by 
a complex system of relation that emphasises the autonomy 
(or ‘subjectivity’ in Whitehead’s terms) of the becoming of an 
entity. Whiteheadian autonomy, however, always acknowledges 
the ways in which such becoming draws on both the actualised 
environment from which an entity emerges, and the role of the 
virtual as an equally real, if differently composed and operative, 
influence on becoming.
For Whitehead – as for James with his concept of radical 
empiricism that admits all experience, including relations, as 
equally real – it is of utmost importance to develop an ontology 
with a consistency in philosophical abstraction of reality without 
resort to exceptions, applicable to all entities and events (Stenner 
2008, 99). Feeling, as the basis of his system of becoming, must 
then be applicable to all entities, as must the acknowledgment 
that each entity feels in its own particular way.116 And thus, from 
this world-view, if you and I can ‘feel’ and make ‘choices’, so, 
in their own specific way, can a rock, a bird, an electron, or as 
Darwin argued, a worm.
Feeling
For Whitehead’s organic philosophy, nothing is inert: everything 
is engaged in processes of becoming, changing, emerging, 
marching towards novelty. All things, Whitehead states, are 
capable of feelings (1978, 220), sensitivities that allow them to 
navigate, to form workable assemblages, and to become with 
their environment. Such feelings are not necessarily conscious, 
and in fact the vast majority are not conscious. Thus feelings 
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are as relevant to entities without consciousness and they do 
not privilege sentience or the living over inanimate entities. 
Nor is feeling attached to preformed entities (Manning 2013a, 
21). Rather, this is feeling as a force gathering towards form, 
immanent with the occasion, moving with the event. In this 
sense for Whitehead’s ‘atomic’ philosophy, actuality is only this 
act of an entity’s in-forming or ‘concrescence’: the gathering 
of physical and conceptual feelings into one subjective form.117 
Once this resolves into the ‘satisfaction’ of the entity (though 
such resolution, as discussed below, does not involve the erasure 
of the differences between the gathered feelings but their 
productive contrast from the point of view of the entity), it in 
one sense ceases to be, although it continues to exert influence 
through its potential to be felt by future entities in their own 
concrescent processes.118
In this complex theory of ‘prehension’ Whitehead outlines 
processes of becoming based on this concept of feeling.119 
Two aspects of this theory are of particular important for the 
purposes of this discussion. Firstly, the concept emphasises the 
inevitable emergent condition of existence. That is, there is an 
ongoing, unceasing process of individuation that all actualising 
events are involved in. Secondly, this emergence involves choice 
or selection from a larger potential (on a largely if not entirely 
non-conscious level), and therefore it is always a differentiation. 
Here process is a creative event of formation of an entity as 
potential is transformed into actuality (Guattari and Rolnik 
2005, 311). Thus feelings are always cuts – choices, points of 
divergence or nascent novelty – that differentiate both from 
the potential data drawn from that which is already actualised 
and from the data drawn from the larger virtual or ongoing 
planes of potential. These cuts are made intensively, by an entity 
for its own satisfaction rather than in any way beholden to 
external interests.
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To explain this, here I briefly outline aspects of the process of 
‘concrescence’ as Whitehead calls becoming or actualisation. 
Concrescence is a process by which an emergent entity, 
occasion or event120 draws a disparate or disjunctive selection 
of datum from the world into ‘the real unity of one actual entity’ 
(Whitehead 1978, 22). Thus in an ecology this entity is a nexus or 
‘one complex feeling’ (Whitehead 1978, 44) at which a number 
of potentials meet. From the perspective of the field this nexus 
represents one novel solution to a feeling for the field in its 
entirety121 that reflects its own perspective on the universe and 
has some connection, however remote, to all that is actualised.122 
Every prehension consists for Whitehead of three factors, the 
‘subject’ prehending, the datum prehended and the ‘subjective 
form’ or the way in which that datum is prehended by the subject 
– that is, the selection or choice that is made and that leads 
towards novelty (Whitehead 1978, 23).
Feeling is a force gathering towards form, immanent with the 
occasion, moving the event (Manning 2013a, 21). Feelings are 
not relations between things. Rather the entity is a singular 
concrescence of feelings: an event of synthesising or patterning 
of formally disparate relations at one point in the field 
(Whitehead 1978, 232). The relation, from the point of view of the 
subject prehending, is a feeling: its own perspective or subjective 
take on the other entity. As Whitehead states, feelings ‘aim at 
their subject’ rather than being ‘aimed at’ their subject (1978, 
222)123: they are generated and owned by the forming entity, not 
projected by any external agent. For Whitehead, becoming is an 
act of self-enjoyment, and the entity is in this sense self-realizing, 
transcending the entities that already exist and adding to the 
novelty of the universe (1978, 222).
It is important, however, not to think of this gathering of various 
feelings (concrescence) or the end-point resolution of this 
gathering (satisfaction) as erasing differences between those 
feelings, either extensively or intensively. In the former case the 
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datum prehended is objectively available for other events of 
concrescence, within which portions of it will be accommodated 
and other portions excluded (negatively prehended), creating 
with this datum new complex feelings that express their 
difference to previous entities. The potential for further 
differentiation always exists.
In the case of intensive difference, this is a more complex 
matter that might be overlooked. In her writing Jones attempts 
to bring this to the fore, positing ‘intensity’, defined as ‘the 
compression of multiplicity in an individual unity’, as the key to 
understanding Whitehead’s ontology (1998, 157).124 Whitehead 
uses the term ‘contrast’, which Jones defines as ‘the positive 
relation of two or more discrete elements in the complex feeling 
involved in concrescence’ (1998, 12). That is, differing select 
datum from the world are made compatible (though only in the 
instance of a particular concrescence). Here the ‘richness’ of an 
entity’s becoming depends on its ability to positively involve 
the maximum amount of datum in this pattern of contrasts and 
therefor maximise intensity ( Jones 1998, 12, 17, 36). Contrast is 
therefore ‘unity in difference’, preserving these differences but 
finding a ‘self-consistency’ of the many in the one (Jones 1998, 
56).125 These ‘held’ contrasts do not, as Murphie notes, need to be 
resolved, but exist productively as a differential ‘pattern’ (2016, 
20),126 internal to and constitutive of the subjective form (Jones 
1998, 102). This patterning consists of four factors contrasted 
into a pattern of relevance: ‘triviality and vagueness’ (the contrast 
terms for the prehension of a background of a becoming), 
and ‘narrowness and width’ (contrasts of which determine the 
foreground) ( Jones 1998, 38).
Here relation is this gathering and holding of contrasts, not a 
simple connectivity. Events come together but remain atomic 
(a ‘disparate multitude’ and a subjective self-creation) (Massumi 
2011, 20–1). Without this intensity, there can be no relation.127 
Intensity or contrast is therefore a problematic structure, a 
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partial solution that is productive (of variation) rather than 
resolvant. Such intensities continue to be productive after 
the perishing of an entity in that these patterns are inherited 
through their ingression into future acts of concrescence 
(creating ‘contrasts of contrasts’) ( Jones 1998, 40).
This intensive organisation is always the entity’s self-motivated 
choice or selection from potential. This point cannot be over 
emphasised I think, as it provides a way out of a static universe 
of things in which only select ‘special’ entities, such as humans, 
are seen to have choice or agency. This separation of the human 
from the rest of matter underpins our supposed authority to 
command nature, and denies the validity of listening to the 
expressions and forming relations of all events. In this sense 
Whitehead’s philosophy might be seen to be post (or trans-) 
human, though in reality it is also post object in emphasising 
relation and process over form.
As Murphie points out, Whitehead’s system flips traditional 
Western notions of subjectivity around: no longer is the subject 
‘somewhat separate from the world’, but rather ‘it begins to head 
towards an actual occasion’ (2016, 11). Subjectivity is not exactly 
erased in this thinking, but is seen as emerging from the acts of 
selection that take place in concrescence.128 Indeed to look for 
truly individual subjects begins to look like the wrong question.129 
Firstly, this is true because, for Whitehead, an entity perishes on 
completion of its concrescence (‘it never really is’) (Whitehead, 
cited Jones 1998, 101). Secondly, this ‘character’ is trans-entity, 
in that it is then present in other entities’ ‘achieved intensive 
character’ ( Jones 1998, 100).
Subjectivity exists here as ‘subjective form’ or ‘character’ in 
the act of concrescence: the acts of feeling, valuation and 
patterning of physical datum and virtual forces into an entity’s 
own particular take on the universe. Thus it would seem to more 
radically complicate notions of agency than philosophical moves 
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simply assigning agency to non-human and inanimate objects.130 
‘Agency’ can be a problematic term, with a tendency to imply the 
primacy of ‘agents’ as discrete, independent and stable entities 
positively exerting force, while somehow remaining internally 
immune to change.131 This isolates objects, Jones claims, and is 
Whitehead’s key issue with philosophies of substance, which 
again position relation (and its component parts) as secondary 
( Jones 1998, 95). Indeed, Jones argues, the search for agency 
either naively seeks this false separateness, or pessimistically 
abandons any concept of will or power as per some post-modern 
approaches. Whitehead, on the other hand, maintains what she 
terms ‘an ethical spirit of hope and adventure’ (1978, 176–7), and 
it is this ethical spirit of the potential for novelty in all events that 
this discussion of feeling is attempting to channel.
In Whitehead’s system agency is situated in the event. This does 
not imply an externality of control, but that agency is intensive, 
in the making of evaluations as to the relevance of datum for an 
entity’s own concrescence (Jones 1998, 88). That is, the agency 
is in the ability to create productive contrasts. Thus it is both 
‘borrowed and new at the same time’: drawing on the valuations 
and ordering of prehensions by previous entities and imposing 
in some manner ‘on all subsequent process’ ( Jones 1998, 129, 
131). Therefore it never truly belongs to objects or entities, even 
with Whitehead’s expanded field of creativity. At best agency is a 
condition of the emerging ecology itself.
Entities indeed do have a very real connection to all of the 
emerging ecology. As Whitehead states categorically, it takes 
a whole universe to make an event or entity. This can be seen, 
firstly, in that as an entity establishes a relationship both to 
those objects that it directly draws data from, it also draws in 
a ‘second-hand’ manner from entities whose data went into 
the formation of this object. Therefore, in a more and more 
mediated and remote fashion, the entity forms a relation to 
all actualised entities and their histories. Thus a prehension is 
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always complex, capable of being divided into other prehensions 
in indefinite numbers that reach a singular resolution as a 
pattern of contrasts in any particular entity but never preclude 
other potential resolutions from arising.
Secondly, relation includes not only the complex layering of 
selected prehensions as discussed above, but also ‘negative’ 
prehensions. That is, prehension consists not only of positive 
relations or feelings – whose selection constitutes the data 
that forms its concrescence – but also the act of not selecting 
other data, again a choice or differentiation from what has 
been. In this, it establishes a richness and complexity that 
allows it to (negatively) retain relation to all, if only as the 
‘scars’ or ‘impressions of what it might have been’ (Whitehead 
1978, 226–7).132
Lastly, as well as drawing on these actualised objects for 
data (‘physical’ prehensions), an in-forming entity also draws 
conceptually on some of what Whitehead terms ‘eternal objects’. 
These are pure and indefinite qualities such as ‘redness’, 
‘hardness’ and ‘warmth’ or, for the ‘higher level’ entities amongst 
us, ‘lust’ and ‘despair’.133 These qualities are felt as objects. That 
is, what is felt is their ‘capacity for being a realised determinant 
of a process’ (Whitehead 1978, 239). Through this ingression of 
eternal essences or qualities (and contrasts between them) an 
entity conceptually modifies or evaluates its feelings of the actual 
world, creating another layer of complexity in the concrescence 
(Jones 1998, 45–6, 59; Whitehead 1978, 240–1).134
Once actualised an entity continues to ingress on proceedings 
by acting as datum for the concrescent processes of other 
entities, functioning ‘as an object’ to be felt in these events 
(Whitehead 1978, 220). Here it transcends itself and is further 
enmeshed or integrated into the ecology out of which it has 
emerged. The seemingly contradictory values of processes of 
personal satisfaction and objectification (being ‘a unity’ in its own 
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subjective form, but in being ‘divisible’ objectification by other 
concrescences) of course overlap in complex ways and cannot, 
Jones’ argues, be sharply separated on an ontological level, as 
individuation is never a linear or simple process (1998, 52, 88). 
Here feelings are never entirely clear and distinct, ‘overlapping, 
subdividing [and] supplementary to each other’ (Whitehead 1978, 
235), as well as being divisible into other feelings. Conceptual and 
physical feelings may also ‘hybridize’ each other through treating 
other feelings in the event as objects to be felt (Whitehead 1878, 
246). In this way they might be thought of as ‘nested’: as a series 
of contrasts or intensities that are ‘implicated in one another, 
each in turn both enveloped and enveloping’ (Deleuze 1994, 252; 
Jones 1998 48–50).
Rocks
If we accept Whitehead’s challenge and carry this concept to its 
limit – beyond entities with attributes easy to anthropomorphise, 
such as animals and plants – we can ask instead: what does a 
rock in a stream feel? To which forces are its sensitivities tuned: 
rain, salts, acids, wind, tides, heat? How does the becoming 
form of the rock instigate new force – shape the wind, give new 
direction to the current, absorb or dissolve salt solutions? We 
begin to see the rock-world relation anew: the rock’s continued 
fielding in the world – its continued effect on or transduction 
of the ecology’s forces – and the field’s continuous expression 
through the force of the rock, becomes an ecology of operations. 
We learn from the ‘wisdom of rocks, from which we can derive an 
ethics involving the notion that, ultimately, we too are fluxes of 
matter and energy’ (DeLanda 1992, 143).135
But the rock does not only feel the flow of the river, its chemical 
composition and the rain. Through mediation136 it also feels the 
waterfall further upstream through the waterfall’s effects on 
the flow and mix of sediment stirred up from the river bottom. 
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It feels the mountain at the birth of the river through its various 
effects on the river over time. It feels the change of season on 
this mountain top through the melting of the snow, the birth of 
fish and their thrashing, the splash of a bird hunting in the water 
and so on, all at various degrees of remove and impact, through 
the water. And conceptually the rock also feels and selects from 
qualities of rockiness, hardness, wetness, and heat, exploring 
some potentiality of these concepts through a selection that 
inserts them into actual events, valuating to some degree its 
experience of the actual. And, the rock selects not to feel other 
events: both the actual, such as the ticking of the clock in your 
house and your thoughts of lunch, and the conceptual: lust, 
anger, depression.
The valuation and admission of the various positive prehensions 
is more than a modifying factor; they constitute the rock’s 
becoming – for it to ‘not only have but to be a perspective on the 
world’ ( Jones 1998, 36, emphasis in the original). The rock has 
its own singular take on or positive logic of all the feelings that 
are deemed relevant to its concrescence. Its neighboring rock 
may also feel the melting of the snow and the movement of the 
fish upstream, but each evaluates these factors from its own 
perspective and according to its own appetite for becoming.137
Each rock valuates the positive feelings according to their 
importance for its concrescence (its triviality, vagueness, 
narrowness and width), and scales or contrasts these into 
a pattern of relevance, seeking the required depth of held 
intensity: the ‘inequalit[ies] by which it is measured’ (Deleuze 
1994, 222). Thus for our rock the movement of a upstream fish 
may be a trivial feeling, felt through its momentary effect in 
the very slight variation in current, but a smaller stone at the 
epicenter of this disturbance feels the full force of the fish’s 
fins and is lifted off the riverbed and flows downstream – not a 
trivial feeling at all from its perspective. Similarly backgrounded 
for the rock in question may be the vaguely felt movements 
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of the individual leaves of a tree in the water – ‘vague’ in 
their indistinctness from one another ( Jones 1998, 35, 38). 
‘Narrowness’ and ‘width’ constitute the more foregrounded 
assessments of feelings (though all the terms are interrelated). It 
is a balancing act between a certain ‘narrowness’ of scope that is 
necessary – a value judgment that allows prehensions deemed 
less relevant to be backgrounded sufficiently (becoming the 
relatively trivial and vague) – and sufficient ‘width’ of ingression 
of those feelings deemed important for satisfactory depth 
of feeling and complexity of intensity to be achieved, and for 
sufficient ‘thematic unity’ for the rock to achieve the status of this 
particular novel entity in the world. These feelings are contrasted 
and patterned according to the rock’s entertaining of its own 
‘ideal of itself’ – in other words, in relation to its conceptual 
prehension of relevant eternal objects such as rockiness, solidity 
and so on (Jones 1998, 38).
We might easily accept this conditioning of the rock in relation 
to its given actual circumstances and its potential expressions 
during its overt formation, such as rock formed by lava flows 
molded in relation to landscape, water and climate. But part of 
the challenge Whitehead demands is that we consider the rock to 
be continually recomposed through events of concrescence and 
perishing.138 Here the rock as a whole is a ‘society’ of smaller and 
briefly becoming events or entities (Whitehead 2014, Chapter 
III). Admittedly this is a society without great internal difference 
and, from a human scale of attention, with a very slow rate of 
differentiation, but it is a significant step from thinking of an 
entity as that which goes through a becoming phase to arrive 
at a ‘pure’ object status that is outside of this individuation (a 
downfall in the logic of many philosophies, as Whitehead seeks to 
demonstrate). Here Whitehead’s ‘societies’ are nexus ‘with social 
order’. That is, they have ‘common element[s] of form’ that are 
‘imposed’ on all the member entities by their positive prehension 
of other members of the same society (Whitehead 1978, 34).139 
Within this ‘atomic’ conception of entities the rock retains at least 
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some potential for change and ongoing selection or choice.140 
There is always room for differentiation to occur, and there are 
always prehensive relations of the world that tie the becoming-
rock to the ecology with which it gathers.141
Worms
Another humble entity worth consideration, although in 
this case an animate one, is the earthworm. Charles Darwin 
devoted many years of study and an entire book to the worm, 
utilising a rigorously empirical methodology that lead him to 
an understanding of the very real and complex interactions 
and forces informing the worms’ lives and their impact on the 
human world.142
However of most interest here are the sections of the study 
in which Darwin explores the ‘intelligence’ of the worm, an 
intelligence evidenced by their creative and non-teleological 
interactions with their ecology. While worms clearly have limited 
capacities to sense and interact with their environment, being 
blind, deaf (though sensitive to vibration), and possessing a 
limited sense of smell, to Darwin this does not mean that their 
actions cannot move beyond pure instinct or habit. Through 
a detailed study of the way that worms utilise leaves, Darwin 
seeks to show that worms have a capacity for creative self-
determinacy. The worms appear to be able to adapt very quickly 
to unfamiliar types of leaves and to invent ways to attach to 
leaves, to drag them along the ground and to utilise them to plug 
the entrances and line their burrows. In doing this they develop 
novel capacities for solving the problems that are incurred with 
particular leaves – for example, plugging a burrow with pine 
needles for the first time rather than a broad leaf, or handling 
a leaf with an unfamiliar petiole (Darwin 1881, 59–60). Here 
perhaps we could say that the worms are able to successfully 
assess and pattern their prehensions of the capacities of the 
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leaves in relation to the various conceptual qualities needed 
carry and to plug their burrows.
Darwin concludes firstly that the worms’ approach to these 
new challenges cannot be explained by any logic of inheritance 
or habit. Secondly, he argues that the worms’ abilities to utilise 
novel materials successfully are not based on methods involving 
either significant elements of chance or trial and error, which 
might also eventually result in the worms discovering a suitable 
method for handling the leaves. Rather, the worms appear able 
to perceive and creatively engage with difference in thinking 
through the best way to drag and utilise the leaves (Dawrin 1881, 
73–4, 92–3).
Any argument that the lowly worm acts always or entirely purely 
for survival as an ultimate aim seems to be unsustainable when 
faced with this evidence. Whereas a neo-Darwinist approach 
might argue that a worm’s capacities are all pre-formulated 
with survival as its entire domain of enquiry (a worm is blind 
because it has no ‘use’ for sight, and so on), in fact the worm is 
involved in a creative enquiry with its environment. Here it pays 
to remember that in Whitehead’s system the leaves have feelings 
too, as does the borrow, and that the worm’s prehension of leaf 
and burrow opening are, through mediation, also prehensions 
to some degree of these other entities’ subjective take on 
their worlds. The worm’s capacities are always forming-with or 
immanent to its emergent ecology through acts of feeling-with. 
These capacities are creative in that they are open-ended to a 
certain extent, never reaching a state of full formation, desirous 
of novelty rather than limited to survival or directed towards any 
one simple perfect worm-form143 (an ur- or uber-worm perfectly 
able to exploit its environment144). The worm, in other words, has 
plenty of wriggle room.
For Darwin the worms demonstrate ‘some degree of intelligence’ 
in their activities (98).145 But the worms are not writing philosophy 
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or sonnets on love, so in this context, what exactly does the 
intelligence mean? I would suggest that what the worms 
demonstrate is an ability to tune with their environment on a 
profound level. In other words, they have the capacity to ‘feel’ 
or prehend the potential in worm-leaf-burrow interactions 
(a resonance or intensification of potentials146), to compose 
relevant contrasts out of this information (to pattern), and to 
make creative selections or choices immanent with their actions, 
tastes and needs (to valuate). Here the usage of the leaves in the 
burrow is a nexus of possibilities that resolves some potential 
of the worms, leaves and burrow’s collective capacities into an 
event with its own subjective expression (necessarily composed 
also of all the negative prehensions of what is not selected or 
actualised). These collecting feelings making up an ecological 
intelligence that is immanent with, and belongs more to, the 
event, as a bringing together of potentials and capacities, 
rather than belonging to the worms147 – just as the intelligence 
of juggling belongs in the moment of conversation between 
balls, hands, gesture, gravity and performativity rather than the 
identity of the juggler.
In this we might also say, in the styles of interior decorating 
the worms develop in collaboration with the leaves to line their 
burrows, that they exhibit a (pragmatic) creativity, which again 
goes beyond simple need or survival. As much of Alphonso 
Lingis’ writing seeks to demonstrate, here there is a joy in living 
or self-production – in feeling with the world – that is an essential 
creativity.148 Just as the individuation of the rock becomes more 
complex and resonate the more we consider its capacities and 
their expressions-with its ecology, so the worms’ choices can 
never be fully explained in simple terms of need: there is a non-
teleological, qualitative desire at work in the event, composed as 
it is of feelings that prehend and play with potentials.
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Ethics
If morality is the relinquishing of individual freedom in favour of 
alignment with a prescribed concept of good that then constrains 
as it is applied blanket-like over all (a generalised righteousness), 
then ethics is perhaps in many ways the opposite, an 
‘augmentation of the power to live in this world’ (Massumi 1992, 
108; Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 256–7).149 That is, it deals not 
with the system-wide or universal but with the specific, local 
and emergent: with, in other words, a politics. This, as Manning 
states, is a procedural and emergent politics rather than a 
politics of control exercised by subjects over life (Manning 2013a, 
147). It is therefore ‘attentiveness to the conditions of the event 
expressing itself’ (Manning 2013a, 148): a force of becoming that 
is also always in itself open to new feelings that might affect and 
overlay its individuation.
In this, ethics is affirmative. The negative movement of morality 
might diminish or flatten relationality, composed as it is of 
capacities to ‘express the high levels of interdependence’ of 
entities. Ethics, on the other hand, emphasises the expression 
of entities’ capacities to prehend and the power of their positive 
ingression to create novelty (Braidotti 2010, 226). For Whitehead, 
as Jones states, the system of prehension is a system of ethics in 
that it is a ‘commitment to attentiveness about our world’, both 
in terms of acknowledgment of the role of broad experience, 
and of the singular intensive character of each event. It does not 
level out experiences of the world as morality might seek to do, 
but adds to it, if addition is thought of as the addition of further 
contrast or difference (1998, 85).150 Here Whitehead’s system 
approaches ethics in that it requires attention to ‘the general 
good’ (Whitehead 1978, 15). This attention to other realities and 
perspectives is the very contrast that is ‘internal to the being 
of the agent, and thus integral and ultimate to any action’. This 
concept of ethics eliminates both notions of the passivity of 
the non-sentient or non-biological, and ‘the exaggerated sense 
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of ourselves in as some kind of special freedom-nature in the 
cosmos’ ( Jones 1998, 85).
As Lone Bertelsen has suggested, such ethics might be the 
beginning of ‘ecological responsibility’, a ‘shared attentiveness 
and an affective field established across space, bodies and 
objects’ (2012, 39). Perhaps, as Darwin did, there is a need for 
humans to listen more closely to the non-human and consider 
more carefully the potential of non-human capacities. If we think 
these capacities and individuations from the perspective of the 
field more than from any object, then we may arrive at a trans-
human sympathy that recognises not only the capacities of rocks 
and worms, but also a human potential for greater resonance 
with the ecology. This might be the very tentative beginnings 
of a different kind of sympathetic exploration that could also 
instigate our own adventure into greater expressive freedom: an 
ethics as relevant to rocks and worms (more specifically of rock-
ing and worm-ing), that is an expanded ethics of differential ‘life 
potentials’ (Massumi and McKim 2009, 12).
Joyce Hinterding’s Induction Drawings
When it comes to applying these ideas of capacities to feel 
(powers to select and self satisfy) to art, what is it that we might 
be looking for? Perhaps it is an art that plays with and off specific 
difference, concerns itself with flux, with an in-forming. Perhaps 
it is to seek an artwork that allows space for the emergence of 
feelings of its component events, which might seek not to impose 
a human-centered perspective or entertainment but instead 
might favour an entertaining of an environment by (and for) 
itself. This might be a paying-attention-to (a listening) and making 
space and/or time for different scales of interaction, different 
capacities to ingress into proceedings as nascent eruptions 
of difference.
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Joyce Hinterding’s Induction Drawings (see Figure 3.1), I propose, 
might exhibit just such characteristics and concerns. In these 
works Hinterding makes continuous graphite drawings on 
paper, wires them up (sans microphone), via amplification to a 
speaker system. The graphite forms a continuous conductive 
loop through which an electrical charge can move, when such 
a charge occurs its fluctuations are converted into speaker 
vibrations and thus heard as sound.151 The sounds heard in the 
work are the result of the phenomenon of electromagnetic 
induction: sensitivity within the drawing loops to the differentials 
of fields of magnetic flux that causes a current to be generated in 
the graphite ‘circuit’ (induction loop). The natural phenomena of 
induction occurs when one potentially electro-conductive closed 
system (such as the graphite drawing) is in close proximity to an 
electromagnetic field (such as a body, a voltage loop or magnet), 
and a sympathetic or parasitic resonance occurs that causes 
a transient current in the first system. It is a resonance – two 
energies in communication (Deleuze 2002a, 65) – not the same 
electromagnetic force flowing between the systems. Each is self-
determining. This resonance occurs only through differentiation: 
Fig. 3.1 Joyce Hinterding, Soundwave: Induction Drawings, 2012
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it is only change in the original electromagnetic field that causes a 
sympathetic voltage to flow in the induction system.
Multiple factors are drawn together – selected and felt – by an 
induction loop (in this case the graphite drawing) in order to 
create the inductive current. That is, the event of the inductive 
charge is drawn from a concrescence or patterning of a 
number of other events or actualisations that act as objects 
for the insipient induction: the strength of the electromagnetic 
field, the area that this covers, and its rate of change (and the 
electromagnetic field is, as an event itself, already a subjective 
synthesis of all the various emitters of magnetic force in the 
vicinity that are valuated as relevant – bodies, machines, 
electronic devices, magnets and so on). This is Faraday’s law 
of induction, where induced electromotive force in any closed 
circuit is equal to the rate of change of the magnetic flux 
enclosed by the circuit.152 This law is a differential equation, 
expressing an immanent contrast (difference differing) between 
the three key objects from which datum is prehended by the 
induction event: an event that expresses a particular and 
subjective patterning of this datum as intensity.
The induction is atomic, constantly reinventing itself in relation 
to the changing conditions. Like the worms, this induction is 
a kind of ecological intelligence. It is not in any way related to 
human or worm intelligence and experience, but the induction 
loop’s own ingression into the ecology with which it individuates, 
an expression of its capacity to prehend relevant differences 
differing and to put this datum to use to satisfy its own 
concrescence.
Two contrasts are needed to produce this induction: firstly, a rate 
of change in magnetic field from the position or subjective view of 
the induction loop153 (an individuating difference that is qualitative 
and intensive), and secondly, a contrast in the angles of the two 
fields that meet (that is, between the electromagnetic field and 
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the induction loop, with the two flows at an angle to each other). 
A new contrast is always produced in that the resulting induction 
loop flows in opposition to the original electromagnetic field. 
Such held contrasts operate problematically (being unresolved) 
and productively (producing the novelty of induction out of this 
ongoing prehensive differentiation or intensity). The potential 
for such contrasts is, according to Whitehead, the precondition 
of relations (1978, 228–31). That is, this potential operates as 
a future resonance (the necessary conditions of the field for 
prehension to occur), or intensity, which is the drawing together 
or nexus of contrasts or differences brought together as the 
subjective feelings – in this case, of this particular event of 
induction.154
But, in order to be true to an ethics of attention to all potential 
events in their own right, we must also acknowledge that the 
induction/flow of electrons is not simply a property belonging 
to the graphite drawing/induction circuit, but is an event in and 
of itself. It has its own selfish relationship to viewer, drawing, 
electromagnetic field and so on, and its own patterning of 
contrasts (as on an atomic level there is a patterning of electrons 
– a ferromagnetic ordering – in magnetised materials under 
the influence of electro-magnetic force155). As Isabelle Stengers 
notes, since Faraday’s discoveries, ‘the electromagnetic field has 
exhibited properties irreducible to those of a force “between” 
two charged and localized bodies’ (2011, 101), and the charge 
here is ‘a quantitative character’ of the event rather than a 
property of any electron (Whitehead cited Stengers 2011, 101).156 
It is this ‘character’ that Hinterding lets loose – allowing its voice 
to be heard, its ingression into events to be expressed.
Alongside this event of induction, every component entity 
of the work has, amongst other feelings, its own subjective 
feeling of the other components to draw from: the speakers feel 
and pattern variation in current in the graphite loop, human 
movements are affected by eruptions of sound, and molecules 
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of graphite feel the negative charge of electrons. Whilst every 
element draws datum from the others (and draws conceptually 
from the abstract qualities of flux, vibration, line, volume and 
so on), it is not possible to say that one exactly follows another 
in a linear manner. That is, they cannot draw in a simple way 
from resolved entities as ‘objects’. The activities of concrescence 
are nested within each other. Potentials (individuations) are 
intertwined and co-dependent, it is an emergence that gathers 
(contrasts, relations, feelings, concrescence), and a concreteness 
that continues to become.
The induction loop-event is one particular tuning into the world 
that this artwork highlights. But it also, I think, encourages 
other sensitivities to be explored, allowing other expressions 
to be heard and expanded on such as touch, movements and 
sounds. All of these are events that can be thought of as not only 
between entities but constituting the very feelings of which these 
entities are (re)composing. What is foregrounded and made 
felt, by both the drawing and through mediation by the viewer, 
is the continued ingression of one event into another. This is 
communication across (trans) entities – a resonance between 
certain qualities (orderings of feelings). This might operate 
between a viewer’s electromagnetic field and a potential of the 
graphite line to carry charge, or between the speed – the style of 
movement – and the volume and pitch of acoustic vibrations of 
the speakers.
What might be felt in part by the viewer as they interact with the 
installation is their presence as an object, in the Whiteheadian 
sense, for the graphite loop. That is, as datum to felt by another, 
very distinctly non-human but vital entity: desirous and selfish in 
its exercising of capacities to feel and incorporate some element 
of the human into its becoming, alive in its self-satisfaction and 
independence. But what is felt and made apparent in the human 
is also trans-human – a mobile field of electromagnetism that 
is itself an event drawing on elements of the human that can 
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be utilised, alongside other electromagnetic forces (the mobile 
phone in the viewer’s pocket, static from a nylon shirt, ambient 
charges and so on).
Thus the work asks not only who or what other than the human 
might engage or feel with their eventness, but also how other 
modes of human engagement might occur. While it does not 
deny the visual pleasure of the drawings or a distanced listening, 
it engages across the human with an unseen and largely unfelt 
more-than-human component of us all, the field of our gathering 
electromagnetic expressions. It requires that we pay attention 
to forces that can be felt in their effects, but which cannot 
ever be fully grasped – an oblique attentiveness to differential 
intensity known only as a continued expression of held contrasts. 
These induction artworks enable, I would suggest, an act of 
listening rather than performing, emphasising the singularity of 
feeling as well as the its collectivity.157 We listen to the drawing 
system’s expressions of a particular capacity (to feel flux), as 
the graphite listens to our more than human electromagnetic 
fielding. Unlike in much interactive and new media work where 
such non-human or more than human components are drowned 
out by performance and the instrumentation of non-human 
components that tends to ignore their capacities, perhaps 
Hinterding, like John Cage amplifying cacti, is listening to the 
components, allowing the space or time for the resonances 
between gesture, drawing, movement and flux to arise, giving 
attention to the various manners in which these acts of feeling 
by all components to make themselves felt in the event: the 
graphite’s desires, the electrons’ future-feelings, the speakers’ 
negative prehensions.
Jane Bennett has stated that the ‘ethical task’ at hand is to 
‘cultivate the ability to discern non-human vitality’, to become 
affectually open to the larger ecology (2010, 14) (though again I 
think this is often mistakenly interpreted as a call to acknowledge 
the agency of objects rather than the field). To me works such 
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as Hinterding’s might, in their own humble way, contribute 
towards an ecological turn and towards thinking the more-than-
human. The Induction Drawings make us aware of how ecologies 
emerge across entities, and the importance of non-human 
scales (the slowness of the rock, the micro-activities of the 
worm with their macro-resonances, the continued liveliness of 
a graphite gesture). The works remind us that we must begin to 
think the ecological not as preservation for human use – indeed 
not preservation at all, but an ethics of positivity, that is, of a 
move towards greater involvement, feeling and creativity, as a 
‘veritable theatre of metamorphoses and permutations. A theatre 
where nothing is fixed…[leaving] the domain of representation 
in order to become “experience”…a transcendental empiricism of 
the multiple, chaos and difference’ (Deleuze 1994, 56–7).
4
Thinking parasitic action
Life degenerates when enclosed within the shackles of 
mere conformation. A power of incorporating vague 
and disorderly elements of experience is essential for 
the advance into novelty.
Alfred North Whitehead
A turn towards a minor form of interactivity might be seen as a 
move to an ethical configuration of such events. For Simondon, 
an ethical approach to relation addresses not its relation but 
its immanent construction, enabling an opening to further 
expression and connectivity, and an ability to affect and be 
affected: to affirm both the singular nature of events and 
openness of relational potential (Combes 2013, 65).
As seen in the discussion of Joyce Hinterding’s work in the 
previous chapter, such a definition of an ethical interactivity 
might concern not only the ability of relation to remain open in 
its connective potential, but also the way relation emerges out 
of a play of affectual forces and subjective feelings collectively 
taken into consideration. Murphie defines ethics in art as a 
‘series of practices…which promote expression and machinic 
connections’ (1996, 105). As Murphie argues, the problem for an 
interactive art event is that a work will always re-stratify after 
an event of deterritorialisation. Therefore, to retain this ethical 
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potential to explore collective creative expression and defer 
stasis, the pull of continued potential movement or change is 
required (Murphie 1996, 105). How then might a continuous 
and vigorous drive towards reinvention be structured into an 
event? Rather than just concentrate on the power of the event 
to establish layers of relation, how can their perishing and 
replacement also be driven internally?
In a minor assemblage, its ‘health’ lies, as Murphie says, in 
an ability to conserve creative possibilities (1997, 164–5). In 
the previous chapter I argued, after Judith Jones’ analysis 
of Whitehead’s ontology, that just such a ‘preservation’ of 
difference could be seen to operate through the held contrasts 
(productive differences) that constitute an event’s becoming 
(and indeed constitute and are indivisible from the whole of 
the event’s subjective life). Yet this ‘holding’ of contrasts should 
not be conceived as static, it is always in-forming, keeping the 
actualizing entity at the point of ‘supersession by novel actual 
things’ (Whitehead 1978, 45–6). For a system to continue to 
approach a molecular state, it is not enough to establish relation. 
It must continue to agitate – even if this molecular agitation 
exists on a virtual plane as an ‘unrealized potential’ (Whitehead 
1978, 45–6), luring prehension towards further individuation.
To become an event that gains the power of continual self-
invention of the everyday experience might require a system 
that is able to include not just a positive connectivity, but 
disconnections and failed, disruptive, competing and destructive 
relations (as Whitehead’s system includes both the negative in 
terms of negative prehensions, and ‘competition’ in the singular 
subjective ingressions of an entity into all other entities). What 
is needed to activate a machine capable of drift is potential 
machinic difference – a capacity to intensively produce change 
that then acts on a local level to agitate and destabilise (Deleuze 
and Guattari1986, 50). To remain intensively relational here, we 
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must look for a disruptive movement that has a causal logic, 
however complex.
Michel Serres proposes that ‘noise’ in a relation is a necessary 
condition of its existence, stating that ‘if a relationship succeeds, 
if it is perfect, optimum and immediate; it disappears as a 
relation’ (2007, 79). That is, relations are a condition of difference 
in a system or assemblage, rather than arising out of harmony or 
equilibrium. As Serres states, relations are full of ‘losses, flights, 
wear and tear, errors, accidents, opacity’ that are their creativity. 
Without this differential capacity composed of excesses, 
surpluses, interferences and disruptions, such systems collapse 
back into a molar configuration (Serres 2007, 92, 127). That is, 
they becomes at best patterns of stratified or ossified relations, 
with a loss of the intensity that opens systems to novelty.158
Serres terms these noises within relation ‘parasites’, and explores 
the parasite as a potential mechanism to complicate and expand 
the idea of co-causality (2007, passim). The parasite here has 
multiple meanings, being both a literal parasite – feeding off 
the energy (both physical and social) of another – but also more 
importantly as the noise in the system of relations. Thus in a 
‘relational’ system there is a potential third position – the parasite 
– (and then a noise within this parasitic relation as a third 
position of this third, and so on) that creatively interferes from 
within the assemblage.
As the noise or disruption to a force, the parasite is the emergent 
difference in relation; relation’s potential to differentiate from 
itself. It is a force that pulls towards a more-than, towards 
a continued individuation or movement of the system that 
differentiates from the actualised. The parasite, as Yates says, 
acts against any ‘fantasy of control or mastery’ (2002, 50). It 
demonstrates how systems generate their own subjective ‘open 
or dissipative’ differentiation through interdependence produced 
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by disruption: ‘systematic orderings, local ecologies or drifts’ 
produced by ‘momentary deployments of forces’ (Yates 2002, 50).
The parasite is essentially creative, in that it forces into existence 
new logics, new combinations, and new orders of exchange 
(Serres 2007, 35), as a difference that unifies through the 
production of relation (Deleuze 1994, 56). It disrupts clear 
communications, but produces something else through its 
(mis)translation of relations. This third position in the system is 
itself unstable, Serres argues, as the roles are interchangeable 
and fluid – each position is potentially noise for the other two. 
Therefore parasites lie in between any absolute or fixed position, 
always fuzzy and multiple, contradictory and irresolvable. This 
destabilises any hierarchy or relational equilibrium, making each 
position implicit in the relation of the other two (a nesting or 
quasi-causality) (Serres 2007, 182).
This is the ‘disorder’ or unpredictability of relational systems 
in drift that is inclusive of the disjunctions and failures that are 
always initiating new orders (Whitehead 1978, 91). The parasitic 
proposition is a machine that produces a continued evolution of 
difference: a difference in relation and then further difference 
within this difference. As a movement or molecularisation within 
any system, the parasite is potentially an engine capable of 
driving drift through its continued problematisation of relation. 
Parasites turn any linear system of relations into a complex and 
intertwined set that is never fully resolvable, making ‘chains of 
contingency’ (Serres 1995, 71) and then continuing to activate or 
reactivate these chains (Yates 2002, 51) so that they are more a 
‘series of frictions’ than a linkage – ‘tangential, contingent [and] 
unstable’ (Serres 1995, 73).
It should be evident that this productive concept of noise is 
very different to its position within communication theory, as 
Shannon and Weaver conceptualise it. Within their systemisation, 
noise is only the ‘unfortunate and unwanted additions’: 
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distortions, static and errors (Shannon and Weaver 1967, 7–8). 
For them information exists as in a pure, abstracted form (the 
medium is not the message), that can ideally be transmitted 
between a stable source and receiver. Here message, sender 
and recipient transcend the actual conditions of the event of 
communication in an artificial separation of semantics and 
information as signal (Shannon and Weaver 1967, 8). This 
problematically supposes that information is simply replicated 
across the divide between two objects, rather than needing 
to be reproduced (Ingold, 159).159 Any ‘freedom’ created by 
the presence of noise is, in Shannon and Weaver’s thinking an 
‘undesirable uncertainty’, as uncertainty can only be desirable 
if it is located in the agency of the sender to make choices 
(1967, 19). Thus, from a process philosophy viewpoint that 
seeks a productive problematisation or intensity of relation, 
their communication theory fails not only to acknowledge the 
essential role of differentiation in producing novelty, but also 
seems to deny noise its own status as an event with its own 
subjective prehension of the sender, signal and receiver – all of 
which are given an (artificially stable) agential status.160
Serres’ parasite, however, is more than a simple disruption to 
established relation. It is a potential that is immanent to relation 
in-the-making. This is a potential at the stage of prehensive 
lure towards connection that always positions relation at the 
point of splitting and differentiating. In this the parasite is, as 
Serres states, ‘a third [that] exists before a second’ (2007, 63). 
This is a system of differenciation161 – potential difference – as 
much as actualised differentiation. It is a system of internally 
organising and foregrounding the lure of instability and 
difference in creation. The parasite is a self-organising multiplier 
of relations – it bifurcates any stable exchange as a derivation 
from equilibrium, with ‘abuse-value’ rather than exchange-value 
(Serres 2007, 17).162
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This creates new relationships through the eruption of 
difference that ‘recharges the activity of relating from which all 
experience emerges’, as Massumi states, it is not deconstruction 
but ‘continued construction – reconstruction on the fly, not 
interruption, but recharging and resaturation with potential’ 
(2011, 102).163 This implies creating a propositional structure 
where relations not only layer, but also have the inbuilt potential 
to interrupt each other. Even as virtual noise, parasites create 
open-endedness – potential disruptions that can create a tension 
acting on any actualised relation to keep it on the verge of 
change or collapse, multiplying its virtual qualities rhizomically.164
On an interactive design level, the productive implications of 
the parasite might involve firstly the acknowledgment and 
encouragement of a wider range of potentially disruptive 
relations. Secondly, utilising the flexibility in relational positioning 
that the parasite forces into existence, and, thirdly, the more 
concrete construction of generative systems – with the inbuilt 
potential to interrupt and distort each other on multiple scales, 
and within many differing types of relational forces. The first of 
these factors involves understanding ways in which sensorial, 
affective and social relations can creatively alter and disrupt the 
actual individuated experience in any event, for example:
• Utilising the disruption of personal propositional 
tendencies – styles of movement, for instance – with 
which the participant disrupts the artist-artwork 
propositional relationship;
• Understanding how participants’ emotional tonality 
may affect their experience, magnifying some aspects, 
minimizing or negating others, connecting their 
experience to memories;
• Considering how the participants’ movements might 
disrupt any stability of software/sensor relations;
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• Understanding how the vibrations of sounds felt through 
the floor will complicate the sense information gained 
through the ears;
• Acknowledging how the affective tonality of the 
room might be disrupted with the arrival of another 
body, creating a hyper awareness or ‘transparency’ 
of temporality within one’s body in relation to the 
event, making a participant hyperconscious of posture, 
disrupting their image of themselves.165
Secondly, the parasitic model embraces fluidity in relation to 
any art event, enabling numerous interchangeable parasitic 
diagrams that could be described. For example, if we return to 
A Chorus of Idle Feet, the artwork example from Chapter Two 
in which the movements of the viewers comingled with the 
sensor infrastructure, software and the production of rhythmic 
pulses of sound, we can see the interchangeability of the three 
positions within parasitic relations. From one position, the 
participant is the host; the software draws energy from their 
body, and the parasite is the rhythmic sounds that disrupt the 
participant’s movements. From another position, the software 
can be the host, in relation with the sound that draws the energy 
to mutate from its wave patterns, while the participant is the 
parasite, interfering with their simple communication through 
speed and rhythm of the body’s movement. The sound might 
also be considered the host, in communication with ears/brain/
kinesthetic functioning that draw stimulation from the vibrations, 
with this communication disrupted by the additional difference 
in rhythm that the software insistently implants in the relation. 
The exploitation and enhancement of these naturally slippery 
relations brings to the event an unpredictability of any planned 
interaction – continual, subtle re-tunings of relations that 
modulate and invent.
Thirdly, the parasite provides a focus in the more overtly 
concrete design of sensor-machine interactions, factoring 
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in potential perishings or negations as primary creative 
propositions within intensively active systems. In A Chorus of 
Idle Feet, the various sensor-machine produced vibrations could 
be seen to be parasitic in their potential diffractive actions on 
each other and to involve a drifting. Much of the system still 
seems linear and predicable in its relational connectivity – with 
a trigger from a sensor activating a sound via connecting wires, 
computer interface, sound program, and speaker system (see 
Figure 4.1). In the design, however, this was complicated through 
building in multiple competing relations with the potential to act 
parasitically on each other.
The application of a series of parasitic propositions, in even 
one small part of this chain, altered the nature of relation. 
For example, in the relations between the sensor output that 
triggered sounds, a series of competing propositional potentials 
were designed that complicated any actualisation of a sound. 
Other sensor events had the potential to turn off the sound 
sample, and/or swap it for a different sound, and/or modulate its 
volume so that it might be inaudible or dominant, and so on (see 
Figure 4.2). Here in the latter example the eventual sound event 
involved a complex series of prehensions, both positive and 
negative, and a patterning of this datum. In the linear example 
however, while there were still prehensions of other events, there 
was less tension between the potential and actualised relations 
and ingressions of datum.
In such relatively simple ways, the design moved from a 
linear causation of relation of movement-equals-sound – a 
realisation of the possible – to multiple complex potential 
events intermeshed within a nexus of relations. Here the 
Figure 4.1 A linear chain of relations.
Sensor ➝ wire ➝ interface ➝ program ➝ wire ➝ speaker ➝ sound
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‘noise’ of disruption, a continual force moving the process 
into reconfiguration. These two designs need not be seen in 
oppositional terms, rather, there is a distinction between a 
differentiation that leads only to the possible, and a ‘hyper-
differentiation’ that might ‘seethe with fractal future-pasts’ of the 
unactualised potentials (Massumi 1992, 91).166
The nexus of relations here can be seen to operate not just as 
independently self-satisfying, but also as complexly and fluidly 
interrelated through disjunctive events of emergence. These 
are potential noises within relations that construct through 
disrupting create intensity and the potential for novelty. An 
enriched connection to the virtual proposed relation as more 
than just complex vector relations of physical interdependence. 
Here a technological system utilising simple components began 
to approach a relational modelling, as each trigger became a 
factor within a complex series of interrelated events that were 
concerned with rhythms, intervals and disruptions that built an 
‘ecology’ of interdependent components (Manning 2009, 74).
This complex system of relations was then multiplied 
exponentially for each sound event, and its virtual potentials 
also added to the equation.167 Triggers that shifted the sound 
Figure 4.2 Parasitic potential relations.
sensor trigger/cancel trigger ➝ cancel sound A
 = sound?
sensor trigger ➝ volume up
sensor trigger/cancel trigger ➝ (sound A)
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emitted from one speaker to another also disrupted the spatial 
relations of the sounds. Other triggers proposed competing 
shifts in the tonal qualities of the sound produced – changes to 
the equalisation, reverberation, and so on – potentially disrupting 
the perception of sound by bodies.
In this example, the parasitic potentials of the system drew the 
various machines into implication in each other’s individuation 
through its entangled chains of cause and effect. Not only were 
these machines all concerned with the production of sounds, 
they are also involved in the actualisation of each other, as they 
began to affect the success or failure of each other’s productive 
expressions. Differentiation here was the unifying element 
– activating the individuation of relation between entities 
and assemblages that were implicated within each other’s 
actualisation. This was, at the same time, a differenciation that 
created a shared potential or priming for further disruptions and 
relational entanglement, and reveals the potential of disruptive 
noise to open a system.
The parasitic embraces Deleuze’s concept of a ‘difference without 
negation’, it operates as a productive or ‘positive’ differentiation, 
rather than an oppositional difference (1994, xx, 205). That is, 
rather than acting as a negation that ‘subordinates difference 
to itself’, it creates problems within a system that are positively 
productive (Deleuze 1994, 266–7). This means, firstly, that all 
the differences have a productive or creative role to play in the 
drive towards novelty of the system. Secondly, it means that 
those differences not actualised in any one event remain open 
to further potential influence on the future of the event. The 
competing forces of the parasitic potential disruptions within 
the system create a logic by which the system intensively ‘works 
out’ what sound will actualise. It is a self-creative unity that in 
each instance creates a set of competing propositions, which 
then drift according to local and singular conditions in any one 
instance, rather than according to any preconceived outcome.
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Relations within a parasitically activated system have a new 
intensity. They continue, even after splitting, to contain the 
tension of potential further such actualisations of disruption. This 
both molecularises and concretises the system by demanding a 
reconfiguration of each relational pull in relation to every other 
actual and potential force. There are always tendencies towards 
multiple, incompatible future splits, and therefore the relational 
forces remain in a problematised state that cannot be resolved 
into stasis.
Here parasitic tendencies evolve, not simply in reaction to 
established relation, but as a force of relation. The virtual and 
the actual parasite are emergent events in and of themselves. 
While there is always difference contained within a system, 
constructing an event that accentuates the parasitic tendencies 
of relations to creatively disrupt themselves perhaps shifts it 
further towards a state of hyper-differentiation.
This parasitic modelling remains emergent, embracing change 
and contradiction, constantly at a point of rearranging. Again, it is 
a way of enabling the conditions for difference to arise within the 
event, rather than a prescription of actualised differences. This 
conception of the parasite allows a way of describing a dynamic, 
emergent and complex series of relations, a methodology that 
embraces the potential fluidity. The point to such design is, in 
a sense, to not have a point: to rescue such art-events from 
purposefulness, to encourage growth, mutation and destruction, 
to enable an event to generate its own forces of concrescence, 
and find its own satisfaction. This does not imply an absence 
of artistic input in any negative sense, but a shift towards 
propositional, speculative structuring.168 It places emphasis on 
the intensification of relation through differentiation, a shift that 
embraces the richness and lure towards future creativity of a 
dynamic virtual milieu.
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The task for the artist is to steer interactivity towards the 
propositional, to invent ways to keep the event and the temporal 
experience of participation unstable, to keep assemblages fluidly 
creative. The point of this multiplication of the virtual is twofold.
Firstly, it makes the work as the event, the temporal experience 
of participation, unstable; it keeps the assemblage fluid and 
emergent – always reconfiguring, inventing new relationships of 
connection depending on the specifics of involvement.
Secondly, this instability begins to apply not just to the actual 
experience, but to the language that is used to articulate the 
event – it becomes a kind of meta-modelling of the experience, 
which combines various potential relations and interferences 
into a model that describes the event.
This combination is an immanent critique, always at a point of 
change or dissipation; it applies only to a specific viewpoint, and 
a specific moment, and must always be reinvented. As a model, 
it remains emergent, embracing change and contradiction, 
always needing to be rearranged. What this language of the 
parasite then begins to allow is a way of describing the dynamic, 
emergent and complex events of relation that embrace their 
potential fluidity, rather than a concentration on the form and 
comprehendible movement. The remainder of this book is 
dedicated to such an open exploration, with a series of different 
parasitic tactics across a number of registers, all potentially 
capable of driving interactive events through the intensive 
production of difference.
5
Walking with the world: towards a minor 
approach to performative art practice
One walks down the path to get somewhere, but 




Walking is intrinsically inventive and relational: to space, to 
the body itself, and to the potential that it both creates and 
differentiates. Walking moves us beyond a stable configuration 
of relations between a subject and objects, and towards a more 
complex experience that begins to escape such boundaries. It 
is, in the broadest sense, a parasitic tactic for the disruption of 
social, physical and mental structuring, capable of folding the 
body into the world – and world into body – a molecularisation 
that excites and disrupts.
This chapter considers the potential of walking as a ‘minor’ 
practice. For Michel de Certeau, cities are excessively stratified 
and homogenising systems that might be troubled through 
a technique of walking. Walking, de Certeau argues, is a ‘soft 
resistance’ that seeks a creative flight through reactivating 
connections between bodies and their environment. As 
Ben Highmore articulates, such walking is ‘minor’ in that it is 
positioned less as direct opposition to structure, and more 
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as that which ‘hinders and dissipates the energy flows of 
domination’ (Highmore 2002, 152).
Every walk we set out on, even the most mundane and 
functional, is inherently an adventure into the unknown, into 
improvisation and discovery. If we are too jaded or numb 
to notice, then we have only to invite a small child or dog to 
accompany us to realise or invent creative and connective 
possibilities. With a child in tow or towing us, our walk can never 
be simply a blinkered move from A to B. Instead, it is rich with 
potential. It splits to become multiple: consisting of many foci, 
intensities, and heterogeneous singularities (Manning 2009, 
7). A particular smell, a pretty tree, a siren, and a cat, a game 
instantly evoked out of the walk: all layers of an experience 
that is being continually reinvented in response to stimuli. Our 
bodies rearrange and respond to the affordances of the rock 
underfoot, a cold wind, the effort of a hill, the anticipation of a 
busy road ahead, the pull of the dog’s leash. As Erin Manning 
says, in moving, the body and the space vibrate with potential 
relationships and affects (Manning 2009, 13). Such a walk is 
capable of being expansive without necessarily getting lost – a 
becoming-with the environment. It is for de Certeau a spatial 
practice that ‘slips into the clear text of the planned and readable 
city’ (1988, 93).
Stratifying and restricting forces exist not only within cities, 
but also within bodies that are unified and ordered by habit 
and subjection, succumbing to stasis and a loss of connectivity 
and breadth of expression. This Deleuze and Guattari term 
a body’s own capacity for ‘micro-fascism’ (1987, 215). As 
movement complicates and disrupts established spatial 
relations, multiplying and creating new immanent connections 
to extend the potential of the body in space, it might also allow 
a becoming-minor of a body. Walking, as Manning argues, is a 
temporal, re-combinatory operation of becoming that decentres 
subjectivity and troubles stasis (2009, 23); thus a moving body 
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is always more than a fixed identity (2009, 63–4). Arakawa and 
Madeline Gins conception of the ‘landing sites’ (2002, 5–22) – 
nodes of attention that the moving body produces – further 
explores minor procedures where bodies and environment fold 
into one another and disturb boundaries. The intermeshing of 
body-world potential that Arakawa and Gins articulate is always 
in-process, a performative exploration within an established 
system, be it a body or a place.
Here movement fundamentally disturbs boundaries. It 
complicates relations as it multiplies and creates new immanent 
connections – relation in-the-act. Walking differentiates and 
intensifies life, folding the body into the world and world into 
body (an environmental or ecological engagement169), exciting 
and operating processes of creative disruption. It is, in the 
broadest sense, a parasitic tactic for the disruption of social, 
physical and mental structuring, turning a rote exercise into an 
attentive adventure.
In this chapter, Nathaniel Stern’s Compressionism performance 
is examined for its ability to enable exploration of a minor 
potential of walking. The configuration of technical objects and 
bodies in Compressionism contributes to a reactivation of the 
streets as de Certeau proposes, and allows a reconfiguration 
of intensive bodily relations through the activation of new 
internal and external sites of attention. I argue that the technical 
components of Compressionism help to transport the body 
beyond habit. While this assembling of bodies and technologies 
helps to constitute an ‘augmented awareness’ that might be 
cynically viewed as a postmodern counterpart to some romantic 
or mythical past of ‘pure’ non-stratified relation to place, my 
interest here in the work is rather that it problematises the 
habitual acts of walking and engaging with the environment. In 
this, Compressionism demands that the participant’s body seek 
out new intensive and extensive minor relational potential. From 
this perspective Compressionism can be viewed as a procedure 
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to ‘escape or “reenter” habitual patterns of action’ in order to 
reinvigorate our attention to these processes of contraction 
(Arakawa and Gins 2002, 62), to explore alternative routes, 
reinvent both processes and outcomes, and to embody a minor 
practice.170
Making the world/performing space
For de Certeau, walking through the streets recreates the city as 
more than a fixed ‘geometrical or geographical space of visual, 
panoptic or theoretical constructions’ (1988, 93).171 The immanent 
movements and ‘tactics’ of everyday life produce a relational, 
contingent experience. In ‘walking the city’, de Certeau examines 
ways that deterritorialisation of spatial order is enabled 
through the act of walking, and the positive personal and social 
implications of these movements (1988, vii). This is positioned as 
a ‘tactic’ that destabilises, a fragmentary insinuation into place to 
reappropriate it ‘without taking over in its entirety’ (de Certeau 
1988, xiv). It is a destabilisation that does not necessarily impose 
new order, remaining immanent and essentially per-formed 
rather than a preformed strategy (de Certeau 1988, xix, xx). In 
walking’s immanent recomposition of static place as ‘vectors 
of direction, velocities, time variables…intersections of mobile 
elements’ (de Certeau 1988, 117), it molecularises or reenergises 
these territorialised ‘places’ (de Certeau 1988, 117.).172 As Tim 
Ingold notes, in such a conception of walking and the space itself, 
both lack any real ‘essence’ or idealised form, but rather the act 
of movement explores emergent differential capacities held 
between bodies and environment (2011, 49, 24).
Here de Certeau sets up a clear distinction between an 
abstracted and disembodied or distanced concept of a space 
(such as the view of a city from the heights of a skyscraper) 
(92), and the embodied interactions within such spaces that 
movement enables. A number of other authors have explored 
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these distinctions, if not always utilising the terms in the same 
way.173 James J Gibson argues that there is no abstract space or 
time that is then ‘filled in’ by lived experience, but rather a ‘flow 
of ecological events’ that are heterogeneous and differentiated 
(1979, 93). Similarly, Ingold describes the emergent space of 
movement as ‘unclassifiable’, consisting not of stable and 
inherent properties, but a dynamic relational field of ‘meshwork’ 
that is always ‘under construction’, reproduced and reinvented 
(rather than replicated) through movement (2011, 159–60).174 
Manuel DeLanda makes a clear distinction between such 
‘meshworks’ and ‘state’ structuring of space that is useful here 
as it avoids the naïve concept that a deterritorialisation of space 
is either sustainable or necessarily positive. Rather, he defines 
the latter as a centrally organised and rigidly controlled space, 
and the former as a ‘bottom up’ approach to the organisation 
of space that consists of complex, intertwined heterogeneous 
elements largely self-organising (DeLanda 2011, 257–274 
and passim).
Indeed, as Ingold notes, any expanded concept of space could 
be misconstrued to still imply a static order that positions livable 
places inside of static space. This would, he argues, retain the 
concept of living as bound to the landscape rather than positing 
them as existing ‘through, around, to and from [places], from 
and to places elsewhere’ (Ingold 2011, 148). Movement for Ingold, 
after Deleuze and Guattari, is not a connection between points 
or places, but always runs between: an uncontainable line of 
flight breaking boundaries (2011, 83). The point here is the need 
to replace or reinvigorate the imposed structuring with potential 
for greater novelty and interrelatedness (to molecularise). This is 
the potential that the tactic of walking proposes in the city space 
for de Certeau.
Michelle Lamant comments that de Certeau’s tactics allow 
pedestrians to ‘create for themselves a sphere of autonomous 
action within the constraints that are imposed on them’ (1987, 
Walking with the world 115
720). The walker, she argues, reconfigures the impersonal, visible 
and knowable space of the city streets through minor methods 
born of creativity rather than passive or active resistance 
(Lamant 1987, 720), replacing the productive and pre-structured 
place with an improvisational experience that operates inside 
the established systems. Of interest here is not the problematic 
and romantic return to the flâneur, as de Certeau’s argument can 
be read.175 Rather, it is that de Certeau’s walker reactivates their 
relationship to a space by emphasising the reconfiguration of 
relations out of existing entities, and the continual differential 
action of movement that keeps these relations at this point of 
splitting, rejoining and re-layering.
Walking invites an intimacy and active engagement with 
the singularities composing an experience that enriches the 
homogenising actions of a place. The streets we navigate or 
describe through remembered movements and sensations might 
perhaps disrupt any idea of an absolute organisation of space 
with our shifting experience over time. Instead, as de Certeau 
says, they become a ‘story, jerrybuilt out of elements’ that is both 
‘allusive and fragmentary’ (1988, 102),176 layering and splitting the 
existing structure, filling the streets with ‘forests’ of ‘desires and 
goals’ (1988, xxi) to make the world habitable. An ‘in-between’ 
is created that allows a movement, a flow of forces, bodies 
and affects.
In walking, the experience of the city is always an intimate 
and shifting engagement, as feet selectively prehend the 
qualities rather essential properties of the street. The street 
is ‘a course cloth of patchwork woven from the comings and 
goings of its manifold inhabitants’ (Ingold 2011, 16), that splits 
the homogenising actions of the city through a continued 
gathering of singular ecologies of feelings. It is an immediate 
engagement with materiality, a creative coming together of 
surfaces. Mobility here activates the productive potential of 
life, giving it ‘it its seemingly infinite range of specific virtual and 
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actual individuations’ (Murphie 2005a, 1). Thus walking becomes 
a technique of differentiation that extends and complicates, 
positioned as a creative derivation from that which is already 
in existence (Deleuze 1994, xx). It is a positive parasitism that is 
‘molecular’ in allowing new communication or composition in the 
spaces between components (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 41).
Differentiating the body
While walking can disrupt and reconfigure relations to space, 
Manning argues that it can also work to differentiate bodies 
through movement, allowing exploration of new potential 
intensive connections. Imagine that you are standing 
stationary in a doorway, about to walk out. Except that 
‘stillness’ undermines itself: you are already always moving in 
two important ways (Manning 1996, 43–7). Firstly in a literal 
and physical sense, the body is always in a state of intensive 
micro-movement. Heart, lungs, eyelids, and eyes are the more 
obvious aspect of this, even though for the most part they 
operate below an overtly conscious, willful level. There are 
also the efforts of the muscles as they continue to exert force 
in opposition to gravity to keep one upright, and as the body 
performs constant micro movements and adjustments to keep 
balanced. The relatively still body, Manning states, is in fact a 
series of ‘micro-postures that move in tandem with the rejigging 
of micro-movements’ (1996, 44), perceptual disruption and 
differentiation.177 Here, one could argue, the body is always 
in a process of perceptually differentiating, in that it has its 
own differential machines – technics – built into the sensory 
distributions of the body. These operate in the interval – the 
differential. Again it is this gap between – a qualitative intensity 
– that is meaningful: the felt experience between the data 
processed from one ear/eye/nostril/foot and another, a held 
contrast before a relation.178 Movement here activates the 
continuous streams of noise that are perceptual differentials, 
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and this ‘perception/action continuum’ of differentiation is 
emergent with movement, intrinsically composed of and with 
such movement (Murphie 2005a, 6).179
Secondly, the continuous gathering and incipient pull of the 
virtual also undermines stillness. As you are about to begin, 
Manning proposes, milieus of virtual possibilities are composing 
themselves, creating tensions, an ‘elasticity’ that is released as 
the possibilities resolve into an actual movement. The choices 
are not infinite, in that not everything is physically possible, but 
are limitless in that they are being endlessly created, and each 
choice generates another equally complex series of choices. 
They resolve in the satisfaction of an actual event (your left foot 
takes a small step straight ahead), and all the virtual movements 
perish. This event ‘propels the preacceleration of a new occasion’ 
(Manning 1996, 38–9). New sets of virtualities begin composing 
possibilities for the next step, shaped by many things, such as 
the limits of body, habits, responses to the space, and so on, 
and it is movement that both generates and selects from the 
potential actions.
Movement here, Manning says, cuts across the body (2013a, 46), 
connecting and disrupting the actualised body’s relation to its 
larger potential, which is always also reconstituted by the activity. 
It is a technique by which a body accomplishes the shifting 
beyond itself of ongoing individuation. This evolving potential for 
new connections is a minor ‘flight’ from stasis, a flight that is not 
an escape from oneself, but an increase in intensity, or richness 
of potential (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 13).
Landing sites: worlding the body
Walking the space of the city is never without constraints: 
proposing and conditioning movement, the body’s projection 
and diffusion into space. Environments provide conditions – 
platforms of potential actions – that affect the actions of the 
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walker. As Massumi argues, a park bench, for example, creates 
anticipation of a certain habitual action (sitting), and in this 
way works to order the movement in the space. The bench is a 
‘storage of repose’ that creates suggestions of actions. While one 
could sit on the ground or stand on the bench, Massumi argues 
that the image of the bench creates anticipation of a certain 
habitual action (bench-equals-sitting), and in this way works to 
order the movement in the space (2003b, 5).180 These conditions 
can enable as much as they constrain, proposing new actions.
Massumi relates this both to Gibson’s concept of ‘affordances’ 
and Arakawa and Gins’ concept of ‘landing sites’. Affordances 
are what the environment ‘offers’ or ‘provides or furnishes’ an 
animal (Gibson 1979, 119). Affordances are about productive 
relationships. What is prehended is not the object as such but 
the relational or interactive potential between objects and 
bodies (Gibson 1979, 126). That is, affordances are perceived 
potential machinic couplings-through-movement. Affordances, 
Gibson writes, are not neutral or abstract but complementary 
and specific to an individual animal’s tendencies. An affordance 
‘points two ways, to the environment and the observer’ (Gibson 
1979, 132). They are a prehension of the potential of the body as 
much as of the environment (Gibson 1979, 132). Affordances then 
exist and interact with each other in complex and nested sets 
or ‘niches’ that are ecologies in and of themselves, whereby ‘the 
niche implies a kind of animal, and the animal implies a kind of 
niche’ (Gibson 1979, 120).181
Such affordance are propositions, ‘lures towards feelings’ 
(Whitehead 1978, 259), constructing potential from which events 
can draw. For example, a patch of grass might afford many 
responses from the walker: a place to lie down, the danger of 
snakes in summer, wetness to be avoided after rain, the smell of 
the countryside, an opportunity to sit and talk, and so on. These 
propositions potentially operate on multiple levels – sensorial 
(softness underfoot/wetness/smells), affectual (inviting tiredness 
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and an urge to rest, fear of hidden danger, joy of free space to 
play), kinesthetic (sitting, lying, running, walking), and social 
(conversation, solitary contemplation). The conditions of the 
space do not necessarily impose a habitual bodily response; 
rather, they can lure a range of potential actions into being, 
triggered by common constraints (Gibson 1979, 119).
These constraints are immanently performed by the body-in-
composition as it walks. The ground, for example, is an ‘enabling 
constraint’ of movement intrinsically related to the form and 
practice of walking (Manning 2009, 70),182 as gravity plays a role 
in shaping some movements (exertion increasing up a steep hill) 
as much as it precludes others (leaping walls), wrapping the feet 
into sensorial relationship with surface textures and resistances 
of various materials underfoot. This active making of movement-
body-space is not limited to, nor even primarily located in, 
conscious mental activity, as propositions ‘are not primarily for 
belief, but for feeling at the physical level of unconsciousness’ 
(Whitehead 1978, 186). Conscious – mindful183 – and pre-
conscious movements are capable of both the habitual and 
improvisatory.
Certain activities and spaces more forcefully and productively 
disrupt habits by requiring an active and attentive care that 
brings to the fore the processes of connection and projection 
into the world. The urgency of movement and the complex 
negotiations required to enter or exit a peak hour train, for 
example, both instinctively causes one to edge into a gap 
between bodies that affords passage and brings to our 
consciousness the continual negotiations and collective 
reconfiguring of space required by moving in the city. We must 
calculate who will allow passage, who must be edged around, 
intuiting minute adjustments of tempo and posture to keep a 
free space ahead. Positional information comes at the body 
from all directions as we compose a provisional line through the 
chaos. With every step, the space available and the potential for 
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the next move shift, and both body and path must always be 
renegotiated, making premeditated paths redundant. It is in such 
moments of intensely improvised movement that the space and 
body might together begin to approach a contingent, immanent 
quality.184 Such an encounter with the city is far from the free 
and idle wandering of the flâneur; it is a series of conversations 
between competing forces and potentials affecting both the 
configuration of the space and the composition of the body 
(Manning 2009, 15).
Arakawa and Gins concept of ‘landing sites’ provides a useful 
refining of affordances (2002, 7). This is a process of ‘portioning 
out’ space to provisionally deposit sited awareness around the 
body (Arakawa and Gins 2002, 5). The body, they state, takes 
cues from the environment to ‘assign volume and a host of other 
particulars to the world’ (Arakawa and Gins 2002, 7, 9). These 
sites are a way that the body contributes to and distributes 
itself into the world: a ‘holding of the world’ in attention, an 
attention with dispersed foci composed of all perception 
– ‘a bit of substance, a segment of atmosphere, an audible 
anything, a whiff of something, whatever someone notices’ 
(Arakawa and Gins 2002, 81). Landing sites are a process by 
which differentiation of the field occurs, to different degrees of 
specification and diffusion.185 This, Arakawa and Gins argue, is a 
process by which, perceptually and kinesthetically, the world and 
body are immanently enfolded. In this sense, the body not only 
differentiates the space through movement, but also distributes 
itself within the space, contributing its awareness towards things 
in the world.186
Processes of landing sites productively disrupt the limits of the 
body, constructing through dispersion a new extended and 
enriched potential bodying. These projected landing sites fold, 
nest, diffuse and focus dynamically while the body moves. It is a 
constant, creative, noisy process of splitting stable relations.187
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Returning to the space of the peak-hour train, where spatial 
relations shift quickly, this process by which the space-body-
movement relations enfold the body and object/world into 
shared individuations becomes more consciously attended.188 
Entering the train carriage with one’s own particular style 
of moving189, we begin to create landing sites. We distribute 
awareness on both the more physically concrete (arrangements 
of bodies and objects), and on more vague and diffuse levels, 
such as the ephemeral (reflections of light on surfaces or 
affectual tonalities). A change in height or texture underfoot as 
we enter creates a foot-floor site, a commuter’s headphones or 
conversation sites attention vaguely in one direction, the line of 
bodies exiting the train deposits attention towards this flow. The 
vacant seat in front of us concentrates attention not only on the 
object itself and the seat/body kinesthetic potential (stopping, 
sitting, a virtual becoming-with of seat/body that makes the seat 
also part body and body part seat), but also on the kinesthetic 
possibilities of surrounding floor space (the potential of moving 
to or beyond the seat).
Landing sites thus move through, over, around, and inside 
other landing sites, each divisible into smaller sites, continually 
complicating relations as the body moves and redistributes itself 
in the environment. The point we are pressed against other 
bodies in the train carriage becomes a shared site of focused 
attention,190 located within a general awareness of the other 
passengers. As we move through the space, the sites make 
such navigation possible, and begin to propose relational and 
kinesthetic possibilities. The landing site on the exit opposite 
not only creates another site of attention, but also wraps both 
body and door in potential future kinesthetic relation (an exit 
from the train).
These landing sites are in-the-making – as Manning says, a 
‘tending towards relation’ (2013a, 12). This again is a process 
of becoming-minor, a decentering through movements that 
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recombine components of an event (Deleuze and Guattari1986, 
50) and create new intensities through prehensive selection. 
The act of depositing landing sites agitates or molecularises 
boundaries between body and world – destabilising distinctions 
through the creation of shared potential collective individuation.
In the theories of both affordances and landing sites, vision is 
construed as haptic and kinesthetic, and this is far from the role 
de Certeau assigns to vision as inextricably linked to power.191 
Both Gibson and Arakawa and Gins suggest that it has other 
potential operations of an enactive and synesthetic nature, with, 
as James Gibson states, ‘the optic array…not only provid[ing] 
base information but also the possibilities for action on the basis 
of that information’ (Gibson cited in Mock 2009, 96).
 ‘Ecological’ vision, as Gibson describes it, is not about a 
distancing through the reduction of the world to retinal images, 
but an ongoing engagement with the world (1979, 61, 244–6, 
passim). Here vision is a perceptual system, involving ‘eye-head-
brain-body’ rather than passively received messages to be 
decoded by the brain. Thus for Gibson, vision begins not with 
the head fixed and the eye exposed to a series of snapshots 
‘like a camera’, but with ‘the flowing array of the observer who 
walks from one vista to another, moves around an object of 
interest, and can approach it for scrutiny’ (1979, 290). Ecological 
vision is sensed throughout the integrated sensations of 
muscles and body structure and through the movement within 
the environment (an ‘ambulatory vision’) as an embodied, lived 
experience, not the translation of stimuli (Gibson 1979, 291–2).
Manning also elaborates a synesthetic operation of vision that 
is part of a co-mingling of the various senses that themselves 
are linked to movement and also kinesthetic (2009, 49). As we 
move towards some landmark – a tree for example – vision 
operates not just to recognise the image of a tree, but also 
proprioceptively to create the feeling of self within the space 
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(Manning 2009, 49).192 This we might think of as a landing site that 
has been deposited, situating part of the body at the landmark 
ahead. As we move, we see continual variation in image of the 
tree – parts come into the field of vision or disappear, become 
larger or smaller, so that our eyes as they move across the tree 
might act not as ‘a capturing of the world, but a captivating by 
it’ (Manning 2009, 86).193 Furthermore, as Gibson also notes, 
an essential component of vision is proprioceptive, involving 
a registering of ‘movements of the body as much as does the 
muscle-joint-skin system and the inner ear system’ (1979, 175).194
Compressionism
Transdisciplinary artist Nathaniel Stern’s ongoing Compressionism 
performances (2005–)195 comprise a customised, scanner-battery 
pack-laptop assemblage worn or carried by one participant, while 
she or another person holds and moves the scanner surface 
across objects to ‘perform images into existence’ (Stern 2013b) 
through a kind of shared seeing-moving within an environment. 
These scans are literally a ‘compression’ of the temporal act into 
a two-dimensional image (see Figure 5.2), seeking, as Stern says, 
to ‘accent the relationships between the performance, myself, my 
subjects and the tools’ (Stern 2013a).
What does the performance of Compressionism add to the 
already dynamic becomings of the moving body in space, or, 
rather, how does it reinvent and re-molecularise these processes, 
doubling them with new levels of awareness? Compressionism, 
I want to argue, does not alter being, but the manner of being 
(Guattari 1995a, 109): it creatively performs the body (and space) 
in a new way, not to return it to an imagined pre-stratified form, 
nor to replace previous space-body modulations, but to enfold 
it with existing relations. The work here challenges habits, 
provoking participants to intuit new minor ways of being.
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Compressing the city
Performing Compressionism was an awkward act. The size and 
weight of the scanner required that it be held in both hands away 
from the body, with feet braced to maintain balance. This created 
a tension running through the body, stretching toward objects 
to be scanned. Keeping the scanner steady required a clumsy 
cooperation between both scanner and bodyweight as counter-
balance, and also between the holder of the scanner and the 
person carrying the battery pack and laptop capturing the image 
(see Figure 5.1). There was a zone of intimacy established, both 
between the collaborating bodies and between the scanner-body 
assemblage and the objects being scanned. Scanner, body and 
space all conjoined through the act of moving.
Compressionism here involved a close investigative walking – 
through back alleys, parks, along surfaces of objects, architecture 
and bodies. It was an exploration of texture, colour and contrast, 
held together by the collective movement of the bodies-scanner 
machine. The intensive, explorative, close-visioning movement 
in the city enacted through the ‘Compressionist’ event was 
remembered through the personal, composed from actions, 
disjunctions and sensations. One’s experience of the event was 
composed of particular colours, surface textures and variations. 
The colour of a particular leaf, the textural shifts on a building 
surface, the passage from tree to wall to doorway, the incidental 
sounds heard while waiting for the scanner to warm up, the 
effort of a particular stretching of the body – each of these 
coloured one’s experience of the event. It was a fragmentary 
mapping of a space – a haptic or closely focused narration of 
layering intimate, personal actions onto the surface of the city 
space. The haptic here showed its potential in bringing attention 
not just to the surface of the object, but also in its engagement 
with multiple sensations, and with participants’ interior/exterior 
boundaries (Marks, cited Jones 2006, 143).
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Participants performing the scans improvised new literal 
connective passages that opened gaps between systems of 
Figure 5.1 Compressionism Documentation, Montreal, 2012. Digital photograph. 
Photo: Bianca Scliar
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place.196 The scanning travelled up walls or through holes, over 
horizontal, vertical and angled surfaces, backtracking to points 
of interest – inviting and improvising new affectual connections 
as much as the equipment’s awkwardness precluded usual 
styles of movement through the space. The space scanned was 
understood as a series of overlapping and angled surfaces, as 
the scanner was moved parallel to these surfaces, emphasising 
their shifts as the body coordinated the changes in angle – a 
point of ‘touch’ between body and environment.197 Space was 
understood not through a stable image or representation, but 
through practice of engagement: a dynamic expression of the 
relationships between moving bodies and environment that 
was felt through the meshing of forces (rhythm, tempo, shifts 
and variations) (Ingold 2011, 211). Compressionism’s movements 
insinuated into the city the experience of a ‘plurality of centres, 
a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of view’ 
(Deleuze 1994, 56).
Figure 5.2 Nathaniel Stern, Compressionism Scan, Montreal, 2012. Courtesy the 
artist. Digital Image.
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Dancing objects
As participants slowly moved the scanner over the surface of 
an object, these actions were translated into a larger movement 
of the hands and arms – creating an awareness of contours and 
small deviations that was heightened by the fact that the object 
itself was always at least partially obscured from view by the 
scanner. This was a blind, groping approximation of the shape 
that was performed: a scramble of image memory, a drawing of 
the shape with the hands, a constant reforming of posture and 
balance, an attention to the sound of the scanner’s processes 
that resonated with the rhythms of bodies moving. Each object 
invited potential movements in relation to its form. For the 
minute or two before the laptop compressed the data into a 
viewable image, the event existed on its own as an awkward 
dancing of the object, an approximation of vision performed by a 
loose assemblage of other senses, drawn together by movement.
Compressionism afforded new connections between senses 
through movement. Vision became situated ‘along the tendons 
and the muscles’ (Serres ND, unpaginated), and the event 
approximated a new eye-organ out of hands/feet/balance.198 
What would normally be felt as the small-scale movement of 
the eyes traversing an object was explicitly performed (danced) 
as a full body movement, and brought to attention through this 
shift in registers. The body-scanner assemblage performed 
sight, inscribing it in space.199 Here the primary link between an 
ecological perception and movement was made evident to the 
participants – an engagement in an emergent environment that 
demanded time spent along a ‘path of observation’ (Ingold 2011, 
46) rather than an assessment from a fixed point. This embracing 
of the scanning/visioning technics was a minor tactic in that it 
consisted of ‘adding to’ and ‘perverting’ habitual configurations of 
sense organs to increase the intensity of felt experience (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1986, 10).
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The Compressionism event deposited a series of (mobile) landing 
sites in addition to those that walking the space might normally 
require. Attention landed on the new and mobile collaborations 
of sensory input informing the movements (a shared sensory 
experience residing between and linking body/scanner/
world) that caused unexpected intensified conjunctions, and 
cooperation between surfaces beyond their usual functioning 
(Deleuze cited in Grosz 2008, 198). Part of the conscious attention 
landed on the held scanner, as the mechanics of holding and 
operating the equipment forced new improvisation of relations 
and landing sites in the muscles of the hands and arms, in the 
feet maintaining balance – depositing more defined sites of 
attentiveness onto the surface, gradient and texture of the 
ground. Less qualified sites were also deposited in the vague 
attention given to those carrying the rest of the equipment, 
and to the space around the object or surface being scanned. 
The more defined and useful landing sites were in the mobile 
spaces between object and scanner surfaces, while the unseen 
object itself remained a more generalised ‘imaging’ landing 
site, in Arakawa and Gins’ terms, nesting within the particular, 
while resisting definition. In these ongoing differentiations 
Compressionism perhaps molecularised and multiplied local 
connections through a splitting and re-siting of attention 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 50, 37).
Compressionism might be seen to address a heightened 
awareness of, and engagement with, the processes of the 
virtual in two ways. Firstly, it literally created new potential 
that the assemblage’s heterogeneous component parts did 
not hold on their own – such as new capacities for seeing, new 
postural explorations, and new prehensive potential to trigger 
actualisations. Secondly, through continued disruption of any 
developing habit, it promoted a suspension in its own continued 
unfolding that made the ongoing individuations perceptually 
felt. Here the assembling of body and scanner equipment 
provided new levels of potential intensive sensory difference, 
Walking with the world 129
for example: the rhythms of the scanner head moving that the 
body attempted to follow, but never quite duplicated; the new 
decentering weight pulling on bodies that had to be resisted or 
followed; and new restrictions on the range of movements of 
the limbs. All these factors created tensions and difficulties. The 
technological components were not specifically the producers 
of these new relations, but were a technique to activate the 
conditions under which bodies began to explore minor ‘sideways 
and decentered movements’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 50).
Conclusion
What Compressionism produced as its primary outcome were new 
expressions of movement – new improvisational collaborations 
between bodies/scanner/objects /surfaces/space that 
reconstituted each as enactive and extensively relational, both 
collective and singular (Manning 2009, 22). The event demanded 
an augmented or composite awareness, larger than that of the 
body on its own and prior to the event, reconstructing the body’s 
field of sensitivities, and requiring new cooperation between 
bodies, equipment and space.
In thinking more generally of the potentially generative role of 
movement in interactive art, what might Compressionism have 
to offer? Firstly, while many interactive works involve movement 
as a key factor in participation, in this instance, I would suggest, 
there is never a sense that it is a functional movement designed 
simply to link pre-defined capacities of bodies and objects (hand-
to-joystick, gesture-to-sensor). Rather mobile capacities might 
begin to emerge as ‘properties of systems of relations’ (Ingold 
2011, 49) that continue to differentiate from actual conditions 
in a lively relation with the virtual. In developing this type of 
emergent relation, as Massumi comments, a work might attain 
a dynamic co-causality that is often missing in the triggers of 
sensor-based works that instrumentalise movement (2011, 45–6).
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Secondly, unlike many interactive works that employ everyday 
and unthinking movements, Compressionism foregrounds these 
habitual gestures through the awkwardness of the constraints of 
the mechanism, the disruptions to the visual perceptual system, 
and the delays between gesture and its representation in the 
final scanned image. While walking, as both de Certeau and 
Manning argue, might already allow a body to exercise potential 
to produce minor iterations of streets, bodies and their relations, 
here such activity is made strange from within at the same time 
as its relationship to the surfaces of the environment is troubled. 
Perhaps then the key to this artwork’s capacity to activate minor 
potential lies in its problematisation of any mastery of conditions 
or movement, creating awkwardness in the negotiations 
between limbs, bodies and space that made the performers 
strangers within their own movement capacities.200
Compressionism might then be seen as neither an attempt to 
return to pre-stratified states, nor as some new prosthetic 
melding of bodies and technologies to take us beyond the limits 
of the biological, but as a technique for bodies to disorganise 
their own forms in order to experiment with new expressions 
of relations (Massumi 2011, 28). If the ‘minor’ is concerned not 
with outcomes but enabling the conditions for new connections 
to arise (Massumi 2011, 18), then this artwork suggests that the 
role the technological component of the work plays might be less 
about creating new relations itself, than with disrupting habit 
and turning the body’s attention to the capacity of movement to 
gather bodies into emergent and dynamic new ecologies.
Bridge: Psychopomp
In Psychopomp,201 two performers moved around a darkened 
space inside two costumes that generated internal light and 
sounds that played through four speakers arranged around the 
edges of the space. The costumes worn during the performance 
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were embedded with sensors so that movement, contact and 
pressure and shifts in posture generated the soundscape and 
caused coloured LEDs in the costumes to operate (see Figure 
5.3). Each individual’s actions had the potential to affect the 
lights in both costumes and to displace sound samples triggered 
by their movements.
The headpieces of the outfits curtailed participants’ vision, so 
that they could only make out bright spots of light, thus they 
were more reliant than usual on touch and hearing to navigate 
the space. Their ability to fix stable positions was complicated 
by the disruptive actions of their movements, which triggered 
changes in sounds and shifts in the locations of sounds from 
one speaker to another. In addition, the lights they could see in 
the costumes altered in response to both body movements and 
the volumes of sound from various speakers. Navigation further 
complicated by the weight, volume, and soft texture of the new 
‘skin’ wrapping their bodies, which made tactile sensations vague 
and somewhat alien.
All this created a scenario in which movement was necessary as 
a means to any level of cognition in body–body and body–space 
relations, yet movement simultaneously kept these relations 
highly mobile and caught in a web of co-causality. Here the 
primary role of movement in understanding both the space of 
performance and the capacities of bodies was made evident. 
Stripped of any possibility to overview and quickly grasp the 
space, each step consisted of a tentative reconstruction as 
participants tested their new capacities to interact and relate to 
sounds, lights, surfaces and bodies (both their own, newly made 
strange and the other participant’s body as a potential site of 
connection).
With this reduced vision and unreliable hearing, participants 
were forced to turn attention to new and mobile collaborations 
of sensory input that distributed prehension throughout the 
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body and space. This was an imaging that was in the service 
of, and serviced by, a synaesthetic coalescence of sensations 
– touch, hearing, balance, temperature of another body (the 
body as a perceptual system) (Gibson 1979, 61) – that were 
cobbled together as a workable alliance. Peripheral sensations 
were brought to attention by bodies attempting to make 
connections: perceptions composed of the intensities held 
between contrasting surfaces.202 This cooperation between 
surfaces beyond their usual functioning caused unexpected 
and intensified conjunctions to arise – an arm pressed against 
the weight of a back, a foot cautiously feeling out the terrain 
underfoot, the slight vibrational ripple and noise of costumes 
brushing lightly past each other, all became central to any 
comprehension of spatialisation and the boundaries of the 
performers’ own bodies.
As bodies reached out, groping in darkness for certainty, they 
battled with the problematics of their new clumsy relation to 
the field. With such compromised and unstable sensory input, 
affordances became more transient and slippery. Landing sites 
could be tentatively projected here – onto the new augmented 
surfaces of the body, the spots of light perceived on the 
other performer’s costume, a particular sound emanating 
from a speaker, a shared site between foot and floor, and so 
on – distributing attention onto the surface of the body, the 
collaborator, and into the space. But these alliances quickly 
dissipated as the conditions continued to shift. In this way, 
senses cautiously turned out to these edges in an unresolvable 
searching for a stable point of location, an attention to these new 
shared but fuzzy spaces between body, costume and world: an 
attunement to the collective event in its unfolding.
Such tentativeness might be a suspension in the gathering of the 
event, an emergence of form, or, perhaps even less definite, an 
emergence of the conditions for form to begin to arise. Perhaps 
it was the inability to filter or prioritise sense information – to 
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order and stabilise the field of experience – rather than a lack 
of information, which caught participants in a looping state of 
‘always just beginning’ to make sense of world. The flooding with 
sensation of something not yet comprehensible is described 
by Manning as the ‘activation in the here-now of the not-
yet’ (2013a 179) – a tuning towards and slowing down of the 
process of ‘parsing the object from the field’ (2013a, 277).203 This 
disruption to the usual processes of perception separated causal 
comprehension from the richness of undifferentiated sensual 
immersion. It was a stretching of perception that provoked, as 
Manning has written of such experiences, an encounter with the 
shaping of the ‘more than’ of the event (2013a, 179), of the crystal 
point at which the actual and its larger potential begins to split, 
and the pull or lure of the virtual can be felt.
This tentativeness might approach what Arakawa and Gins have 
termed a ‘biotopological thinking’, encouraging an attention 
to the field, as much as to the body proper (2006, 60). Such 
Figure 5.3 Andrew Goodman, Psychopomp Costume documentation. 2012. 
Digital photograph.
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thinking they describe as a ‘self-diagraming’, a coordinating of 
one’s world that portions spatial relations both approximately 
(as it was always evolving), and at the same time rigorously (as 
it was intensely relational across multiple scales of engagement) 
(Arakawa and Gins 2006, 73–4).
Psychopomp accentuated a felt quality of ‘not knowing’ – not quite 
knowing what delineated one’s boundaries anymore, where 
either oneself or the other performer were positioned in the 
space, where a sound emanated from, how movement translated 
into sound events. This might be viewed not as a ‘lack’ as such, 
but, as Stengers notes, a ‘characterization of a mode of working’ 
(Stengers 2011, 286) that foregrounded the multiplicitous nature 
of the point of actual/virtual at which bodies moved. The ‘not 
knowing’ was a parasite within the knowable – the already-
formed relation, the stable object of representation – disrupting 
and advancing through differentials with which movement 
problematised and molecularised the body. Not knowing was 
here commissioned as a tactic of production, positioning bodies 
at the ‘edge of virtuality’ (Manning 2009, 35) that movement 
then stretched out. In this it was perhaps a system ‘advanc[ing] 
through problems and not through victories, through failures 
and rectifications rather than by surpassing’ (Serres and Latour 
2011, 188); a system charged with new indeterminacy. It required 
a new in-process attention that drew the creative and ecological 
processes of ‘worlding’ and bodying that are always occurring, 




In the late eighteenth century, the Abbé Nollet created 
entertainment by passing electric current from a Leyden jar (an 
early battery prototype) through a line of 300 Carthusian monks 
holding hands, causing them to simultaneously jump in the air 
(Elsenaar and Scha 2002, 19). This was one of a series of early 
experiments exploring a fascination with this newly discovered 
force in the world, capable of passing through and rearranging 
subjects and objects. Such works demonstrated a shift in 
positioning the human and the environment: an enthusiasm for 
exploration of a distinctly non-human agency active in a lively 
world of forces, and an entrancement with the capability of such 
forces to traverse and reorganise human body potential into a 
decidedly ‘post-human collective body/assemblage’ (Goodman 
and Manning 2012, 2).
Erin Manning has proposed ‘entraining’ and ‘entertaining’ the 
environment (Goodman and Manning 2012, 6)204 as a way of 
thinking through Alfred North Whitehead’s perceptual categories 
of ‘causal efficacy’ and ‘presentational immediacy’ (Whitehead 
1978, 310–21; 2014, passim). ‘Entrainment’ concerns the 
‘immanently relational intertwining of perception with action’ 
(Goodman and Manning 2012, 6), and as causal efficacy can be 
thought of as a ‘lure’ towards prehension – ‘call(ing) forth new 
immanent associations and new assemblages’ (Manning 2013a, 
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23). ‘Entertainment’, on the other hand, is indifferent to these 
causal relationships (Whitehead 1978, 324).205 Entertainment 
concentrates on ‘the direct perception of the fielding of 
experience such that it brings its qualitative resonances to 
the fore’ (Goodman and Manning 2012. 1). It centres on the 
felt quality of the experience of the activities of the field 
organising itself, rather than on the resulting objects or subjects. 
‘Entertainment’ is resolutely concerned with the immediate 
activities of the field or environment and the collective 
individuations of an event that might arise.
Perception, Whitehead states, ‘is the catching of a universal 
quality in a particular substance’ (1978, 158). Here perception 
moves beyond mere feeling, subjectively ‘rooting’ the ‘blind’ 
and ‘vague’ feeling in the ‘immediacy of the present occasion’ 
(Whitehead 1978, 163). For Whitehead, as Jones states, it is 
the bringing together of the perceptual components of causal 
efficacy and presentational immediacy as the display for 
the subject of ‘an extended environment contemporary to the 
percipient’, that allows for comprehension through symbolic 
reference of ‘the way in which causally connected organisms 
in temporalised relationship…are apprehended in genuine 
community in the present moment’ (1998, 151, emphasis in the 
original).206 That is, the two aspects of perception ‘intersect’ 
to provide sufficient understanding of ‘a contemporary world 
of extended actual things’, which, Whitehead argues contra to 
Hume, presentational immediacy cannot provide on its own 
(Whitehead 2014, unpaginated, II: 5, II: 1).207 In this ‘intersection’ 
of the two factors intensity is achieved through subjective 
patterning, in that there is a contrast felt between the perception 
of the moment and comprehension of what has come before it, 
and that there is a contrast between what is in the moment and 
prehension of that which has potential to come to be (Whitehead 
2014, unpaginated, II: 4).
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In thinking through Whitehead’s dissection of acts of 
perception into these two categories there are three points 
that I would argue are worth noting. Firstly, that the two 
components are essential to perception and are never fully 
separable. Nor, despite the term presentational ‘immediacy’, 
does one necessarily precede the other in a clear linear sense 
(Whitehead 2014, unpaginated, I: 8). Secondly, perception in 
this sense does not necessarily mean conscious perception, 
though it certainly is a factor for, as Whitehead terms them, 
the ‘higher grade’ organisms. These organisms have greater 
access to presentational immediacy and therefore have a 
greater capacity to condition the causal information prehended 
from the environment (Whitehead 2014, unpaginated, I: 8).208 
Thirdly, we must remember that for Whitehead perception is 
never the passive imaging of an established environment by a 
subject, but an act of self-production through the prehension 
of different components of actual and virtual datum and their 
constitution into the organism’s concrescence (Whitehead 2014, 
unpaginated, I: 6).
Isabelle Stengers explains causal efficacy as a construction of 
chains of cause and effect, often based on prior knowledge or 
habitual response to sense data (2011, 401). This is a succinct 
description, in line with Whitehead’s own initial description of 
causal efficacy as a subjective perception of the relation between 
the organism perceiving and relevant concurrent and precedent 
events.209 But it also something of a simplification of the greater 
potential of causal efficacy, which more expansively also places 
events within a temporal and spatial relational patterning. 
This is not concerned with notions of time as ‘pure succession’, 
but the ‘concrete’ relational time marking the passages from 
events to events (the objectification of events that ‘establish the 
conditions’ to which subsequent events conform) (Whitehead 
2014, unpaginated, II: 1). Similarly, causal efficacy is not a 
relationship to abstract space, but, in defining actual geometrical 
relationships to the environment, causal efficacy explicates 
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another aspect of subject–event relations, and importantly 
is also a perception of the intertwining of the body with the 
environment, as we ‘see with our eyes, we taste with our palates, 
we touch with our hands’ (Whitehead 1978, 170). Through 
these aspects, causal efficacy provides not only a grounding of 
the body in the space and time of the past, but ‘a sense of the 
implications…of the present on the future’ (Whitehead 2014, 
unpaginated, II: 4).
For Whitehead causal efficacy belongs ‘to the fundamental 
constitution of an occasion’, and is therefore available in 
some form ‘even to organisms of the lowest grade’, whilst 
presentational immediacy is a ‘more sophisticated activity’ and 
available only to ‘organisms of a relatively high grade’ (1978, 
172)210. Presentational immediacy is ‘our immediate perception 
of the contemporary external world’, and the knowledge it 
provides is, Whitehead says, ‘vivid, precise and barren’ (2014, I: 
12). That is, whereas much if not all of the information gleaned 
from causal efficacy is vague and trivial, in the qualitative force 
of the immediate sensation we find both the precision and 
directness needed for a deeper perception. On its own however 
(if such a thing is truly possible), presentational immediacy 
remains ‘barren’ or disconnected from the full realisation of 
the occasion because these qualitative factors are not linked 
with intrinsic characteristics of that which is prehended until 
combined with causal efficacy (Whitehead 2014, unpaginated, 
I: 12).211 As Whitehead notes, it is hard to imagine, at least for 
a human organism, a situation in which one might experience 
presentational immediacy on its own. Firstly this is because ‘the 
present fact is luminously the outcome from its predecessors, 
one quarter of a second ago’, at the very least in terms of having 
laid the conditions for events, however surprising, to arise from 
(Whitehead 2014, unpaginated, II: 4). Secondly, the very act of 
sensing provides some spatial information, as there is a spatial 
relationship established between, for example, a sound and the 
ears that hear this sound (Whitehead 2014, unpaginated, I: 12, 
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II: 6). Even in a moment of blind anger, he reasons, ‘it is the man 
we hate’ – a ‘causal and efficacious’ object, and ‘not a collection 
of sense data’ (Whitehead 2014, unpaginated, II: 4), and thus not 
blind to the way actual things are at all. However, perhaps one 
might occasionally experience a moment in which immediate and 
unqualified sensation briefly overwhelms the causal,212 and it is 
one such experience in an artwork that this chapter examines.
Art events, like all other events of perception, necessarily contain 
causal efficacy and presentational immediacy to various degrees. 
However, as Massumi has articulated, interactive artworks have 
tended to overshadow direct experience in their insistence on 
demonstrating and fixing relational connections, foregrounding 
‘causal efficacy, instrumentality, [and] affordance’ at the expense 
of their ‘own artistic dimension’ (2008, 7–8)213. This, Massumi 
says, is ‘why you so often hear the comment from participants 
that [interactivity] feels like a video game’ (2008, 8). Massumi 
argues that this reduces and contains relation in problematic and 
prescriptive ways as representational (2008, 8–10). Here it again 
becomes evident that a call to a ‘relational’ turn in interactive 
art is not enough on its own, without a careful consideration of 
the types and qualities of relation, and particularly an intention 
to encourage open-ended relational pulls towards the future 
rather than reinforcing existing conditions. The question 
of how to foreground the felt qualities and intensities of an 
interaction over causal comprehension is therefore a pertinent 
one for interactivity – the kind that wishes to step beyond the 
representation of existing relation toward an experience of its 
felt emergence.
While an emergent awareness of the processes by which causal 
efficacy folds into presentational immediacy does provide, as 
Whitehead states, a sense of the ‘withness of the body (as) an 
ever present’ (1978, 312), here, as a means to immerse within 
the immediacy of sensation of the event, I propose disruptions 
to the qualifications and validations of sensation that causal 
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efficacy provides214. This parasitic disruption is examined 
through Lygia Clark’s propositional artwork Caminhando, where 
the lack of causal comprehension within the work disrupts 
habitual perceptive processes and instead works to activate a felt 
resonance with environmental fields. This is produced through 
processes of transduction, bringing a new engagement with 
other entities in the environment and felt implication in a larger 
shared potential.
This chapter attempts to ‘think with’ Manning’s concept of 
entertaining the environment in order to unpack the experience 
of Caminhando, concentrating on its potential for the opening 
of the body to a wider transductive field of play, and for the 
production of a phasing. This phasing might be a moment of 
slippage, a crack through which to escape the limitations of 
subjectivity. The question of how to think beyond the human 
subject is, as Simon O’Sullivan states, not as simple as a turning 
away from the human. Rather, it is a becoming-minor that is ‘a 
kind of stretching or twisting, a rupturing and stammering, a 
releasing of forces from within and the contact of forces that are 
without’ (2006, 64).
I relate Caminhando to a concept of an ecological ethics in that 
the work addresses not the representation of relation but its 
immanent construction. I argue that the work is ethical in that it 
enables an opening to further expression and connectivity. That 
is, it encourages an increased ability to recognise and respond 
to the force of other components of the event (to affect and be 
affected).215
From agency to transduction
As discussed in Chapter Three, the term ‘agency’ is problematic 
for a relational approach that seeks to resist collapsing back 
into the philosophies of substance of which Whitehead is justly 
critical. Once subjectivity is seen as only emergent in the act 
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of concrescence, another, more ecologically compatible or 
event-based term is needed that is capable of acknowledging 
ongoing individuation and emphasising the ongoing and positive 
ingression of forces into new individuations.
In Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett addresses these issues by 
thinking such acts of forces as a ‘distributed agency’, a ‘swarm of 
vitality at play’ (2010, 31–2). We might also think it as a process 
of transduction by which we can understand individuation 
that ‘operates beneath all forms [and] is inseparable from a 
pure ground that it brings to the surface’ (Deleuze 1994, 152). 
It is an ongoing and, in itself, multiple process that underlies 
individualisation. Individuation is the ‘more than of becoming’ 
(Massumi in Manning 2013a, xi) – becomings being dephasings 
of ongoing field-entity relations, singular expressions or 
differentiations of larger ecologies of forces. Transduction then 
is the process by which such ‘an activity sets itself in motion’ 
at the same time as it generates ‘processes of modification’ 
(Simondon 1992, 313; Simondon 2009, 11). For Simondon, it is 
a way of understanding and expressing the ongoing relation 
of a gathering of pre-individualised forces to an individualised 
entity that then exists as a ‘partial and relative resolution’ to 
these internal tensions (Simondon 1992, 300), while still allowing 
potential for further change.
Transduction describes the integration of formerly disparate 
things within a concrete system, the evolution of a shared 
associated milieu. It is how the becoming of an entity generates 
further unfoldings: becoming a force for further change, though 
not as a linear progression, but a series of overlapping, always 
transforming forces of differing viscosities, driving ongoing 
individuation. Whitehead’s theory of prehension similarly 
describes such a process as a system of concrescence and 
continuity: an entity, having achieved actualisation, becomes 
an ‘object’ for other entities, potentially influencing these 
entities’ unfolding concrescence (Whitehead 1978, 235). Thus 
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an entity draws prehensively on every other actualised entity 
and the further potentials of the system, by whatever degree 
of separation, becoming a dynamic point in a complex ecology 
of relations. Here such feeling can be seen as transduction, a 
continual moving of force from subjective gathering to objective 
datum, and in such a complex and intertwined system, the 
transduction that triggers prehension must be seen as a vast 
nexus of complex forces, rather than a simple cause and 
effect paradigm.
Caminhando
Make yourself a trailing: you take the band of paper 
wrapped around a book, you cut it open, you twist 
it, and you glue it back together so as to produce a 
Mobius strip. Then you take a pair of scissors, stick one 
point into the surface and cut continuously along the 
length of the strip…When you have gone the circuit 
of the strip, its up to you whether to cut to the left 
or to the right of the cut you’ve already made. This 
idea of choice is capital. The special meaning of this 
experience is in the act of doing.
Lygia Clark
Following Caminhando’s instructions creates a body-tool-object 
machine producing movement or an expression of connectivity 
rather than representation.216 The work is per-formed rather 
than pre-formed, opening potential for a process of collective 
individuation to occur – a new event of assembling between 
its component parts – a drawing together through the force of 
shared movements between hands, eyes, scissors and paper 
(see Figure 6.1). As Clark says, ‘at the outset, the Trailing is only a 
potentiality’ (Bois and Clark 1994, 99); the paper and the cutting 
are, in themselves, nothing substantial. In the end, the result 
seems inconsequential and leaves little trace (Clark in Suchan 
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2008, 6). The art exists as a moment of resonate intensity, of 
prehended phasing, its beauty lying in the delicate capacity to 
activate and foreground transduction.
Process philosophy clearly views transduction as a ubiquitous 
event, enabling the ‘drive towards novelty’ in the universe that 
Whitehead describes. What then differentiates Caminhando from 
the everyday? It reveals the process of the translation of forces 
moving through the hands, scissors and paper, but it does not 
make the process ‘conscious’ in any articulate manner. It makes 
the effects of transduction felt by slowing down the process 
of phasing, provoking a suspension in the flow, and making 
evident the potentiality of the event. With the opportunity for 
re-construction and invention, it brings attentiveness to the 
environment, not as ‘other’, but as a collective gathering of a 
potential dynamic ecology.
At the point where you have cut an entire loop of paper and 
are back to the beginning, the scissors are no longer next to 
the original incision, they are somehow on the other side. Sight 
contradicts expectation, hand/scissors contradict paper: the 
habitual perceptual schema is problematised and cohesion 
falls apart. The causal efficacy gleaned from the skin/hand 
sense datum leads one to expect that the cuts in the paper 
will match up, but this is contradicted by the presentational 
immediacy. It is an ‘error in symbolic reference’, exploited here 
to promote ‘imaginative freedom’ (Whitehead 2014, I: 10). The 
link between these two components of perceptual processes 
is felt through their failure to smoothly orchestrate. Any stable 
sense of fixed space instantly dissolves, briefly becoming 
purely relative to the movement. It is a sudden plunge into 
the depths of presentational immediacy – an immediacy of 
sensuous perception that does not yet have the ‘solidarity’ that 
its qualification by causally efficious information will provide 
(and thus on its own it resists division ‘into delusions and not-
delusions’) (Whitehead 2014, I: 12).
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Tentativeness
This jolt shifts one out of habitual inattention and preformed 
assumptions, forcing a new concentration on what is going on 
in the moment. A similar sensation of disorientation might be 
experienced in the everyday when there is an unexpected loss 
or distortion of sense perception – such as a sudden change of 
auditory conditions like the disorientating effects of echoes in 
a tunnel, or the tactile strangeness of one’s mouth after dental 
anesthesia. Such occurrences make the familiar world uncanny, 
and force improvisations with new combinations of sense 
information.
For the sighted person, for example, sudden darkness might 
trouble any sense of stability of objects and their relations and 
boundaries, and force a temporary fluidity and experimentation 
as the body cobbles together some kind of workable new ‘organ’ 
to make sense of the available data. In such a space, to those 
habitually reliant on sight to make quick spatial decisions, the 
whole body surface becomes a groping hand. Skin feels the edge 
Figure 6.1 Lygia Clark, Caminhando,1964. Photo: Beto Feliciano. Courtesy of “The 
World of Lygia Clark” Cultural Association.
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of an object – as a resistant force – to gain information about the 
object, but never really know it as a whole. An edge could as well 
belong to a table, as a bookcase or doorway. Nerves respond 
only to the immediacy of the hard flatness, reinventing the object 
and body in relation at the next, cautious groping forward. As 
Whitehead says, sense relations here become ‘vague’, losing 
spatial definition yet retaining and even amplifying the emotional 
tonality of the event (1978, 176). Causal efficacy becomes less 
distinct here, while the immediate sensory information – and its 
felt lack – is drawn to the fore.
This process of re-gathering and reconfiguration that follows 
such a shift is the focus of Caminhando. Faced with a sudden loss 
of causal logic and a confusion of sensory data, completing the 
delicate task at hand requires a response to the unfoldings of the 
event in the present – and, indeed, to care more for what is being 
felt in the moment. The work demands a slowing down, a care 
towards the developing relationships between hands, paper and 
scissors, and how their potentials begin to merge and interact: 
sympathy with their own particular capacities.217 We are asked to 
pay careful attention to what is being felt: to be immersed in the 
feeling of a re-gathering of forces. In navigating such conditions, 
‘tentativeness’ naturally arises, as Arakawa and Gins might say 
(2002, 45), as both cause and affect of a body rearranging.
Such tentativeness might be thought as a feeling-out of the 
future potential of the event, an immersion in its goings-on. It 
requires that we gather what sense information we can, and 
backtrack from assumptions. This slowing down the shift from 
shaping to content allows a felt awareness of the pull of forces 
towards recomposition to arise (Manning 2013a, 189), feeling 
out the ongoing transductions of the ecology. Caminhando 
problematises any sense of subjective control over the 
event; it begins to evoke tentativeness into a simple habitual 
cutting action.
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For an art event seeking to re-energise relations to the evolving 
ecology, we might ask how this kind of tentativeness evokes 
or makes evident the momentum of future potential and its 
relation to the field. Caminhando enacts Manning’s proposition 
by unlinking the processes of entertainment and entrainment 
(however briefly or incompletely) in order to become submerged 
in the flow of individuation, of the gathering and transduction of 
forces from the field.218 It perhaps asks us to develop a sensitivity 
to proceedings outside of habitual, so that the ‘delicate and 
fragile value-realities’ – those first tentative prehensions of the 
gathering of the ecology – do not ‘die under our feet’ as we march 
toward the already known (Jones 1998, 195). If there is an ethical 
need to think-with and feel-with the individuations of the non 
or more-than human ecology (Bennett 2010, 14), then art might 
have a potential role to play in engaging us in this increased 
attention and sensitivity towards emergent relation.
Paper, scissors, hands
As discussed in Chapter Three, for Whitehead the feelings of 
all entities are shared with the environment in the ingression 
of datum to form the entity and in the entity’s gifting of itself 
as datum for other acts of concrescence (1978, 220). These 
feelings allow entities to become with their environment, if 
the environment itself is taken to be an event or series of 
enmeshed events. In Caminhando, affects pass through and 
initiate assemblages, new forms, and instigate new forces. The 
arrangement of fibers in the paper form tendencies (tearing 
in one direction, resisting in another way), that shapes the 
displacement from the hand-scissors’ force. The kinesthetic 
tendencies of the scissoring action collect and direct the 
expressed pressure of muscle energies; the rhythm of vibrations 
of the cutting of paper is transduced by the ear and skin. 
Caminhando engages with not only the extension of what is 
perceptible to the participant, but also the dynamic negotiation 
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between what is felt by all components of the event, and 
the feelings not immediately perceptible but essential to the 
forming of the event (Goodman and Manning 2012, 1). The event 
requires attention to how scissors, fingers and paper feel, to 
the sensitivities that form their worlds. It questions how their 
combined individuation – their folding into one another, their 
eventful assembling – creates, mixes and shapes their shared 
responsibility for events and further potential.
In itself, this is a potential extension of interconnectedness 
with the larger ecology of the event. The forces instigating 
the unfolding individuation flowing through the entities – the 
event of cutting and their intertwined affectual relations, their 
ability to feel – form the assemblage. These flows distribute 
the agency, not within objects per se, but in the event itself, 
contradicting the animate/inanimate divide. The ‘environment’ 
here is not some stage for a theatre of operations, but the field 
of forces resonating with entities. Here we might say that rather 
than things having feelings or sensitivities to an environment, 
entities have types of forces that can pass through them, that 
can transduce them, activating phasings, and that an increase in 
affectual sensitivity is therefore an increase in involvement with 
a larger ecology.
Multiplicity
The Caminhando assemblage is more than a binary machine. It is 
more than a multiple; the event is a multiplicity with its own logic, 
a concrete system of objects and field that exists in its entirety or 
not at all (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 2). This multiplicity lies in the 
gaps between molar opposites – between hand/scissors, body/
paper, subject/artwork – and in the transduction, the movement 
of forces through simultaneous individuations that pull apart 
the molar, making sieves of its boundaries and, in the excess of 
ongoing further differentiation, its shared potentiality.
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Such transduction integrates disparate realities into a system 
of relation (Simondon1992, 315). This is a relation not only of 
the actual, but also the virtual. Multiplicities are irreducible: the 
sound of the ocean, wind, fog, and flocking birds. The earth’s 
multiplicities are ‘nebulous set(s)...whose exact definition 
escapes us, and who’s local movements are beyond observation’ 
(Serres 1995, 103), that we are thrust into or born out of (already 
always re-phasing): always from the middle of things (Deleuze 
and Parnet 1987, 23).219 In the middle are the lines of flight 
(lines of ‘growth and movement’), as immanent and symbiotic 
connections between that which is in the midst of coming-
to-be and the larger potential (Ingold 2011, 71, 83).220 Leaderless 
birds, for example, can collectively navigate so gracefully 
because their shared individuation brings into being not only 
the individual, but also an associated milieu, a collective pool 
of potentiality (Mitchell 2012, 73). Subjects themselves are not 
communicating, but rather are ‘regimes of individuation that 
meet’ (Debaise 2012, 7).
Caminhando places us in the middle of the tension of events 
tending towards further becoming, as always in-process, a 
reaching towards the next. Paper, scissors, skin each become 
dynamic points in a system, singular expressions implicated in 
the modulation of a shared multiplicity. This is the agencement 
of the assemblage (which is also always the assembl-ing221), 
more than its component parts, where cause and effect are 
lost in concrete inter-determined, co-causal transindividuation 
(Manning 2013a, 24–6). The becoming-scissors of the hand, the 
becoming-paper of the scissors, or the becoming-cutting of 
all the components, are combined in their shared potential – 
indeterminacy that is the richness of the event. To begin to feel 
part of such a gathering of future potential of forces might be 
a lure tending towards, or giving attentive care to, the qualities 
of how and what emerges, towards a shared responsibility 
in an ecology.
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The power of the forming multiplicity here is that it takes 
us beyond the stalemate of the dichotomous, denouncing 
‘simultaneously the One and the many, the limitation of the 
One by the many and the opposition of the many to the One’ 
(Deleuze 1994, 203). Caminhando draws attention to our shared 
individuation with the ecology of the event, and that our 
individualisation is an expression in and of this individuation that 
neither halts nor contradicts the latter process, but is a partial 
solution to an ongoing field of negotiations. Here it is made 
evident that we cannot have the individual without environment, 
that the two are points on a path of symbiotic enaction, 
individuation driven by transduction that is the becoming of 
the whole system, both the actual and the virtual with which it 
resonates. Assemblages in Caminhando create a shared ecology 
in the largest sense – a shared milieu or potential alongside 
a connected actuality – a system with ‘internal coherence’ 
(Simondon 1980, 40), because the enaction of the assemblage 
is co-causal with its field of potential: field and individual are a 
multiplicity.
Tactics
Clark says that, through participation, Caminhando causes 
the figure of the participant to ‘deterritorialize itself’ (cited in 
Martin, Ruiz and Rolnik 2000, 76). Deleuze and Guattari state 
that everything can have a microbrain (1994, 213), a topological 
system of forces for a nervous system. While Arakawa and Gins 
say we are organisms that ‘choose to person’; such individuations 
are routines of expected behaviors (2002, 1–5). Implicit in 
Caminhando’s instructions are challenges: choose something 
else; embrace your multiplicity, your connections with the world, 
the forces that exceed your body, invent procedures, tactics 
to free yourself, learn to ‘swim’ in the tentativeness that is the 
‘more than’ of bodying (Arakawa and Gins 2002, 84) that move us 
beyond stable subjectivity.
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Arakawa and Gins’ work shows how bodying makes ‘landing 
sites’, mobile points of connection penetrating the world, 
dispersing the body and intertwining with environment. 
Caminhando is such a technique for reaching into the world, 
transducing the body into emergent assemblages, to spark 
new individuations. It is a procedure that gives rise to new 
microbrains: in the hands-scissors, in the ears-eyes-paper, and 
so on. The art event here is a machine that might open up a 
gap in the subject. It is in this gap that moments of ‘felt phasing’ 
begin to create a flight path: an option to embrace multiplicity, 
to accent individuation over fixed identity. Caminhando begins 
to question the containment of the subject; it begins to activate 
an awareness of a dynamic relation both the actual environment 
and to the virtual, ‘the combination of mutating fluxes, on their 
productions of speed’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 88).
Conclusion: Towards a new politics
This relationship to an environment is not something separate 
with which to engage, but is enactive: formed through collective 
individuations always occurring from and in the middle of other 
processes. This is not to say that the everyday does not contain 
subtle but strange occurrences when the body schema becomes 
momentarily confused. These are moments where causal 
efficacy and presentational immediacy fail to align and the body 
has to scramble to reassemble itself, allowing a brief glimpse 
into the processes of exchange and emergence in individuations 
(the confusion of tying a tie while looking in a mirror, where 
right becomes left, for example). But it is in Caminhando’s 
ability, despite the banality of the actions, to detach the event 
from the habitual inattention to transduction, and instead 
create a ‘semblance’, that such processes are drawn to the 
fore. Semblance, as Massumi uses the term, is the virtual’s felt 
ingression into the event (2011, 15–16), its felt presence allowing 
a diagramming to take place, a thinking-feeling of the ‘dynamic 
Entertaining the environment 151
form’ of relation and its connection to ongoing potentiality 
(Massumi 2011, 15).
All this, I suggest, is a step towards a new politics of art that 
attempts to engage in the creation of lines of flight, with the 
composing of techniques for inventing (new) potentials for 
existence (Massumi 2011, 14). It is political in that it ‘connects up 
different aspects of life’ – new lines of causality and experience 
(O’Sullivan 2006, 74).222 Here Caminhando’s politics are those 
of the ‘micro-political’, as Lone Bertelsen defines it, working at 
the level of bodily habits (2012, 43), in which the event focuses 
attention on the continued felt emergence from which neither 
body nor field can be detached. This is an ethical art in Deleuze’s 
definition, a practice of pursuing expression and connection, 
rather than representation (Murphie 1996, 105). It is an ecological 
approach that activates attentiveness to life and the field, to the 
conditions of the event expressing itself (Manning 2013a, 147–8), 
an ontogenetic ‘technicity’223 for living. This is an ecology-in-the-
making: body-becoming-environment, environment-becoming-
body. It is ecologically sensitive in assisting the formation of a 
trans-subjective attentiveness to an affective field across the 
becoming of space, time, bodies and objects (Bertelsen 2012, 
39). Art events here, as Guattari states, can create an ‘ecology of 
the virtual’ capable of engendering ‘conditions for the creation 
and development of unprecedented formations of subjectivity’ 
(1995a, 91).
Throughout this book I have suggested that interactive art 
could at times do with less emphasis on the efficacy of relation 
between participant and artwork, and particularly on the 
conscious comprehension of these relations. Instead it might 
focus on further exploration of the potential of an immersion 
in sensation that stretches perceptual processes and makes 
felt the viewer’s own emergent role in an environment’s 
individuations.224 I am proposing that the agencies driving this 
are best understood as the flow of forces and their transduction. 
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These forces pass through and trigger the individuations of 
entities, gathering such individuations into an intensive ecology 
that drives invention. This is an experience of a trans-human and 
lively world in the widest possible sense. This is a move beyond 
the subjectivity and agency of the human participant. In this 
move an investigation into what might trigger the environment’s 
own capacity to generate forces of becoming would seem to me 
to be paramount, and I begin to approach this through Manning’s 
concept of the ‘minor gesture’ in the following section.
Bridge: Pnuema and the minor gesture
In the installation Pnuema,225 things happened as participants 
moved around – lights came on and faded or their rhythmic 
pulses quickened, and stormy sounds erupted and swirled 
around the space. Things happened too when the participant 
stood perfectly still or left the space, as elements of the work 
responded to other components’ actions (such as feedback 
from light variations affecting the tonal qualities of sounds, or 
the movement of the hanging sculptural objects triggering the 
sensors), and complex ‘behind the scenes’ algorithmic processes 
continued to activate changes calculated from both current and 
previous sensor input. Here, rather than linear connections 
between movement and light or sound, complex combinations 
of triggers determined what changes were generated, so that 
the effects of a particular action continued to reverberate 
through the work over some time. For example, the composition 
and development of the layers of singing sounds that occurred 
when the space had no participants present was shaped by the 
system’s ‘memory’ of bodily actions that had occurred earlier, 
and any stormy sound sample required particular sequences 
of triggers within certain time limits in order to be played. 
Thus while the generative aspects of the work related to bodily 
movement, the participant was not able to discern a direct link 
between their gestures and what was generated. In this sense, 
Entertaining the environment 153
the event began to have an (automated or algorithmic) life of 
its own, entering into relation not only with human bodies, but 
also into a series of temporal conversations between various 
elements of the work.
Participants were able to feel some qualitative connection 
between their actions and how events evolved. For example, 
striding quickly around the space would over time increase the 
speed at which the aural storm developed and the lights took 
on more complex and resonate patterns of movement. But as 
the work played out connections and disruptions, it also resisted 
the demonstration of interaction. The complexity of the relation 
between an event – a movement or a change in light, the effects 
on other components of the work, the built in time-lag between 
a sensor event and its repercussions, the variations in the effects 
of a particular movement – meant that while the art event itself 
could, in its own way, ‘feel’ the relational implications, such 
quantitative understanding was denied to human participants.226
What filled this space that was formerly central to the relational 
or interactive event? Perhaps the immediacy of sensation began 
to assert itself? Perhaps it was something subtler that resolutely 
refused to address the human, and instead addressed the 
formation of the work from the field at an imperceptible and 
undemonstrative level? In this, the effects began to edge into 
vague perception – a fuzzy awareness of the incipient gathering 
of an event that was the event’s ability to feel and respond to 
itself, to prehend potential individuation.
Manning has defined such relational pulls that ‘lead the field of 
experience’ and ‘open [it] to its differential’ as ‘minor gestures’ 
(Manning 2016a, 48).227 A minor gesture is not exactly contained 
in any entity (algorithm, sensor or person), or event (movement, 
calculation, sound, light or relation), though, in order to 
individuate, these draw on the potential such gestures open.228 
A minor gesture ‘introduces a kind of continuous variability into 
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the work’s progress, a variability that is durational’, as Manning 
states, where what is felt is variability in itself, a sense of an 
opening to (parasitic) potential (2016a, 49).
This is a ‘tuning’ of the event to its future that is felt qualitatively, 
as an aliveness of an event forming. In Pnuema, this might be 
felt through the immediate and sensual connection with the 
expanded relational value of the lights and sounds as they form 
new complexities of connections. That is, it might be felt as a 
variation in connective or transductive potential sitting alongside 
any material or actualised variation. The minor gestures at 
the heart of Pnuema’s self-tuning made both the actualised 
and potential relations mobile, always in flux – though not 
comprehensively demonstrated to the participant. Rather, such 
causal efficacy addressed, and was sensed by or resonated 
across, the ecology as a whole. This was an intensive exploration 
of the ‘environment’s own capacity to make felt the complex 
ecologies at work’ (Manning 2016a, 54, emphasis in the original) 
– an ecological sensitivity not fully located in any one body, but 
as a plane with which the event itself engaged.
Participants were addressed here, but not only on a subject-to-
object level. They might have tuned to the shifts in the affective 
tonality, alongside other components that also tuned and aligned 
in their own ways with such field effects. There were forces 
or wills at work that were not only dispersed but that resisted 
residing in objects and remained instead gestures incipient 
with the event. This allowed components to begin to address 
each other directly rather than only via human mediation. Did 
participants feel these gestures? Perhaps as an excess of relation 
beyond understanding, as a displacement of will, a loss of 
agency when compared to a normative interactive experience, 
as a sense of something lurking just beyond comprehension 
but nevertheless broadly affective: as an immediate but 
indistinct sense of variation and of a gathering of a more-than-
human ecology.
7
The noise in the noise:  
micro-perception as affective  
disruption to listening and the body
Sounds…dematerialize the substance of things they 
resounded and extend their own patterns…they drift 
off things and link up with one another.
Alphonso Lingis
Introduction: vibrational symbiosis
The pitcher plant and the wasp have come to an arrangement: 
when the wasp enters the plant’s flower and buzzes at a 
specific pitch the stamen release their pollen in an emphatic 
burst of rhythmic (vibrational) sympathy. No other pitch will 
do, the flower is indifferent to all other notes. It waits; it listens, 
attentively, for the wasp’s particular calling card.
And yet…this is a plant – it has no ears, no brain. How is it able 
to listen, with what does it hear, how does it pay attention? And, 
one must ponder, how is it that it knows what it hears when it 
has no brain to perceive with? Perhaps, just as the brittle star 
has no eyes and yet is all eyes,229 the pitcher is all ears – its entire 
surface attuned to the potential of a frequency, sensitive to the 
particular oscillations of the one vibrational speed for which it 
has an appetite.
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The dance of the pitcher plant and wasp hints at the micro-
perceptive potential enriching heard sounds. The transversal 
agency of sound as vibrational force courses through ecologies at 
pre-subjective, pre-content and pre-contextual levels, enveloping 
all in resonance that is the ‘combat of energies’ confronting each 
other (Deleuze 2002a, 65–8).230 This is the vibrational diffraction 
of enmeshed relational difference. At this affective level, 
interactions – immanent relations – with sounds are not limited 
to the ear and the brain. They stretch across the entire surfaces 
of bodies attuned to the sensations of their particular ecologies: 
a ‘listening’ independent of cognitive capacities and body 
boundaries. This strange pitcher-wasp symbiotic relation seems 
to indicate that sound contains, or is contained within, sonic 
excess (Goodman 2010, 9): a silent, contagious life as force and as 
potential force, enveloping all in the ecology of the unheard.
This chapter considers some of the disruptive potentials of 
sound – that is, micro-perceptive sound’s potential as a parasitic 
activator of change. It considers ways in which affective force 
produces ecologies through vibrational diffraction.
Micro-perception
The term ‘micro-perception’ refers not just to perceptions that 
are literally too small to be recognised, though the physical 
presence of the unheard begins to indicate some of the potential 
of micro-perception in relation to sound. Rather, as Brian 
Massumi asserts, it refers to a ‘perception of a qualitatively 
different kind’ (Massumi and McKim 2009, 4). It is pitched 
at the level of affect: ‘hitting’ the body, not with perceivable 
content but as a noise or interruption. Micro-perception can 
be perceived only as this interruption and transition, thus it 
is a ‘purely affective re-beginning of the world’ (Massumi and 
McKim 2009, 5).
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Affect is a primary creative force,231 as Jonas Fritsch argues, that 
unifies an event as it is also its extension or excess. Affect is, 
he argues, ‘pre-personal, pre-individual and non-conscious but 
real in so far as it offers potential for action’ (Fritsch 2009, 5). As 
such, it questions easy distinctions between event, subject and 
field (ibid. 6). It is a transitive force that connects and remains 
in excess of its effects, thus retaining further capacity to affect 
as it moves cross-temporally towards the future (Bertelsen and 
Murphie 2010, 140, 145).
Micro-perceptive sound then might be seen to offer potential as 
a transductive force, disrupting boundaries as it drives creativity 
through a resonance that connects through intersecting 
and knotted together ‘diverse realities’ (Mackenzie 2002, 13). 
Understanding the act of hearing as one of transduction 
potentially alters our whole conception of the act.
A single sound pulse is micro-perceptible. It is a singular shock 
to a surface that on its own cannot be understood as sound. 
It can be perceived only when in contrast: in relation to the 
interval, rhythm or difference between pulses. That is, it is not 
so much the single high or low point of a sound wave that is 
comprehensible, but the variations in pressure over time or 
the differences between a high and low point of a wave (the 
amplitude), and the distance between waves (the frequency, 
or number of waves in a given time). These then require firstly 
an internal or intensive differential logic (in the subjective 
comparison between the components of the larger sound 
event).232 Secondly perception requires an external differential 
between the ambient pressure of the medium through which the 
wave travels and the pressure of the wave itself. In both cases if 
there is no contrast there will be no perceived sound, although 
clearly a single force or pressure will still be felt by the body 
as a micro-perception (though, as I will argue further on in the 
chapter, this can be expanded on in several ways).
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As indicated briefly in the previous chapter, a direct connection 
can be made between Whitehead’s conception of the role 
of prehension and held contrasts in the concrescence 
or individuation of an entity, and Simondon’s concept of 
transduction. Simondon argues that transduction is more 
than the operation of forces on objects and the subsequent 
transformation of these forces through those operations, in that 
it is forces transformed into other forces through structuring 
(Combes 2013, 14–15; Mackenzie 2002, 50). We can therefore 
say that forces as held resonance constitute becoming (or 
individuation or concrescence):233 affectivity that is ‘the relational 
layer constituting the centre of individuality’ (Combes 2013, 31). 
These ‘resonances’ are the internal contrast of different relations 
that, like the held contrasts of prehensions for Whitehead, are 
constitutional of the event of concrescence (Simondon cited 
Combes 2013, 18–19).234 As in Whitehead’s system whereby 
there is a subjective ingression of selected datum from the 
world into the concrescence of an event, the resonate contrasts 
are internal but also forge a link to the actualised world. These 
contrasts also resonate with the preindividualised potential of 
the event (which is also in a sense exterior to the individual at 
any one point in time) (Combes 2013, 31; Simondon 2009, 5, 7–9). 
Thinking of this link between transduction, affect and resonance 
emphasises that it is never a resolution of affective energies that 
occurs in becoming, but as Deleuze says, there is an ongoing 
‘confrontation’, frisson or interaction between energies (2002a, 
65–8). A collective or trans-individual and concrete example of 
this is discussed in this chapter in relation to the phenomenon of 
diffraction, in which complex resonances between sound waves 
constitute new and collective sound events.
In thinking of resonance as a key to the production of an event, 
one might argue that we do not even ‘hear’ the sound per se. 
Rather, the sound waves activate a sympathetic resonance in 
the mechanisms of the ear, which in turn are transduced into 
impulses in the nerves and then to neural firings in the brain. 
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This suggests that while in the act of hearing sound in the 
environment is prehendable by a body, the actual ‘hearing-
event’ is self-contained and self-actualised as a subjective event 
that is intensively driven and satisfied. Deleuze’s example of 
this thinking is that of a needle piercing the thigh: the pain felt 
is not the needle, but the actions of the nerve endings in the 
flesh (1993, 96). In this, as in Whitehead’s theory, an entity is 
responsible for its own ‘satisfaction’ or concrescence, even as 
it draws prehensively on its relation to other entities (1978, 
126, 153–6, 236–8). In this sense, sound does not pass into the 
body as such, but perception might be said to occur through 
a productive sympathetic tension or held resonance between 
the two systems.235 In terms of an act of hearing or listening, 
this means that the hearing event is separate from, though 
influenced by, the sound event, and is never simply a passive 
ingression of data. Thus there is always the potential for 
creative divergence.
Interlude: Artaud’s scream
Artaud’s radio play To be done with the judgment of God pierces 
the air and vibrates the listener with wild screams and glossolalia 
(that are parasites to language, ‘ruptures’ and ‘stoppages of 
flow’) (Serres, 2007, 189). These can never be confused for nor 
contained within representational meanings. But more than 
this: the words themselves that are sung, shouted, agonised and 
whispered are so charged with affective power as to ‘illuminate 
the entire nervous system’ (Artaud cited Weiss 1992, 275). Here 
objects (bodies and meanings of words) become again force. 
The play’s broadcast is an act of transduction as its transmission 
disperses the actors’ bodies through the airwaves as disruptive 
vibrations, enacting Artaud’s philosophy that man ‘is not only 
dispersed within his body, he is also dispersed in the outside of 
things’ (Artaud cited Weiss 1992, 253). Artaud incites this ability 
of sound to transverse the body, turn it inside out, to make 
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organs of its surfaces, to empty its interior of meaning: Artaud-
the-alchemist236 cruelly uses ‘radio magnetism as a counter-
shock to achieve…the destruction of bodily hierarchies through 
vibrations’ (Lucaciu 2010, 72). It is a cruelty, as Deleuze says, 
made not of horrible things, but rather ‘the action of forces upon 
the body’ (2002, 45).
Artaud’s scream is made a ‘physical substance in space’ (Barber 
1999, 106), a disruptive vibrational force that encapsulates 
his ‘vast project of physical transformation’ (Barber 1999, 93). 
Broadcast, it seeks to invade the sanctity of the listener’s home 
and body. But the scream is transmitted not just in the literal 
scream that punctuates the radio play, but also saturates every 
sound of the event, as micro-perceptible affect coursing through 
and tearing open bodies it encounters.237 It proposes to fold out 
the listener’s body, makes their whole surface an organ that is 
invited to resonate in sympathy with the a-perceivable force 
of the sounds.
The problem Artaud addresses through his particular use of 
language/vocalisation is one of how to extend the tension of 
contrast of the micro-perceptive without providing resolution.238 
He develops a technics to suspend the body within the processes 
of multiple ‘tendential unfoldings’, as Massumi phrases it 
(Massumi and McKim 2009, 11), while also making felt the 
potential for ‘different capacities for existence’ (Massumi and 
McKim 2009, 12) outside of the major and the molar. It is an 
‘exploratory dancing of the extremities of the body’ (Barber 1999, 
103) an adventure into excess, a plunging into the multiplicity, 
where body, home, language as ground are contaminated 
and shattered.
Body as ear
While micro-perception is a pre-bodily force of the world, it must 
also be recognised that it is always implicated in the bodily, in 
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that it acts on and through a body.239 It affects bodies through 
the creation of a felt difference, both prior to and after the 
micro-perceptive event: an affective attunement (Bertelsen and 
Murphie 2010, 5, 6). Affects can be known as such only through 
their effects on bodies (Bertelsen and Murphie 2010, 4), and 
such bodies – be they speakers, walls or animals – all have an 
‘appetite’: that is, a potential to affect and be affected240. Each, 
in its own way, performs a particular way of ‘knowing’ the world 
– a specific engagement with certain vibrational frequencies 
(Barad 2007, 379).
The human ear could be thought to engage with vibrations 
roughly between 20Hz and 20 KHz (Roads 2001, 7), but the 
human body is, in fact, receptive to a much wider spectrum. 
Outside of this audible frequency range lies ‘unsound’: the 
infrasonic and ultrasonic (Goodman 2010, 17).241 To this list of the 
imperceptible, we might add, as Curtis Roads does, the subsonic 
(sounds too soft to be perceptibly heard), and ultra-loud sounds 
(those that are ‘felt by the exposed tissues of the body as a 
powerful pressure wave’ more than they are recognised or 
processed through the ears) (Roads 2001, 7). Such vibrations 
might be said to act synaesthetically on bodies – they affect 
the body at a base level of vibrational force that disrupts and 
stimulates multiple sensory capacities. This is the pain of high 
volume shock waves forcibly vibrating flesh, the infrasonic beat 
of a sub-woofer that reaches you through the soles of the feet, 
the prickling sensation on the skin of high frequencies, and the 
physiological effects of these frequencies in stimulating neural 
activity (Goodman 2010, 184). To this we might add the emotional 
effects of such unsound: the anxiety or edginess that might be 
evoked by either the very high or loud, the coercive effects of 
deep beats, the lure of the just-too-quiet to be heard. As affects, 
these unsounds come to be known to us through their formative 
effects on our emergent bodies.
162 Chapter 7
Space-Shifter
Entering the environment of Sonia Leber and David Chesworth’s 
Space-Shifter 242 the viewer is bombarded by strange voices 
– part language, part guttural exclamation – that saturate and 
resonate every surface, as much unsound as sound in their 
violent a-rhythmic shaking of the entire space (see Figures 
7.1 and 7.2). Floor, walls, air, speakers, sheets of metal, and 
bodies are invaded, vibrated, penetrated, turned outward, and 
made into surface. Metal buzzes with secondary resonances, 
feet become ears as they oscillate with the floor. Waves of 
vibrations bounce of windows, walls and flesh, taking on new 
and singular speeds through their interactions with the differing 
viscosities of surfaces. The speakers, room, floor, metal, and 
bodies all (re)perform or express these vibrations in their own 
way, transducing according to their own affordances. Thus, a 
speculative vibration launched into the space by the speakers 
proposes to these various surfaces a multiplicity of responses, 
combining their various and singular capacities to resonate into a 
machine that produces vibrational difference.
The event of vibrational penetration of the space makes these 
new and contingent surface assemblages: machines that 
attract and modulate sound and unsound.243 It rearticulates all 
bodies/entities into ‘shifters’,244 new combinatory propositions 
glued together by the force of vibration. Its ‘choral’ sounds245 
are ‘launched like missiles’ to ‘act directly on the space’246 
and entities.
Parasitic diffraction: the vibrational as differential force
In his essay entitled Four Objections to Sound Art Tim Ingold 
(2011, 136–9) sets out to argue that we need to make use of 
sound in artworks in ways that do not simply replicate the 
representational models of much visual art in presenting a 
soundscape to be ‘played back’, made ‘aural’ as painting can 
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make a landscape ‘visible’ (2011, 136). This, he states, denies 
the fact that ‘the ears, like the eyes, are organs of observation…
just as we use our eyes to watch and look, so we use our ears to 
listen as we go forth in the world’ (Ingold 2011, 137). Rather than 
compare sound to vision, Ingold says, we should associate it with 
light, emphasising the experiential nature of sound that involves 
a ‘commingling with the world’ that is both an ‘embodiment’ and 
‘emplacement’ (2011, 137, 138)247. Here, I think, Ingold argues 
effectively for the need to think beyond the naïve idea that 
merely making an immersive sound recording is enough to create 
meaningful interaction or avoid the traps of representation. 
He instead suggests a more provocative approach that might 
emphasise the potential of vibration to move bodies beyond 
themselves and instigate to new and collective processes of 
individuation.
What then happens then when we think of Space-Shifter not as 
‘sound art’, but as a series of vibratory propositions encouraging 
trans-body resonances – focussing on the productive disruptive 
potential that such micro-sound initiates, rather than its 
aesthetic or representational qualities? How can we think of such 
vibratory events for their ethical potential as disruptive relational 
forces that breach thresholds, folding and splitting entities?
To begin this, we need to first understand something of 
vibrational diffraction, and its role in producing difference 
through parasitic disruption. To include micro-perception in 
any discussion on sound is to acknowledge a more expansive 
definition of sound as vibrational force. Here it is a ‘variation in 
pressure over time’ (Evans in Massumi 2002, 171) encompassing 
all the elements of a sound that will be contracted into a 
perception – tone, pitch, rhythm, volume (composed from waves 
that differentiate in frequency, amplitude, phase and shape) 
(Evans in Massumi 2002, 171) – and the unsound, the micro-
perceptible remainder. The physics of sound, Roads argues, 
clearly demonstrate that the basis of all these components of 
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sounds is events of vibrational difference,248 where rhythms 
of contrast disrupt any continuum: questions of speed and 
interval of oscillation. Sound itself is then an expression of this 
modulating difference (Evans in Massumi 2002, 171).249
But a vibration’s actualisation must also always act parasitically 
on other waves in the space through the physics of diffraction. 
Diffraction ‘has to do with the way waves combine when they 
overlap and the apparent bending and spreading of waves that 
occurs when waves encounter an obstruction’ (Barad 2007, 
74).250 As waves, sound then ‘intra-acts’ in this manner,251 with 
individual wave patterns engaging in disruption and interference 
with one another. These entangle in complex ecologies, always 
immanently expressing their differences in producing novelty in 
the torsion between these forces. In Space-Shifter, for example, 
a sound wave generated by the speakers hits and reflects off 
a surface, returning as a repetition but at a different speed. 
These reflections diffract with the incoming wave, producing 
new modulations that then also interfere and combine with both 
incoming and reflected waves, producing further modulations, 
and so on. What consistency of relation there is here is the 
consistency of events surpassing themselves (Combes 2013, 41), 
as each wave is implicated in the individuation of all the others. 
Such noisily productive enfoldings, disruptions, complications 
and interferences are parasitic actions. It is the noise in relation 
that is its creative force – a third and mobile position252 that 
multiplies vibrational difference, blurring distinctions between 
cause and effect (Serres 2007, 57) as a resonance of a resonance.
Due to diffraction, we can say that a vibration in Space-Shifter 
always also produces parasitic vibrational forces intrinsic to its 
event. Space-Shifter proposes to construct vibration-surface 
assemblages that form parasitic machines operating on multiple 
fronts: producing intensive difference within wave events 
through diffraction that multiplies and drives towards novelty. 
The work here employs micro-perception tactically in several 
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different ways, revealing the experience of Space-Shifter primarily 
as an event that explores the parasitic potential of sound 
and unsound.
The heard and unheard components of the sounds affectively 
engage the body with vibration in ways that create new 
contingent bodies from components of the body-artwork 
assemblage (machines within machines). Over and above 
the sound that is perceived by the ear itself, there is also the 
vibrational excess of sensation experienced by the ‘skin-as-
ear drum’ that envelops the body (Serres 2008, 119).253 This 
creates a shared vibrational zone of feedback loops between 
skin and world, an intra-active ecology of diffractions. Surfaces 
are implicated in each other’s becoming(s): speaker surfaces 
affecting and affected by the vibrational capacities of the 
metal plates, floorboard oscillations meeting and conversing 
with vibrations of shoes, skin and walls bifurcating each 
other’s projected vibrations in the shared space in-between, 
bodies remade as speakers, receivers, reflectors – together 
resonating surfaces.
Space-Shifter proposes space, floor, feet and metal as the ears, 
as they act as conductive surfaces, transducing vibration. 
Sound waves differentially connect surfaces to make vibrational 
ecologies that nest within ecologies. This is a doubling of 
the surface into a field-body machine, an in-between that is 
alive with productive potential – a ‘sound envelope’ that is as 
much a sieve as a container, a ‘sensate surface’ of connection 
(Anzieu 1989, 62–9).254 The force of this sensorial meeting of 
surfaces – pressure/resistance meeting pressure/resistance 
– is a vibrational interaction with another that leads us out of 
ourselves (Lingis 1998, 135). It is a worlding that the sympathetic 
resonances enact: our surfaces taut drum skins.255 This is a 
collective perception, as performed by the body as a sensate 
organ in sympathy with the forces of the world (re)generating.256
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Here Space-Shifter makes explicit the vibrational forces 
surrounding and interpenetrating the body. The diffractional 
resonances with, and resistances to, the power of the 
external vibrational rhythms are folded into the body’s own 
rhythms and speeds to create a third shared potential – a 
parasitic body disrupting prescribed boundaries. This is an 
ecological resonance, a collective and generative contrasting or 
transductive event.
Both audible and inaudible elements of a sound set up diffractive 
patterns with each other (Roads 2001, 33), a resonance that 
Goodman terms the ‘hypersonic effect’ (2010, 184). This 
parasitic noise operates on the audible range, modulating 
unheard vibrations, producing what we perceive as tonal colour 
or timbre (the layering of tones, overtones, intra- and ultra-
sonic frequencies that give qualitative breadth and openness 
Figure 7.1 Sonia Leber & David Chesworth, Space-Shifter (detail view), 2009 Steel 
with 2G pack enamel paint, 14 channel audio, audio transducers, speakers. 
Courtesy the artists. This project was supported by the Australian Government 
Through the Australia Council for the Arts. 
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to perceived sounds). In addition, these diffractions produce 
a rhythmic multiplication or syncopation, with surfaces acting 
as attractors in the system of modulation of beats.257 Here 
Space-Shifter becomes an affective ‘rhythm machine’, where 
connections between entities are assembled via sympathetic 
rhythms (Goodman 2010, 111), organising or patterning relations 
between pulsating bodies. Rhythm plays out the problem of the 
disjunction of differing vibrational speeds, as a gathering of these 
differences on a plane.258
As such, the parasitic actions of wave diffraction more than 
multiply the vibrations to be experienced through diffraction. 
They are micro-perceptive machines that produce a multiplicity, 
virtuality, to the sound event, a system of potential disruptive 
production of ‘new rhythms, resonances, textures and syntheses’ 
(Goodman 2010, 191) that is immanently produced with 
the audible.
Figure 7.2 Sonia Leber & David Chesworth, Space-Shifter (detail view), 2009 Steel 
with 2G pack enamel paint, 14 channel audio, audio transducers, speakers. 
Courtesy the artists. This project was supported by the Australian Government 
Through the Australia Council for the Arts. 
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Micro-perceptive sounds are parasites on cognition, on the 
hegemony of perceptive reduction of sensation of vibration,259 
and on the easy distinction between listener and the listened-to 
(receiver and received) as all become entangled in ongoing 
transductions. The insistent force of vibration in its not-fully-
formed or cognisable state requires of a body that it compose 
organs to cut or actualise perception from a virtual plane of 
vibration. It also keeps vibration on the edge of the virtual, still at 
its most open to different combinatory possibilities, suspended 
in the not-quite decided. This is the parasite as creator of ‘fuzzy’ 
relation (Serres 2007, 57). Here sounds in Space-Shifter lose their 
beginnings and ends through refolding and held dispersion. 
There is unease in the encounter with these heightened 
disturbances, an edginess that the lure of the unheard performs, 
a heightened sense of the presence of an excess that cannot 
be contained within the audible, that refuses contraction 
but insistently is felt on the body. This invades enjoyment or 
contemplation of the work as one is thrust into the middle of its 
machinations (Deleuze 1993, 93). In this way Space-Shifter acts 
parasitically on one’s emotion state – a metaphorical diffraction 
– disrupting the contraction of sound to signification, acting 
heterogeneously on established language-sound hierarchies.
On all these levels, Space-Shifter is insistently not just ‘sound’ to 
be contemplated and comprehended, but affective force in the 
event. It is a ‘performance of the world in its ongoing articulation’ 
(Deleuze 1993, 93), a way of ‘knowing’, a ‘specific engagement of 
the world’ (Barad 2007, 379) across a vibrational plane.
Refrain: Parasitic unsounds
In the installation Momo260 (see Figures 7.3 and 7.4), unheard but 
affectually forceful vibrations were layered to produce a sound 
ecology that might impact on bodies beyond the perceptual 
processes afforded by the ears. Within a sound design – one 
The noise in the noise 169
that already recombined sounds through cutting, layering, 
echoing and volume shifts in response to fluctuations of light 
and movement in the space – each sound sample was itself 
a layered combination of perceptible and micro-perceptible 
sounds. Samples consisted of both a dominant sound (a word, 
phrase, or other vocalisation), and approximately four to eight 
‘unsounds’ (see Figure 7.5). These sounds were manipulated 
to sit below a humanly perceptible threshold by virtue of their 
high or low frequency range, and/or because their volume sat 
below an audible level, and consisted of both altered versions 
of the dominant sound, and other found sounds chosen for 
their particular affectual qualities.261 Here another layer of 
held difference or contrast was added to each sound event 
through these new and competing samples that began to move 
the dominant sound beyond itself, recreating the sample as a 
machine capable of intensively differentiating.
While the viewer could not audibly comprehend these additional 
layers, they did create affects on bodies in ways somewhat more 
difficult to articulate. These affects could be felt by listening to 
the difference between the main sample on its own and the 
layered composite sound. When combined, what was heard 
gained an unsettling quality that heightened the already abrasive 
qualities of the vocalisation. A sense of uneasiness was added 
that could be described as a shift and increase in richness or 
intensity of the affectual tonality – a prehension of the unsaid/
unheard. In addition, certain frequencies in the background 
sounds produced subtle physical affects on the body (such as a 
slight prickly feeling on the skin or a tension in certain muscles) 
that added to the emotional response, and to the feeling of a 
‘more-than’ qualitatively combining with the perceived sound. 
These layers of the experience might be thought of as disrupting 
through creative multiplication, a ‘checking’ of the process of 
clear perception that allowed micro-perceptions to ‘invade’ 
consciousness (Deleuze 1993, 93).
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This felt presence of an unheard excess within the sounds 
perceived might be proposed as the beginnings of a bodily 
awareness of a larger vibrational ecology at work. In this way, 
the design sought to experiment with heightening sensitivities 
to both the excess of sound in the sonic environment, and to 
the sensitive capacities of parts of the body that interact with 
vibration. Rather than focusing on communication via the 
ears, the design experimented with the disruptive qualities of 
vibrations to encourage listening in a larger bodily sense.
The utilisation of micro-perceptible sound also began to work 
towards a more complex ecology of interactions. These were 
concerned not just with ear-to-speaker connections, but also 
with multiple sound wave-to-sound wave and surface-to-surface 
connections and combinations. A non-human level of dynamic 
interaction played out within the work, as vibrations of both 
sounds and unsounds interfered with each other – as they 
always do – but were multiplied and complicated by the greatly 
increased percentage of unsounds present. These played out, 
on an environmental plane, the combinatory, diffractory and 
essentially molecular nature of vibration.
Should we still term these as sounds? Certainly they acted on 
bodies, making connections between surfaces, but perhaps 
they began to disturb the boundaries between sound and other 
forces, between one kind of sensation and another, between the 
capacities of the ear and the potential of the surface of a body 
to be coopted into an expanded listening machine. These micro-
perceptible vibrations remained, to some extent at least, at a 
level of affect, of trans-objective and trans-subjective force.
These active forces played out their differential equations below 
a perceivable level. What was perceived were the effects of 
this battle of ‘wills’ (Deleuze 2002b, 61), but the vibrational here 
extended to a more-than-human plane, beginning to position 
the work as being concerned with a larger play of force within 
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the environment. Micro-perception here operated at the level of 
the minor gesture, emerging ‘from the field itself’, as Manning 
says, concerned with an expressive variation not held within an 
Figure 7.3 Andrew Goodman, Momo, (detail view). 2011. Paradise Hills Gallery, 
Melbourne.
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object as a perceived sound, but within the environment’s own 
capacity to prehend and interact with its intensive differential 
(2016a, 48, 54).
Multiplicity: the aliveness of the virtual
How can we perceive sound – whether through the ears or 
body as a whole –and construct a useable set of vibrations 
from the multiplying ‘noise’ of diffracting micro-perceptions? 
Clear perceptions, as Deleuze argues, are actualised out of the 
potential of the micro-perceptions that form their virtual – the 
multiplicity from which they concresce. Each perception is a 
singular configuration of ‘compossible minute perceptions’ that 
yields perception as a cut in the multiplicity of such potential 
combinations (a ‘zone of clear expression’) (Deleuze 1993, 
Figure 7.4 Andrew Goodman, Momo, (installation view). 2011. Paradise Hills 
Gallery, Melbourne.
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90).262 These enmeshed micro-relations form an affective 
entanglement, without themselves being distinctly expressed. 
It is the act of perception, productive resonance with vibration, 
which cuts into this virtual plane and actualises a particular 
contrast of the relations between micro-perceptions. That is, the 
perception expresses a distinct diffractive combination of micro-
perceptions in a particular way that yields a focus, but retains 
also some relation to all the micro-perceptions of the multiplicity. 
Each perception then is a singular and subjective expression of 
its relationship to the entire field in its intensive and selective 
patterning or contrasting of these micro-perceptions (Deleuze 
1993, 90).263
As always, perception is a result of the differentials of differential 
equations, that is, what is perceived is the modulation of 
Figure 7.5 Sound layering in a sample from Momo. In this example, the dominant 
sound is highlighted, while other manipulated copies of this sample, and 
samples from other sources, sit below a perceivable threshold.
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difference over time (Evans in Massumi 2002, 177). This dynamic 
(unheard) virtual of the perceived sound actively disrupts its 
stable status as ‘object’ with determinate or idealised status.264 
Instead it becomes the product of differential relations of affects 
expressed in conscious perception. There is always a multiplicity 
that is alive in its ever-diffracting evolution in each heard or felt 
sound – a future-feeling drawing the sound towards further 
perceptive concrescence. Shape-Shifter draws these unheard 
relations into a clearer zone of expression, just as it positions 
what would habitually be clear into a zone of indeterminacy. 
This makes evident the dynamic complexity of vibrational 
forces present, and makes felt something of their relation to 
the perceived sound as it invites us to suspend ourselves in this 
individuating process. One is thrust into – or emerges tentatively 
out of – a seething ecology of sensations: the body reconstructed 
as synesthetic machine, drawing vibratory sensation from it’s 
various surfaces-as-organs to construct a perception.265 In this 
respect, the work might be seen to be ‘ethical’ in sympathy with 
Simondon’s proposition of ethics as the ‘sense of individuation’ 
(Simondon cited Combes 2013, 64) that links or makes felt the 
preindividual component of an event and affirms the relational 
nature of this event (Combes 2013, 65).
Here, Shape-Shifter’s ethical relationality encourages an 
awareness of a ‘vitality’ of nonhuman composition, and the 
ability ‘to become perceptually open to it’ (Bennett 2010, 14). But 
the ‘non-human’ here must be thought of, not as an exclusion 
of the human dimension, but as the affectual forces that course 
through and are felt by both the human and other entities, 
making evident the transindividual elements of any concrescence 
(Mackenzie 2002, 117). The transindividual, Mackenzie says, 
cannot be conceived of as being interior or exterior to the 
individual, but as a ‘continuing folding and unfolding limit 
between inside and out’ (2002, 137). This positions the individual 
as ‘one provisional [outcome] of a collective individuation in 
process’ (Mackenzie 2002, 207). This transductive stance, which 
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Mackenzie takes from Simondon, again places an emphasis on 
the forces and minor gestures within the field that motivate the 
further collective gathering or individuation, and of which the 
vibrational ecology of Shape-Shifter provides an exemplary case.
Shape-Shifter achieves this ethical sympathy with the ecology, 
I would argue, through its ability to make problematic the 
experience and concrescence of a remarkable or clear perception 
(Deleuze 1993, 91). ‘Perception’ of sound is revealed as contingent 
and in-process, a process of differentials differentiating, which 
is ‘an expression of the in-between’ (Murphie 1997, 326). Sounds 
that have denied representation on a more superficial level 
– by emphasising part words and vocal expression over easy 
signification – work to draw the participant into implication in the 
processes of diffraction and production, as a series of interactive 
surfaces that assemble as differential machines.266
Micro-perception is configured as a problem, which finds an 
expression in perception (though not as a ‘solution’ as such, 
more a ‘working through’). When engaging with Shape-Shifter 
we try to comprehend, to make the vibrations coalesce into 
readable ‘sounds’. But the magnitude of the differentials, the 
speeds at which they move, and the unbalanced relationship 
between the heard and ‘unheard’, disrupts this contraction. The 
richness of the work’s affectual force leaves us disorientated, 
perceptually unresolved, still searching for a defined body, 
space and sound. This process of disruption of vibrational wave 
by vibrational wave is not only foregrounded but stretched or 
preserved. It is the vibrational ‘aliveness’ of the event that the 
body of the participant comes to feel itself explicitly implicated 
in. Thus as feelings – as prehensive resonance with other 
entities (Whitehead 1978, 220) – the affectual qualities of micro-
perceptible vibrations become evident, and new sensitivities to 
the vibrational ecology in which we are immersed are proposed 
and can be experimented with.267
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Conclusion
Shape-Shifter emphasises the temporal through the mediation 
of rhythms of the vibrations disrupting and combining (Braidotti 
2002, 154). The work addresses listening as an act of combining 
and disrupting relational vibrational processes and of sensing 
the inherent further parasitic potential, rather than as the 
perception of individual ‘completed’ or explicated sounds. In 
this it approaches what Braidotti has proposed as a ‘nomadic 
music’, concerned with a becoming-interval and a dynamic 
relation to the field, to the inaudible and imperceptible (Braidotti 
2002 155). 268
A ‘nomadic’ music suggests shifting ideas of sound design from 
completed or wholly realised sounds to mobile assemblages of 
micro-sounds as micro-perceptions. This might enable a shift 
from a representational model to one of production. That is, a 
shift towards a focus on enabling conditions for the production 
of perception of sounds out of the field of micro-perceptions, 
with their inherent and parasitic diffractive resonances. Shape-
Shifter approaches the limit of what can be heard or understood 
as sound, and in addressing this limit of the perceptible, it 
proposes new organisations of surfaces (assemblages) with 
which to perceive.
Here sound in an art event is potent, not for its ability to extend 
meaning and communication beyond the capabilities of the eye, 
as it is so often how it is utilised, but rather to problematise such 
notions of communication-between. Thus it is harnessed at the 
level of affect to open potential for new bodily individuations, 
and it is the space of the body that Shape-Shifter vibrates as much 
as the air or floor. It sets these bodies resonating to awaken new 
appetites, new sympathetic resonances and dissonances, as they 
tune into the multiplicity of the vibrational ecology within which 
they become.
8
A thousand tiny interfacings:  
fertile acts of resistance
Introduction
These spaces between are more complicated than 
one might think…less a juncture under control than an 
adventure to be had.
Michel Serres
Brian Massumi has argued that the interface is an unsustainable 
concept within a process-centered world. In its usual 
understanding, the interface is positioned as a ‘privileged site 
of mediation’ within a system, Massumi states (1995, 7). This is 
evident in the various definitions of the interface as ‘a bridge 
and a channel’ (Hansen 2011, 68), a distinct ‘point of contact’ 
(Grau 2003, 198), or as ‘devices that link humans to machines’ 
(Poissant 2007, 236).269 Such ideas of the interface as a prime 
site of creativity, interaction and communication deny what in 
process philosophy might be seen as the relationally enmeshed 
nature of all entities. Massumi’s philosophical stance emphasises 
the ‘primacy of processes of becoming over the states of being 
through which they pass’ (Massumi, De Boever and Rolfe 2009, 
38), that is, that any entities interfacing with each other are 
themselves composed of relations. As such, discrete interfaces 
are problematic in that they might be seen to imply a world 
inhabited by ideal, internally stable objects, between which 
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interactions occur. The interface’s role, in such modes of thinking, 
is to rejoin entities that are by implication discrete, where the 
complexity of continued unfolding and relation to the dynamic 
virtual or potential is greatly diminished.
There is much to be critical of in the privileging of the interface. 
As Massumi notes, it can promote a naïve excitement in 
undifferentiated flows of information, an unquestioning, 
utopian promotion of interface ‘for interfaces sake’ (1995, 1), 
that fits in perfectly with capitalist models of circulation and 
surplus value (Massumi 1995, 9). To this, one might add the 
cybernetic conflation of the biological and technical, of which 
Simondon is so dismissive,270 and which Massumi describes 
as the ‘industry philosophy’ (1999, 33). The extension of the 
‘prosthetic function’ of the interface, is utilised as a method of 
controlling, ‘a relay point in the dissemination of human ordering 
activity into space…transform[ing it] into a realm of expansion 
onto which the human projects itself’, with real difference 
erased as the body ‘disappears behind a techno-logical shield’ 
(Massumi 1995, 3). This subjectification of the technical object, 
which Anna Munster has pointedly termed ‘interfaciality’, is a 
codification as face to face, rather than body to machine relation 
(2006, 122–4). Interfaces here contain potentially problematic 
elements of power and control in their stratification and 
limitation of relationships, denying, as Matthew Fuller says, a 
user’s engagement with the internal operations of computer 
software (2003, 142). In this, he argues, they potentially not 
only codify relations and subjectify technical elements (treating 
technical assemblages as a stable and ordered ‘whole’ with fixed 
interrelations between these elements), but also work to model 
human subjectivities in relation to the particular and pre-coded 
interactions that an interface demands of them (Fuller 2003, 
113–4). Here the disciplining operations of interfaces operate not 
only to refuse certain levels or types of engagement, but also 
to enforce or require other types of homogenous interaction, 
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such as the ubiquitous ‘swipe’ of the smartphone or tablet that 
encodes and limits bodily gestures.
Such disciplining of relations, may indeed, as Fuller notes, exhibit 
tendencies to break down as ‘control folds in upon control, 
mess[ing] with its too-easy seriality’, creating ‘opportunity for 
something else to emerge’ (2003, 113). However, the primary 
sticking point for discussion of the interface within process 
philosophy remains: that the very concept of a distinct interface 
relies on hylomorphic thinking that see it as a privileged site of 
interaction within an otherwise inert representational system 
of ‘scientific materialism’ that seeks to explain ‘all change in 
terms of changes in “external” relations between beings that 
do not change in themselves’ (Stengers 2011, 128).271 These 
clear cut boundaries between things become hard to sustain 
with closer inspection: electrons migrate, charges pass, affects 
flow, bacteria course freely through us – the separation and 
discretion of objects and forces becomes more and more relative 
and intertwined. Within a process-based conception of the 
world that recognises the primacy of forces and relation over 
form, all is interface; everything is dynamic communication, 
incipiently co-forming.
So here we have our paradox: maintaining clear and distinct 
interfaces between things requires us to ignore the actual flow 
and enmeshed quality of lived experience, while acknowledging 
the primacy of the relational means everywhere we look are a 
thousand tiny interfaces. Neither proposition is of much use for 
either thinking or constructing dynamic, immanent art events. 
In this chapter, I want to show some ways in which we might 
think through the process of interfacing as a creative force 
within an art event without succumbing to the type of static, 
representational models of which Massumi is justifiably critical.
To do this I will examine a particular incidence of interfacing 
that occurred in Raphael Lozano-Hemmer’s work, Re:Positioning 
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Fear: Relational Architecture 3, in order to consider ways in which 
unplanned interfacings between a public and the technical 
assemblages of the work helped to develop a greater level of 
both self-organisation and openness in the event, potentially 
operating across a social, artistic and technical level. An 
interesting shift in the forces generating in the work occurred 
– moving from those preconceived by the artist to new, shared 
and emergent individuations developed through an interfacing 
of a public bringing their own intentions and tonalities to the 
event. But, while these events are of particular interest here, I 
do not wish to overstate the uniqueness of the case. As Lozano-
Hemmer has said, the events were certainly significant in his 
rethinking of the ways in which he staged further Relational 
Architecture iterations, however this does not necessarily imply 
that the occurrences were extraordinary for such large-scale 
interventions, which are by their nature always composed of 
multiple and often contradictory intentions and forces, and can 
potentially head in numerous directions, both predictable and 
surprising.272 Rather, this example provides an opportunity to 
consider the creative potential of interfacing, and its ability to 
complicate and re-energise the event. In putting the interface 
to productive use as a differential tactic within an art process, 
I propose that it might provide a logic of self-regulation, one 
capable of internally driving the creation of intensities of 
resonance or disturbance through connection.
Interfacing
If we begin by thinking temporally rather than spatially, it is 
possible to consider these interfaces as moments rather than 
points of action or relation. This suggests that the interface might 
now be thought of more as a process of interfacing,273 as an 
unfolding or contingent process within a larger nexus of relation, 
as an in-action moment of intensity of disruption, contrast 
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and invention rather than a privileged or static position within 
an art event.
As noted in Chapter Two, a machinic conception of both bodies 
and technical objects allows us to think of them as assemblages 
that are productively relational, rather than fixed – always 
capable of further expression of some potential. These organic 
and non-organic machinic assemblages are mobile, in that 
they can contain other machinic combinations nesting within 
them, and can also co-operate with other assemblages to form 
larger (though resolutely non-unified) machines (Braidotti 
2002, 254). I will briefly consider the idea of an art event as a 
machine producing transductions of forces, before attempting to 
unpack the creative role of interfacings in Re:Positioning Fear by 
suggesting that interfacing might productively parasitise.
Transduction
It is common to think of interfaces as translators of code, 
points of information exchange, from digital to analogue or vice 
versa, or as a ‘point of contact where humans and machines 
meet in order for exchange to take place’ (Grau 2003, 198). 
However to assert the primacy of the flow of forces, rather than 
the secondary exchanges of text, I have begun to argue that 
transduction is a better way to fully think the event of interfacing. 
Transduction positions interfacing as the integration, through the 
flow of forces of differing viscosities, of formerly disparate things 
within a becoming-concrete system.274 As Thomas LaMarre 
notes, a move towards concretisation implies an increase in 
the complex inter-determination of the individuations of the 
entities that comprise a larger ecology. It also implies a greater 
openness or indeterminacy in the ‘charging’ (with potential) 
of the relationship between the potentials of an entity and 
its field (the internal and external milieu) as the ‘associated 
milieu’ of the event that ‘runs through or across inside and 
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outside as a transductive potential ’ (LaMarre in Combes 2013, 
93, emphasis in the original). This ‘charging’ with potential is, 
as I will argue is the case with the events that disturbed and 
ultimately transformed Re:Positioning Fear, a problematisation 
within a field that acts as the catalyst for new individuations to 
arise. These are partial or ongoing solutions that individuate not 
only relations between the entity and field, but also new sets of 
rules or planes on which individuations might operate (Vollrath 
46). That is, such problematisation enables the ‘discovery of 
the dimensions according to which [the] problematic can be 
defined’ (Simondon 2009, 11, 12). Transductions individuate or 
evolve these dimensions, Simondon states, over time (2009, 12), 
bringing the concept in line with interfacing as an unfolding of an 
ongoing productive relationship rather than a pre-structured or 
instantaneous ordering of relations.
In transduction then, as argued in Chapter Seven, we have 
a way of thinking how components relate that, rather than 
resolving or fixing relation, emphasises the ongoing productive 
and speculative internal and external tension of resonances 
between potentials brought into conjunctive and nonlinear 
relation (Mackenzie 2008, unpaginated). Transduction, for 
Simondon, generates the dimensions in which components can 
communicate ‘without loss, without reduction’ (Simondon 2009, 
12): a ‘solution’ that conserves rather than limits or reduces 
information and potential as in the traditional notion of the 
interface. Thus transduction might expand interfacing from a 
limited notion of fixed actualised relations mediated through 
an interface, to one that emphasises dynamic and ongoing 
interactive potential on a virtual plane.
An art-event might be a transductive machine: regulating and 
producing affectual flows, a ‘machinic of expression rather 
than a signifying apparatus’ (Murphie 1996, 104), a producer of 
movement (Munster 2006, 15) or difference. Again, transduction 
must be thought of as occurring not only on a concrete physical 
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level, but also – as will become particularly pertinent in the 
art examined in this chapter – at social and psychological 
levels (Simondon 2009, 11). In conjunction with this, the 
individuation of the individual is also trans-individual in that 
it is inherently intertwined in larger, collective individuations 
(Simondon 2009, 9).
If the transduction that occurs through interfacing produces 
difference, then this positions interfacing as a prime creative 
force-form.275 Seeing interfacing as a machinic action implies a 
shift in designing art events in order to emphasise their machinic 
potential, their productive capacity or capability to produce 
difference. It is this operation of the interface as a differential 
machine that is addressed below through an unpacking of 
Re:Positioning Fear, in light of three related actions of creative 
differentiation: parasitic noise, folding and the resonance of the 
incompossible, and concretisation.
Re:Positioning Fear
Re:Positioning Fear consisted of an orchestrated shadow 
dance composed of a projected conversation thrown onto 
the architecture of the city. This text was made visible within 
the shadows participants cast on the surface, creating 
silhouettes of differing sizes depending on their distance from 
the light sources (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2). Here the bodies of 
the participants performed disruptive interfacings within a 
machine composed otherwise of technical objects and public 
architectural components. This melding of technical objects with 
the unpredictable input of a public presents one possibility of 
providing the technical elements with an expanded potentiality. 
Its ‘relation with elements outside itself’ provides a level of 
indeterminacy (Munster 2006, 14). The body, as Combes 
states, is always in an ideal position to make connections with 
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the technical, to ‘become with’, to play the role of ‘transducer 
between machines’ as it has an ‘always active virtual’ (2013, 60).276
Parasitic noise
Part of the appeal of this work is undoubtedly the inbuilt 
complexity with which it enables or creates potential to 
engage various components of the city in a new and playful 
manner. This, as Andreas Broeckman writes of the work, was a 
dynamic ‘social interfacing’, as Re:Positioning Fear constructed a 
‘fragmented and heterogeneous system of engaging different 
publics in a variety of specific ways’ (Broeckmann 2004, 381). 
Thus personal imagery was re-inscribed on architecture 
burdened with often-oppressive histories, public spaces 
re-commissioned into dialogues with the performative, bodies 
unproductively intertwined with technologies of surveillance and 
control, and so on.
However a much more interesting and radical disruption also 
occurred in the particular unfolding of this work, which was 
already primed for playful intervention and evolution. It was 
in this catalysing moment, through parasitic action, that a 
new and more complex machine was produced. Alongside the 
positioning of their shadows on the façade to activate the hidden 
text, participants began to synthesise a different work out of 
the components by engaging specifically in play between their 
projected silhouettes. They utilised the potential to radically alter 
the size of their shadows by moving closer and further away 
from the projected light source to engage creatively with one 
another. For example, a wheelchair bound participant created 
a giant image of himself and ‘ran down’ everyone else (Lozano-
Hemmer 2005, 6), while other participants played with shadow 
puppetry of smaller bodies, and the making of multi-limbed 
combinatory beings.277
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Figure 8.1 Rafael Lozano-Hemmer, Re:positioning Fear, Relational Architeture 3, 
1997. Landeszeughaus, Architecture and Media Bienale, Graz, Austria.  
Photo: Joerg Mohr.
Figure 8.2 Rafael Lozano-Hemmer, Re:positioning Fear, Relational Architecture 3, 
1997. Landeszeughaus, Architecture and Media Bienale, Graz, Austria. Photo: 
Joerg Mohr.
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This free shadow play was, I would suggest, a kind of parasitic 
noise, feeding off the energy already flowing through the work 
to create new paths, and to creatively bifurcate relations.278 It 
continued to qualitatively express something of the original 
relation (moving shadows revealing text on the building’s 
surface), while at the same time producing a new (minor) relation 
through the same initial forms. The contemplative and reflective 
rhythm of movement in the large-scale text was overlaid with the 
noise of a quick and teasing play of shadows, creating a tension, a 
clash of intentions and tonalities: gaps and miscommunications.
These parasitic actions existed on multiple levels and at different 
scales. They operated throughout the transductions of form-
force taking place, wherever interfacing occurred, producing 
excess. For example, as bodies overtly disrupted light to create 
new imagery, there was also a more subtle disruption of 
intention. Artist’s intentions (or perceived potential of the work) 
interfaced with the participants’ disparate motivations, to create 
a third, more mobile position. This composed indeterminacy 
within prescribed events of relation. This is not intended as a 
metaphor – within process thinking intentions, urges, feelings, 
desires are not phantasms, but forces and lures towards forces 
in and of the world (as James states, process thinking must not 
‘exclude from [its construction] any element that is directly 
experienced’) (2010, 18).279 Such conceptual forces are, I am 
suggesting, as capable of interfacing as anything more materially 
substantive – of immanently joining and modulating together to 
produce new movement, to drive differentiation/ bifurcation.
Parasitic machinics here produced not a linear evolution of the 
work, but rather enabled processes of transversal connectivity 
and entanglement (O’Sullivan 2006, 17). The parasitic action 
of interfacing was an agent of difference in that it continued 
to transduce relation. It kept the event always on the point of 
splitting and moving into multiple new forms, suspending it in 
unfolding differentiation, disrupting any simple or sustained 
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connectivity. As such this contingency operated both on the 
level of actualised relations (how a given participant’s presence 
and gestures interfaced within the larger event), but also on a 
level of the development of potential dimensions of operation. 
This affected how the very rules that constituted the larger 
event began to evolve and complicate, beginning to creatively 
disrupt some of the more potentially problematic interfacing 
that might occur in the work to fix participants in the gaze of 
the technology’s eye. While disruptions to intention are not 
unusual within works such as this, designed to accommodate 
interference, what is notable is the degree to which such 
interference overtook the original structures.
Folds – the vibration of the incompossible
If parasitic action was, in a sense, a continually performed 
splitting of relation, the interfacing that occurred in Re:Positioning 
Fear might also be thought as producing difference through 
connecting, through incitation or a ‘dynamics of infection’ 
(Stengers 2011, 160). That is, through a folding of technological 
objects and bodies in interfacing, something new was 
produced (art). As Andrew Murphie writes, this is a doubling 
that technologies can perform (1996, 89), in this case the body 
becoming-with the lights, the façade becoming-with shadows, 
portraits becoming-with movement and so on. Rather than 
collapsing difference to produce a new homogenous history 
or façade, this folding multiplied difference to produce new 
singularities that were performed alongside, throughout and 
in the gaps of the previously existing iterations.280 Thus, for 
example, in folding shadows that had a single purpose now 
performed (at least) two operations. But this was not simply a 
doubling of function, as folding overlaid and intertwined the two 
actions: to complement, overlap, interrupt, and fragment each 
other, creating multiple shifting moments of differentiation out 
of what was initially a fairly simple folding.
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Interfacing here was a performative act by which the machine 
continued to re-fold its internal systems, and fold elements 
outside itself (various bodies, intentions, movements, tonalities, 
and so on) into its workings. This created, as Deleuze writes 
of such actions, a ‘forced movement’ or ‘internal resonance’ 
within the system (1994, 118). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, resonance acts like ‘contrast’ in Whitehead’s system of 
concrescence to conserve ‘tensions in the form of a structure’ 
(Simondon 2009, 6)281 – differences that are transduced through 
being ‘topologically and temporally restructured across an 
interface’ (Mackenzie 2002, 25; Sauvagnargues 2102, 66–7). This 
ongoing and continually productive resonant intensity-without-
resolution was a ‘machine’ producing ongoing and new potential. 
The new shadow play on the façade overlaid the original 
projections; as the artist’s intentions and the new tonalities 
participants brought to the event continued to question one 
another; and as one participant’s shadow intentionally and/
or accidentally overlapped in new combinations with other 
pedestrians’ movements, gestures and poses. Such enfolding 
and resultant resonance might suggest that the event of 
Re:Positioning Fear had moved on from a relatively stable state 
of equilibrium where potentials of the event were actualised and 
‘no more force exist[ed]’ (Simondon 2009, 6, 8), and where each 
component was kept at a regular spacing or relationship to one 
another that did not significantly develop over time. Instead it 
had developed into what Simondon terms a ‘metastable’ system, 
‘supersaturated’ with potential that was always individuating 
(2009, 6). This potential that was always immediately available 
‘without distance and without delay’ (Simondon 1995b, 225), 
recharging itself through the re-enfolding of components. 
This might be a diagrammatic system that was a ‘place only of 
mutation’, whereby forces were ‘in a perpetual state of evolution’, 
and were ‘inseparable from the variations in their relations’ 
(Deleuze 1988, 71). Here folding implicated machinic components 
in each other’s becoming through an ongoing and inventive 
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process of variation and re-articulation – repetitions that 
produced difference.282
In this entanglement or nesting the event became ‘polyphasic’, 
in Simondon’s terms, a condition whereby there is a ‘persistence 
of the primitive and original phase in the second phase, and 
this persistence implies a tendency towards a third phase’ 
(cited in Combes 2013, 46).283 This third phase is, as Combes 
explains, the genesis of collective individuation. It is by drawing 
on the ‘preindividual shares [of nature]’ of potential remaining 
post-individualization that ‘individuals can give birth to a new 
reality’: a collective individuation that ‘reunites these shares of 
nature charged with potential’ (2013, 47–8). Such collectivity ‘is 
not a result of relation [between individuals]…it is relation that 
expresses individuation of the collective’ as ‘its own operation 
of individuation’ (Combes 2013, 47). Thus the new shadow play 
in Re:Positioning Fear gave rise to a new collective event with its 
own set of transindividual relations between participants, façade, 
lights and projections. This drew on the un-actualised potentials 
remaining within these components, folding these virtual 
remainders together; addressing collectively those problems that 
were not resolvable on an individual level (Grosz 2012, 50). Here 
we can see the event itself taking on a new level of self-generative 
power – new intensity – through a resonance that drew on but 
surpassed the potential of participants, artist, technological 
objects, architecture and so on.284 Thus the event’s creative 
power might be in both the creation of actualised and potential 
foldings that the interfacing opened up, and in a bifurcating of 
future enfoldings that resonated within the event.
I want to suggest here that this more radical folding occurring 
in the interruption of Re:Positioning Fear might also be seen as 
a fold of the outside. The ‘outside’ or ‘incompossible’ is force 
in non-relation (Deleuze 1988, 72; Deleuze 1993, 60) – itself a 
disruptive gap in the relational field – that ‘eats into the interval 
and forces or dismembers the internal’ (Deleuze 1988, 72). This 
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can produce a reorganisation that is a ‘trans-formation…to the 
composing forces, [which] enter in to a relation with the other 
forces which have come from the outside’ (Deleuze 1988, 73).285 
The participants’ shadow-body play was an outside of the event, 
which was folded into emergent relation, at the level of force as 
well as form.
This folding began to transform the affects of the event, since 
affect is what is experienced in the transduction of force (Deleuze 
1988, 60). The new affective tonality that was folded into the 
event coursed through, transducing, infecting all the systems 
and delimiting the event.286 This was a force of qualitative 
change, of affective tonality. Interfacing here might be viewed as 
a ‘vitality affect’ on a force, ‘elicited by changes in motivational 
states, appetites, and tensions’ (Stern cited Manning 2013a, 5),287 
producing a felt moment of creative differing.
What is it that can be conceived of as truly outside of the event? 
Not the participants themselves (it cannot be any ‘composed 
form’, Deleuze argues), but these emergent and composing 
affectual forces outside of any form (Deleuze 1993, 73, 72). 
This again is more than the individuation of an event within 
an established field – the remarkable point within an already 
constituted ecology. It is the force of individuation that makes 
both the event and its paired environment appear (Simondon 
2009, 4–5, 14 n.2): an impersonal individuating force that 
precedes relation, preceding but acting to gather an ecology. 
The new dimensions of the shadow-play event in Re:Positioning 
Fear did not exist within the initial registers of the systems 
(technological, psychological, social). The plane connecting one 
participant to another, to the lights, to the artist, composed 
itself as components folded, gathering force for a collective 
individuation and the evolution of a shared associated milieu.288 
This was interfacing as not only unimagined prior to the event, 
but ‘unreasoned’ and unthinkable in its entirety, in that it’s 
potential might be ‘impossibly enveloped in a…still undefined 
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experience, compoundly unpreviewed’ (Massumi 2002, 97): 
known and knowable only in its performative individuation, in its 
relativity to the genesis of its collective invention.289
Concretisation and the diagrammatic
I suggest that it was through these particular interfacings that 
the machine of Re:Positioning Fear underwent a process of 
concretisation: shifting systems from a limited, linear or closed 
functioning, towards self-regulation and sustenance, and 
consequently, towards a ‘solidarity of openness’, an increase 
in self-generative capacities (LaMarre in Combes 92–3).290 This 
might be a critical point in the folding in of the outside at which 
new system-level rules begin to operate.291
Interfacing here might be seen to have incited a phase or 
register-shift through transduction, implicating the external. 
That is, these radical interfacings acted to create completely 
new milieus.292 More than modulating transduction, a new 
machine was produced from the field when the system passed 
a ‘threshold of [qualitative] intensity’ (DeLanda 2005, 18–19), 
forcing new flows, with their attendant individuations, to begin. 
The interfacing of the incompossible, here ‘vibrating against 
the conformal’ (Whitehead 1978, 188), instigated a leap or jump 
of registers, whereby a point of ‘absolute origin’ (LaMarre in 
Combes 2013, 86) of a new event (and a new type of event) was 
produced.293
As I have hinted at in the previous section, one might term such 
an ongoing and provisional and essentially co-producing and 
becoming-concrete type of event ‘diagrammatic’: a system of 
‘ongoingly organized and redistributing gatherings’ of its own 
making (Arakawa and Gins 2006, 56). Here what Re:Positioning 
Fear becomes as it moves from the linear to the concrete is a 
super-charged, dynamic ecology. This is not the replacement of 
order with chaos, but a different mode of operation that perhaps 
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‘leaps over chaos’, a ‘catastrophe’ (for the original artwork) 
that is also a ‘germ of (new) order or rhythm’ (Deleuze 2002a, 
84, 83).294 A diagrammatic modelling (for it is never a ‘model’ 
in any fixed sense but an ongoing process of re-inquiry into its 
own status or dimensions – a metamodelling) moves towards 
an immanence of production and connection, across (and in 
conversation with) both actualised and potential planes, and can 
only be understood on a global or ecological level. Simondon 
argues that Euclidean notions of relation between fixed 
entities are inadequate to think the dynamics of over-lapping, 
intertwined and ongoing individuations, and describes this new 
and precarious mode of operation as topological (1995b, 223). 
Topological relationality creates a diagrammatic connectivity 
passing at once between such fixed points while at the same 
time expressing the whole event, not as a reunified object, but as 
the system of rhythms of contrasts or tensions or forces (Deleuze 
2002a, 85–6).
In the new ‘charged grounding’ (LaMarre in Combes 2013, 93) 
between internal spacing and external contrast a larger machine 
ecology began to gather or self-modulate on another scale295. Not 
only the event, but also the field itself had changed. Re:Positioning 
Fear had changed its nature, not only by actualising a previously 
un-actualised potential, but also by rewriting the very field 
of potential available to it. This meant that the work gained a 
greater capacity to generate its own emergent difference – a 
parasitic operation – and in this the parasitic actions on relation 
lead to a state of greater self-regulation and sustenance.296
Conclusion
The shifts that occur in Re:Positioning Fear as a result of 
interfacing were both materially (ontologically) slight and 
processually (ontogenetically) significant. What the participants 
brought to the event that instigated such a shift was, in a sense, 
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no more than a new intention, or perhaps even less distinctively, 
a new tonality that infected the work to produce something new. 
This is not to suggest necessarily that what it shifted to was in 
itself significant, but that the way that interfacings performed 
such a shift was of philosophical and artistic interest, in that 
it provides a potential tactic towards the thinking of more 
open-ended systems of interactivity, suggesting a potential 
machinic, ‘minor’ art event, concerned less with signification 
than a collective becoming (O’Sullivan 2006, 69–71). This 
performative interfacing perhaps acted as a ‘lure’ towards feeling 
or transduction, as a pull towards the future (Manning 2013a, 
57), a pre-relational tendency towards affectual relation or as a 
productive diagrammatic tension.
Re:Positioning Fear was concerned not with utility in technology, 
but with, as LaMarre articulates, Simondon’s plea for relations 
with machines that might instigate sustained inventive 
engagement (LaMarre in Combes 2013, 97). The objects, such 
as they were, in Re:Positioning Fear – lights, buildings, shadows 
– can then be seen to move towards what Manning has termed 
the ‘objectile’: propositions for engagement ‘emphasiz[ing] 
the temporal and qualitative’ (2013a, 148, 149). The event, one 
might say, answered Stern’s call for interactive art to move 
away from privileging signs and images at the interface, and 
the demonstration or fetishisation of the technology in the 
work. Instead the event engaged, as Stern proposes, with the 
invention of styles or qualities or emergence, with the implicit 
and the potential – to construct new ways of relating through 
interfacing (2012, 10).
Refrain: Fuzzy interfacing
In Momo interfacing occurred between bodies and the sculptural 
forms (see Figure 8.2) through a series of light sensors 
embedded in the main form, and movement sensors positioned 
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throughout the space.297 Shadows cast by bodies on the central 
sculpture increased the volume of various audio tracks, providing 
a fluid mix of sounds.298 This operation of interfacing was 
qualitative in its nature as multiple light sensors spread over 
the surface of the sculpture registered subtle variations in the 
intensity of shadows falling across its form. These variations 
were dependent on such factors as the distance of bodies from 
the sculpture, the density of materials blocking light (a thin 
fabric versus a limb, for example), the exact angle of a particular 
light sensor in the folds of fabric, or the collective volume of the 
shadows of bodies momentarily overlapping, alongside subtle 
potential changes in the overall light in the room.
Such qualitatively based sensor interfacings were perhaps 
a step towards a more fluid connection of components that 
began to move away from a focus on delineating and capturing 
or interpreting individual bodily actions and towards a fuzzy 
collective expression of the movement of the event itself. By this 
I do not mean to imply here any set division between analogue 
and digital sensors. Rather, there might be some distinction 
between motion capture systems such as those utilised in Wii 
or Xbox to translate body part movements onto a Cartesian 
grid (and that seek to address not only the participant’s body 
to the exclusion of any other environmental changes, but 
also to focus rigidly on a relation between the intentional 
actions of the subject and the software), and the fuzziness of a 
qualitative sensor registering the variation in the collective sum 
of a particular force over time. Beyond this hardware-based 
interfacing of the sensors, Momo also proposed more ephemeral 
interfacings. These speculated on the resonance of the meeting 
of affectual tonalities between the participant and aspects of the 
work: the infective tonal qualities of the vocal qualities and the 
garish colour palette, for example.
Such partially unintentional interfaces began to capture 
difference on an environmental level. These were not only well 
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outside subjective consciousness, but also outside a larger 
sense of a single body. This fluidity created inexact, unstable 
connections: a disruption of clear relation through a vagueness 
that might be ‘due to an excess of identification’, not a lack 
of connection, as Whitehead states (1978, 111–12). Here the 
contrasts between groups of actual objects that the sensors 
sought to hold a relation to were indistinct and appeared as 
‘one extensive whole’ (though this whole was divisible), and the 
feelings prehended were therefore sensed as ‘chaotic factors’ 
(Whitehead 1978, 111–12). Given the somewhat abrasive and 
confrontational nature of the sounds emanating from the 
sculpture, and its increased vocal ‘agitation’ in reaction to the 
proximity of the participant, these sounds then might be seen to 
have begun to feed back into the styles of movement of bodies 
within the space. In this way, the event perhaps began to take 
on its own collective energy, a folding in the meeting of affectual 
tonalities of the event and the participant – a resonating 
of different moods and intensities – a collective shifting 
and gathering.
This interfacing gathered, to some extent at least, qualitative 
gestures within the event, rather than enforcing privileged 
conversations. That is, the event became sensitive to collective 
sums of reactions, directions, styles and speeds. These might 
be seen as transversal connections, as ongoing acts of the 
transduction of flows of forces across bodies and objects that 
co-implicated them in a collective, performative emergence 
leading towards concretisation – a shared potential or 
transindividuality (Simondon 2009, 9). In this, it began to gather 
a collective field for the event to draw on, beyond the combined 
individual potential of the component parts. More than simply 
being entities communicating across an interface, bodies, 
sounds, colours and lights became fluid (topological) genetic 
components intensively driving an event of collective expression.
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Such concretisation, through a shared responsibility for the 
emergent event, neither subsumed the will of the work to that 
of the participant, nor vice versa. Though participants affected 
the modulation and flows of sound, as the installation contained 
the potential to coax certain styles of behaviour from bodies, 
the expressions of both added further variation and intensive 
movement. Connective possibilities generated and intensified, 
rather than collapsed, difference. For example (on the most 
concrete level), a gesture of one arm created subtle variations in 
shadows across a number of light sensors and simultaneously 
triggered the switching of audio samples through sensed 
movement. Meanwhile the counter-movements of the other 
arm might temporally combine with areas of shadow and send 
contradictory sample-swapping messages to the computer 
system (again an increase of resonance or held contrast in 
and driving the individuations of event). Interfacing here 
potentially directed intentional and accidental movements into 
multiple and overlapping chains of causality – creating multiple 
relations between a body part and the work – and also provided 
mechanisms for variation through instability of its relations.
Again, it is important to note that the event was not concerned 
with representing these interfacings to the participant, or with 
enforcing any one particular set of relations, style of movement 
or feeling of connection, but with affording a variety of potential 
connections. In this instance interactive interfacing at least began 
to move towards the consideration of the infective potential of a 
series of resonating or contrasting styles and tonalities. It began 
to consider interfacing as an intensive (and therefore parasitic) 
action within an event – a folding back of the event into itself to 
gather collective forces – with inexact edges and eddies at which 
difference might pool.
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Figure 8.3 Andrew Goodman, Momo, (detail), 2011. Paradise Hills Gallery, 
Melbourne.
9
Sacrificial RAM: locating feeling and  
the virtual in software
One of the questions ahead of us now is this: what are 
the conditions of digitization and binarization? Can we 
produce technologies of other kinds? Is technology 
inherently a simplification and reduction of the real...
What might a technology of process, of intuition rather 
than things and practices look like?
Elizabeth Grosz
How is it possible to think through from a normative 
freeze-frame of representational to a more machinic or 
rhizomic approach to technology?
Andrew Murphie
Introduction: towards a technical ontogenesis
In 1996, Rafael Lozano-Hemmer published a short article entitled 
‘Perverting Technological Correctness’ in which he suggests 
a number of potential ‘misuses’ of technology to trouble the 
aura of ‘technological correctness’ surrounding the promotion 
of digital technologies within art practice (1996, 5). While the 
suggestions themselves are lighthearted (they include wearing a 
hollowed-out computer on one’s head), they reveal a commonly 
held suspicion about the mechanical role of the computer in 
art, and the dangers of ‘perfect replication’ through the use of 
the digital (Lozano-Hemmer 1996, 6). How to make a computer 
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program in itself behave in anything remotely approaching 
a ‘relational’ mode rather than simply working around such 
issues is important, and inherently political (Fuller 2003, 29–30; 
Dery 1996, 14). That is, in order to question and pursue the 
further molecularisation of an interactive artwork across all 
its registers, the speculative and non-totalising potential of 
algorithms must be addressed. In this we might seek to liberate 
digital programming from representation and productive 
‘purposefulness’ that are its legacy in disciplinary structures. 
Within an expanded empiricist framework, all relations demand 
to be seen as real forces that must be accounted for within an 
ecology. Yet the actual nature of algorithmic events, as Luciana 
Parisi argues (2013, 10–11), is often denied adequate explanation 
within the schema of relations. In order to remain true to a 
process philosophy view of the world the becoming potential of 
an algorithm must be explored, alongside that of the potential 
of all the other components of an interactive artwork. Here we 
might seek a way of thinking the primacy of technical process or 
techno-genesis within computers.
Whitehead seeks to develop a process-based philosophy 
‘applicable to any kind of actual occasion’ (Stenner 2008, 99). For 
this to be consistent, as Whitehead aims, I would argue that it is 
necessary that it be as applicable to the workings of a set of code 
as to any other occasion. Thus rethinking software interactions 
demands the finding of a becoming-minoritarian potential of 
computational processes – an ability to disrupt structuring 
and destabilise any ‘whole’ that is based on the transcendent 
replicability of software process. Again, as Parisi advocates, it is 
necessary to question the whole philosophical basis of thinking 
about code in order to find a new and specific way of tackling the 
problem at hand (2013, 3–5). Therefore, contrary to notions of 
code as a mechanical process incapable of further potentiality, 
or as immaterial representations that are transcendent of 
empirical dynamics,299 an algorithm must be shown to be 
‘machinic’. That is, it must be capable of acting as an assemblage 
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primed and therefore capable of shaping it’s becoming as a real 
event, in and of itself, rather than a mechanical assemblage 
that produces a repeatable result. If we want to truly concern 
ourselves with the ‘ethics of relation’, that is, an attention to 
the event in its emergence that does not deny the potency of 
any of the composing forces (Manning 2013a, 213, 171), then 
we need to consider seriously how to afford the performativity 
of algorithms. This involves thinking through how the potential 
written into code can become temporal events of actualisation, 
and addressing an algorithm’s ongoing potential for engagement 
with both actualised entities and ‘eternal objects’ – the infinite 
potential variety within these entities (Parisi 2013, 63).
In this chapter, I will attempt to think the machinic potential 
of an algorithm (a ‘step by step procedure for calculations’) 
(Parisi 2013, 259)300 and a software patch (a set of sequences of 
algorithmic processes created within a software program). This 
discussion, unlike most of the preceding main chapters that have 
other artists’ work as their primary discussion points, moves for 
practical reasons directly to focus on a software patch developed 
for Orgasmatron – one of the works made in conjunction with this 
book.301 After a brief description of the relevant aspects of the 
work, I discuss the software patch in relation to some relevant 
common aspects of generative software design in order to 
discuss both these concepts’ relevance to the artwork, and how 
the software design attempts to move beyond these paradigms.
In thinking beyond these concepts, I then discuss the work 
in relation to the more promising potential of algorithmic 
prehension in order to argue for an algorithm’s acceptance as an 
entity in its own right, and then examine how the design utilises 
systems of parametrically linked multiple attractors to modulate 
data in non-linear ways.
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Orgasmatron
In Orgasmatron,302 data from pairs of sensors303 embedded in the 
structure of the work was fed into the computer to be utilised by 
the software patch, created in the Isadora program.304 Through a 
series of algorithmic processes this data drove ongoing variations 
in light, sound, sound spatialisation and vibration. The processes 
by which incoming data was modulated are briefly described 
here (see Figure 9.1).305
Firstly, ‘Differential’ actors: here the data from a pair of sensors 
was processed in an algorithm utilising a differential equation 
to calculate the rate of their difference differing over time. For 
example, two pressure sensors (embedded in opposite sides of 
the floor of the work) measured the shifts in pressure as a body 
moved across the surface. As an equation this can be expressed 
by (xi – x)/(yi – y), where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are the initial readings of the 
two pressure, and ‘xi’ and ‘yi’ are the pressure sensor readings 
taken 0.1 of a second later. This provided a series of numbers 
that reflect the rate of change of pressure on one side of the 
structure relative to the rate of change of pressure on the other 
side. The result of this equation was then constrained within a 
range of 0–100.
Secondly, ‘Watching’ actors: Here a set of algorithmic actors 
watched the numbers outputted from these equations, looking 
for a particular range of numbers with which they interacted, 
and then counted the incidence of such numbers within the 
constraining parameters. For example, one such algorithm might 
look for numbers between 0.001 and 1.0, or between 10 and 
20, and so on. In this sense, these algorithms acted as a ‘gate’, 
allowing the flow-on of certain data through to the rest of the 
system, while ignoring other data. That is, the watching actor had 
the capacity to be positively affected by, or interact with, certain 
data and had a relation of non-relation with other data, as it 
actively ignored data outside certain ranges, dividing data into 
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two groups, creating a ‘positive’ relation with data accepted, and 
a ‘negative’ relation to rejected data. As will become important 
to the argument that develops below, each evolving set of 
differentials was ‘watched’ by (or was capable of interacting with) 
more than one of these ‘watching’ actors, each with gates of 
different parameters, so that the affectual potential of the flow 
of data was split in ways that might also overlap.
Thirdly, ‘Triggering’ actors: Once the watching actor had 
counted to a set number of positive interactions, this triggered 
the sending of data to the next series of algorithmic actors 
for further modulation. This next set of actors also watched 
for numbers within certain parameters with which they could 
interact, while similarly rejecting other data. These actors 
counted a certain number of interactions, and then sent the 
data flow to further algorithms that triggered a range of video 
projections and sound events.306
Fourthly, within both the watching and triggering algorithmic 
actors, the ranges of data looked for, and the numbers of such 
incidents counted, were designed with variable parameters. 
While each of these parameters had an initial set range or 
number, they were linked to both its own and each other’s 
outputs, so that they changed over time. That is, the range of 
numbers being accepted at each ‘gate’ increased or decreased in 
response to the amount of stimuli received by the set of actors, 
while the threshold number of such events being counted before 
triggering the flow-on of data also changed in response to the 
activities of the system. In this way, the ability of an algorithm to 
be affected developed complexly in relation to its neighboring 
algorithms.307
Fifthly, amongst the triggering set of actors described above 
were actors whose outcomes triggered the activation of 
additional watching and triggering actors, thus potentially 
utilising and splitting the data flow-on in further directions. This 
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will be discussed later in the chapter in terms of a ‘bifurcation’ 
of the system that created a new set of relations inclusive of 
previous relational factors within the system.
Generative software design
Any discussion of the programmatic nature of computer 
operations and codes, within any artwork that is attempting a 
generative or open-ended approach, must acknowledge some 
of the strategies that have been previously employed and their 
(at least) partial success in creating larger systems that have 
open-ended characteristics. In most cases, however, these 
strategies do not adequately address the non-linear potential of 
algorithmic process itself. While it is not within the scope of this 
chapter to provide a detailed account of the various approaches 
that have been taken, I want to here very briefly discuss three 
areas that retain relevance to the larger system utilised in the 
Orgasmatron project.308 These (related) approaches, at their 
simplest, concern: firstly, attempts to ‘diffuse’ the linear nature 
of computer processes through their integration into larger 
and principally analogue based systems; secondly, the use of 
complex feedback systems interacting with software processes 
to create biologically imitative self-generative systems (second-
order cybernetics); and thirdly, attempts to make code itself 
behave in a generative or evolutionary manner through the use 
of parametric feedback.
Diffusion
In practice, many software-generative works are in fact 
assemblages of software, sensors, participants’ bodies, and 
other aesthetic elements such as larger environments of sound, 
light or sculpture. Many such works rely on the integration 
of these components with software to ‘diffuse’ the digital 
technologies. The supposedly prescriptive digital data is 
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‘diffused’ within an analogue field, as qualitative flows of data 
stimulate movement in the software through the transduction 
of analogue signals into the digital, acting parasitically on 
each other. The analogue qualitative flow is disrupted by its 
digitisation and translation into binary code, while the excess 
of the analogue disrupts the digital. As such, it is easy to argue 
that in the larger context of its place within assemblages that 
include other elements, and within the larger social field within 
which it must also be seen to operate, an algorithm or code 
begins to become extensively indeterminate.309 In these tactics 
the injections of data might be said to be relational rather than 
purely chaotic. But while they may have clear creative potential 
in opening systems to novelty, in isolation (that is, when they 
are proposed as the only generative tactics rather than perhaps 
operating as one element on a particular scale in conjunction 
with other generative propositions ), these approaches still rely 
on working around algorithmic prescriptiveness and ignore 
Parisi’s more radical proposition that an algorithm itself might be 
thought of as intensively indeterminate.
Potentially implied in this approach is the problematic acceptance 
of an always-clear analogue/digital divide. As Anthony Wilden 
argues, distinctions can be made between the continuous 
qualities of analogue variation, and the discontinuous scales 
of digital differentiation that then operate through different 
kinds of differentiation (1980, 158). However, he also argues 
that discrete definitions of the two are problematic, and more 
concerned with the ways in which entities relate than any innate 
qualities. Many processes in the world involve both analogue and 
digital on differing scales within the one event of communication 
(1980, 188–9).310 In addition, when viewed as events of relation, 
the digital is always saturated with the rhythms of the analogue 
in the form of gaps, interruptions, processing time, and signaletic 
noises (Wilden 1980, 158).311 Thus, as Wilden acknowledges, 
the translation from analogue to digital can result in loss of 
ambiguity and meaning (1980, 163), implying that the digital 
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is just a poor replica of the ‘real’ analogue experience. I would 
argue that within an expanded empiricism the digital might also 
be thought of as a different but potentially creative and real 
mode in its own right.312
Second-order cybernetics
A second-order cybernetics approach involves assemblages 
of positive feedback chains between components in order to 
develop complex systems of relation from the ‘bottom up’ (Parisi 
2013, 261). Such systems, as Francisco Varela examines in his 
discussion of drift, create connections of ‘viable coupling’ with 
no regard for an end point (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1992, 
205).313 Here, feedback emphasises the processual – the ways in 
which elements are drawn into relation and the fact that all these 
components play an active role in this emergent organisation 
(Murphie and Potts 2003, 192). In the Orgasmatron system, the 
enmeshing of data from the larger artwork assemblage created 
relations between the workings of the computer and the other 
component parts through systems of feedback. Feedback loops 
were established across the various inputs and outputs, for 
example, as shifts in pressure triggered sound events, causing 
vibrations to be sensed, which then triggered light events, 
causing light variations to be sensed, that then cause vibrations 
Figure 9.1 Simplified graphic representation of Actors in Orgasmatron patch.
Triggers Events
     (sound, video, etc.)
Sensor X
     sends reading every 0.1”
Sensor Y
     sends reading every 0.1”
Differential actor
     calculates difference over time: (xi – x)/(yi – y)
     outputs number between 0-100
Watching actor
     looks for number between parameters a & b
     counts number of times between a & b
Triggering actor
     activated when count 
     reaches a set parameter c
activates changes to parameters a & b 
activates changes to parameter c 
activates new watching & triggering actors
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to be sent, and so on.314 In addition, the bodies of participants’ 
became implicated in these systems, adding their own rhythms 
and disruptions to the speakers’ vibrations, varying the pressure 
applied on parts of the floor, and creating variations in light 
through shadows cast (as the system also worked to disrupt 
the bodies’ rhythms). Bodies were then drawn into relation with 
other components of the larger assemblage, and the system 
was primed to afford the gradual development of such relational 
complexity, as various components became further implicated 
in each other’s expressions. Without particular concern for any 
endpoint, the system was always in a state of reconfiguring its 
feedback loops. This transduction of forces within feedback 
systems emphasised movement or circulation over established 
relations and, in this, might be seen to be heading towards 
becoming-molecular configurations.
Parisi, however, critiques such self-organising, second-order 
cybernetic models as relying on the actions of biological 
elements directly animating algorithmic objects to build a 
responsive environment (Parisi 2013, 33).315 Again, these models 
might tend to imply that the environment exists only outside 
of algorithms, rather than seeing these objects themselves 
as being composed of environments of relations, and thus 
‘discard the possibility that change could concern the formal 
logic of computation’ (Parisi 2013 36, 11,13). Parisi argues that 
such systems still treat computation as a passive, non-aesthetic 
component and potentially infer that aesthetics can only be 
found within sensation and not within algorithmic processes 
(Parisi 2013, xv). Thus feedback systems, Parisi argues, contain 
computational potential by demanding that its primarily relation 
is to an external environment that it responds to (2013, 155). If 
such systems also allow only positive and enduring connections 
between the components then this limitation in the rules 
governing their relations may well, as Parisi argues, prime them 
towards the organisation of a stability of connection and a 
molar thinking, rather than a continued emergence and ongoing 
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potential for relational movement to be expressed (2013, 35). 
However I am not entirely convinced by this aspect of Parisi’s 
critique of autopoiesis and its reliance on feedback to maintain 
a whole, which I read as a narrow definition of the possible 
range of potential becoming-autopoietic systems, and possible 
qualifications are discussed below.
Parametric feedback
Such systems might, for a start, be extended by a ‘parametric’ 
approach within the software patch itself. Where generative 
software seeks to create complex forms through sets of simple 
rules and variations of forms, a parametric approach, as argued 
by Portanova, shifts the emphasis towards the programming 
of relations between these rules or algorithmic processes, 
affording another scale on which feedback operates and 
co-implication develops (Portanova 2013, 87). This concept of 
‘parametricism’ might be in line with the ‘ecological’ approach 
that Jon McCormack, amongst others, has advocated. It 
involves the creation of a field of what McCormack terms 
‘conditions and resources’ (that might be better termed as a 
series of environmental propositions) where heterogeneously 
distributed ‘mortal organisms’ draw both from the field (in 
some cases including the presence of viewer’s bodies) and their 
relations to each other, and have some ability to develop their 
interactive parameters (McCormack 2012, 51).316 These systems, 
as McCormack argues, draw components into interdependent 
relations through feedback on a component-to-component 
level, and are self-organising and dynamic in their modulations 
(McCormack 2012, 45), developing system-level relationality as 
a by-product of these interactions (McCormack 2012, 48). As 
described above, the Orgasmatron software patch linked some of 
the parameters of the operations of its ‘watching’ and ‘triggering’ 
algorithms to each other, so that they changed over time in 
relation to the amount of stimulation various parts of the system 
208 Chapter 9
received. This in itself was a parasitic disruption to established 
relations, as it replaced stable capacities to be affected with the 
vagueness and fuzzy logic of contingent and evolving parameters 
of potential relation.
As it gathered parameters into co-implication in each other’s 
modulation, it also created a rolling or gathering of excitation of 
the system. Here stimulation lead to increased potential to be 
stimulated – leading the system towards a ‘far-from-equilibrium’ 
state, rather than a stasis of connectivity that cancelled further 
potential movement. Such far-from-equilibrium systems, Manuel 
DeLanda states, maintain intensive differences, ‘mesh[ing] 
difference’ rather than cancelling it, and thus the potential 
for change remains active within the system (2005, 74–5). 
Accentuating this non-equilibrium state, he argues, puts systems 
in a condition of heightened potential, what he terms a ‘zone of 
intensity’ of operation that moves away from linearity (DeLanda 
2005, 76).317
Here, parametric systems might begin to escape the purely 
positive feedback of second-order cybernetics in utilising 
feedback within algorithmic relations. Instead they begin to draw 
together and further complexify the computational conditions in 
which such relational play might occur – encouraging an intensive 
movement in the shifting of relations between the component 
algorithms.318 In Orgasmatron, local algorithmic excitations 
infected the parameters of neighboring algorithms, creating 
a molecular movement, and it is only through these complex 
and speculative chains that effects on the system as a whole 
emerged. In emphasising models of interference and parts over 
wholes, parametricism (as an extension of feedback systems) 
can, as Parisi argues, begin to escape pre-emptive control, and 
the smoothing or flattening of novelty that is problematic in 
topological systems. Parametricism thus interferes with the 
smooth ‘capitalization of change, futurity and potentiality’ (Parisi 
2013, 92–3). In her critique of the problematic smoothness of 
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such topological models of self-organising systems, which she 
considers as a form of ‘post-cybernetic control’ (Parisi 2013, 
xvii),319 Parisi contrasts them to ‘mereotopological’ systems, 
which she suggests, consist of this consideration of the whole 
as divisible space, and a concern with its interior parts and the 
relations between the two (Parisi 2013, 123–4). Mereotopology, 
as Portanova writes, emphasises ‘not only wholes and parts, 
but the boundaries and interiors of wholes [and] the relations 
of contact and connectedness between wholes and parts’ 
(2013, 79, 76–80).
Potentially still implicit in this parametric approach is the 
idea that the digital can only be made to behave more open-
endedly by making it operate in a pseudo-biological manner. 
This refusal to acknowledge the potential indeterminacy at the 
very heart of coding processes reflects, Goodman and Parisi 
write, the ‘anthropocentrism of interactivity, which pervades 
recent conceptions of digital architecture’ (2009, 1).320 Technical 
machines, as Pickering argues, have their own singular ways of 
relating (1995, 186–7) and algorithmic processes have their own 
specific modes of thought (Parisi 2013, 186).321 Their processes 
should not be erroneously conflated with representations of 
the biological world, as happens in cognitive approaches.322 
Instead of constructing algorithms as ‘tools for thinking’ in 
order to enhance abilities to plan and control – a ‘mechanics of 
possibilities’ (Parisi 2013, 169) – Parisi advocates for a ‘soft(ware) 
thought…producing computational space-time’ (2013, 169). This 
‘software thought’, which she describes as the architecture of a 
new, specifically digital, mode of thought (Parisi 2013, 169), can 
be clearly linked to the need to rethink interactivity and its use 
of computer technology, moving it away from systems of control 
and manipulation that curtail potential, and towards more open-
ended and collectively creative expressions.
The Orgasmatron assemblage clearly utilised combinations of 
analogue and digital processes and feedback systems – including 
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parametric feedback – to varying degrees in order to create 
multiple systems of relation, and as such it is open to the 
criticisms of such approaches mentioned above. However, as 
I will attempt to show in the following discussions, employing 
these tactics did not necessarily occur at the expense of ignoring 
the creative potential within algorithmic processes, but as a 
supplement to it – allowing a range of complementary tactics 
within various component parts of the overall system and across 
relations between these parts.
In the following section, I explore how it might be possible to 
move beyond these limited conceptions of the operations of code 
through a utilisation of Whitehead’s concept of prehension. In the 
third section of the chapter I then use this concept of algorithmic 
prehension, and its implication of the existence of an algorithmic 
potential, to lay the groundwork for the exploration of generative 
systems that utilise parasitic disruptions to drive creativity. This 
is explored through the concepts of attractors and bifurcations – 
emphasising the parasitic potential within generative computer 
processes that might move towards machine ecologies.
Algorithmic feelings: a digital mode of thought
In order to establish that algorithms are more than ‘simulators 
of material dynamics’ (Parisi 2013, 1), it is necessary to 
demonstrate how they are actualised entities in their own right, 
with accompanying obligations and powers within a schema 
of the play of forces. To do this, Parisi draws on Whitehead’s 
system of prehensions, as it is, she argues, an entity’s prehensive 
capabilities that define ‘what an entity is and how it relates to 
others’ (2013, xii). A system of prehensive feeling describes ‘how 
any actuality…grasps, includes and excludes, and transforms 
data’ (Parisi 2013, xii).323 As discussed in earlier chapters, 
Whitehead argues that in prehending an entity creates a system 
of relation or ‘extensive connection’ – including both conjunctive 
Sacrificial RAM 211
and disjunctive connection – that connects it to all other actual 
entities (1978, 41). At the same time, this is reciprocated, 
as any entity also acts as an ‘object’ to be prehended by all 
other entities.324 Thus, an actualised entity must influence the 
individuation of entities it forms relationships with, as they must 
influence it, ‘however trivial or faint’ this influence is (Whitehead 
1978). It should be noted that there is no essential distinction in 
this ontology between conceptual and material entities, living 
and non-living, or between what constitutes a subject (that 
prehends) and an object (that is prehended) (Shaviro 2009, 23).
Whitehead is adamant, however, that despite drawing on the 
datum of objects, each new entity is ‘freed from those entities’ 
histories’, having its own subjective feeling that is different 
to the previous entity’s feeling on which it draws, and that 
translates (transduces), rather than simply duplicating the 
original force (1978, 238, 236).325 In this there is a creative but 
atomic advance that builds on what exists, but which is also 
always capable of movement and further complexity. It is also 
always a singular point of complex negotiations between all the 
entities whose forces influence it.326 In this system, Parisi says, 
Whitehead manages to conceive an understanding of relations 
as being ‘both more than effects and less than the projections 
of a perceiving subject’ (Parisi 2013, 59). Here prehensions form 
the ‘indissolvable atomic architecture of any occasion’ that is 
therefore both actual while never complete or static (Parisi 2013, 
60). In this sense, no entity (including an algorithmic entity) can 
be said to be purely predetermined, but selects the manner 
and degree to which it is influenced by other events – it gathers 
singular and particular relations to the world that define its 
existence.327 Actual entities are therefore always individual, 
actualised realisations of potentialities, but never fully stable or 
‘whole’, and process here is conceived of not as a self-modulating 
whole, but as a system of parts that are nevertheless all related 
and capable of affecting each other (Parisi 2013, 61). Process is 
therefore self-organising but molecular, as each component has 
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its own subjective power to relate and ingress into other entities 
without regard to any overall design or configuration.
Algorithms, Parisi argues, are necessarily engaged in prehension, 
or selection of numbers with which to interact from a larger 
field or potential that contains incomputable numbers – the 
actual and discrete passages between and combinations of the 
zeros and ones that make up binary code (Parisi 2013, 64–5) 
and that can be endlessly arranged and extended (Portanova 
2013, 127). Parisi draws on mathematician Gregory Chaitlin’s 
theories that classify these incomputable objects as ‘Omega’ 
(Ω) (Chaitlin 2011, 126; Parisi 2013, 17–18).328 Chaitlin’s theorem 
draws on earlier work by Gödel and Turing that shows that, 
contra to common sense, most real numbers can never be 
entirely or definitively calculated or known. That is, they remain 
problematic: incomplete and uncomfortably ‘ugly’,329 and 
resistant to axiomatisation.330 Omega is a real number between 
zero and one,331 yet it cannot be calculated through any other, 
smaller processes or patterns and is therefore ‘algorithmically 
and logically irreducible’ information (Chaitlin 2011, 137).332 Thus 
Omega shows that calculation of particular sequences of ones 
and zeroes cannot fully precede the event of that code’s coming 
into being itself – the entity and its process of actualisation are 
reciprocal, belonging ‘to the register of creation itself’ (Stengers 
2010, 42). Omega proves that there remains an excess – an 
incalculable and problematic uncertainty lurking behind binary 
code (Portanova 2013, 126). The potential in Omega lies in that 
it represents not simply ‘an empty repetition of the same’ ones 
and zeros (a ‘self-varying deformation’ or topology), but rather 
the potential novel and ‘infinite addition of one more possibility’ 
(an infinite number of ones and/or zeros to the sequence) 
(Portanova 2013, 127).
As these infinite, real infinitesimals (endlessly divisible fractions 
between zero and one) and sequences (endless combinatory 
possibilities of zeros and ones) cannot be compressed into any 
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one algorithmic operation, Parisi says, they are best thought of 
as an ‘incomputable virtuality’. They operate as a multiplicity or 
‘eternal object’ – that is ‘patternless and random, objective and 
undetermined’ and that cannot be contained into any smaller 
set of rules (Parisi 2013, 126, 65).333 These are ‘indeterminate 
conditions within which algorithmic objects are able to exist’, 
they are unsynthesisable quantities that disrupt and open 
algorithms to a greater potential (Parisi 2013, 204). Here there 
is a ‘strain’ between limitless (both virtual and incalculable) and 
limited (specific algorithmic functions) (Portanova 2013, 57). 
Any algorithm speculatively contracts potential and determines 
positive and negative relations with numbers it both can and 
cannot contain – ‘demarcating an immanent, actual space of 
disjunctions and conjunctions’ (Parisi 2013, 240–1).334
In the Orgasmatron software patch, not only were these 
incomputable and disruptive transitions inherently present 
within each algorithmic process, each ‘watching’ algorithm 
selected, evaluated and produced data for use by other such 
entities, thus becoming a ‘performing extensive actuality’ (Parisi 
2013, ix). The ‘watching’ actor made a selection of some data to 
interact with – a positive prehension – while rejecting interaction 
with data outside set parameters. This selection established 
a positive prehensive relation with some real numbers, and 
a negative prehensive relation to both other real numbers 
and incomputable numbers: it drew positively on some of the 
potential, but never all of it. This was an act of selecting that 
was an unseen but nevertheless a real moment of transition 
and therefore indeterminacy between actualised determined 
occasions. In exercising its capacities to prehend and utilise 
data – in order to realise potential and resolve its satisfaction 
as that particular temporal and spatial algorithmic process – 
the ‘watching’ actor established itself as a singular vector of 
actualised relations.
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Given that the parameters of numbers the ‘watching’ actor 
prehended were themselves modulating, in this it performed a 
certain choice or capacity to connect or feel that was not purely 
prescribed or linear (that is, a simple positive connectivity). We 
must remember that this was an ‘automated prehension’ (Parisi 
2013, xii), with its own particular algorithmic type of prehension, 
rather than a simulation of other entities’ ways of feeling. 
Moreover, in that each ‘differential’ algorithm in the system 
was watched by multiple algorithms with differing parameters, 
at any particular moment in the process, a number calculated 
could be ‘felt’ and prehensively utilised to drive the various 
‘watching’ algorithms’ processes in multiple different ways. This 
established extensive, but speculative, immanent connections 
between not only a ‘differential’ algorithm and each watcher, but 
between the watchers themselves, in that a number positively 
or negatively prehended by one was also either positively or 
negatively prehended by all the others. In this, algorithmic 
prehensions allowed new complexity in the form of emergent 
contrasts to enter into the system, which then increased in 
differential intensity.
These causal chains were ‘ordinally’ specific – they had a specific 
order in which their operations were linked – but left open other 
dimensions such as time and actual processes. Ordinal numbers 
(‘firstness’, ‘secondness’, and so on) specify an order but not an 
actual number. That is, they specify one rule governing a set 
of numbers, but leave all other parameters open to change, as 
numbers can be any quantity as long as they follow in order. 
Ordinal distances, DeLanda states, connect entities, creating 
a relation between, whereas metric distances separate events 
(2005, 126). Ordinal numbers are ‘anexact yet rigorous’, having 
a single determined spatial quality that allows them to function 
– ‘this’ is next to or after ‘that’ – while never strictly metric in 
leaving other spatio-temporal parameters open. This leaves as 
many factors as possible open to further individuation, retaining 
enough practical specificity to allow their structuring into a 
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software patch (DeLanda 2005, 68, 81–2). The ‘gate’ function of 
the watcher algorithms was ordinal, specifying a position (‘bigger 
than’, ‘smaller than’ or ‘between’ numbers), while leaving the 
specification of these numbers open to change. Furthermore, the 
ordinal links ran not only from differential-to parallel watching-
to-triggering algorithms, but also in multiple lines across from 
watching-to-watching-to-watching as they sequentially influenced 
each other’s parameters. This constructed chains of causation 
that no longer prescribed to simple linear chains of events.
A set of algorithm processes can be argued to have operated 
here within Whitehead’s system of prehensive connection. Each 
actively determined its own actualisation by selectively drawing 
on data from multiple algorithms acting as objects for it, and was 
an object who’s felt datum affected the ways other algorithms 
actualise. This, one might suggest, demonstrated a logic of 
infection that governed algorithmic operations with an open 
potentiality, rather than a fixed law that remained transcendent 
of the play of temporal forces – a process of temporal selection 
that makes immanent extensive connections (Whitehead 1978, 
294; Portanova 2013, 10–11).
When we consider an algorithm as an actualised machinic 
process, and not simply an abstract set of instructions, it is 
possible to argue that it is a temporal processing of data, no 
matter how infinitesimal that timespan is (Miyazaki 2012, 1).335 
As Shintaro Miyazaki argues, algorithms and assemblages of 
algorithms must all have their own singular passages or rhythms 
of operation that are analogue noises within the digital process, 
delineating a rhythmic actuality from a field of potential (2012, 
10).336 When this temporal quality of processing is taken into 
account, numbers produced by algorithmic process are always 
singular spatiotemporal actualities, infected with a parasitic 
analogue: with the micro-rhythms of transition that express a 
temporal ordering of processing, gathering a new relationship 
between the actions.337
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Intensive rhythmic differences began to arise in the Orgasmatron 
patch as multiple ‘watcher’ algorithms waited for, and then 
actualised, the processing of data selected from a ‘differential’ 
algorithm. That is, each began at its own starting time – the 
moment it prehended a usable number range – and then took its 
own specific time to process. Thus what was a single flow of data 
was split (parasitically) into multiple nested cyclical timespans.338 
These potential syncopations creating new rhythmic patterns 
of operation were evolving algorithmic refrains (patternings of 
temporal contrasts).339 As a system utilising parallel processing, 
and given that the ‘watchers’ could also affect changes in each 
other’s operation, these relative processing times were critical 
to how the system developed as a whole, as well as to how its 
parts processed data flows.340 The syncopation in relations 
between algorithmic cycles could open new potential and actual 
configurations of relation to invent new modulations of data.
Potential rhythms of operation are one multiplicity of qualities 
and quantities on which an actualised algorithmic process 
draws upon, along with potential ordinal sequences, potential 
parameters, and potential sets of numbers. In line with 
Whitehead’s system of eternal objects, it is possible to argue 
that an algorithm draws on the potential of various numbers and 
mathematical functions as concepts, expressing some – whilst 
never exhausting all – of their potential. Here an algorithm ‘nests’ 
‘infinite parts of infinities’ (concepts of numbers and functions341) 
within itself (Parisi 2013, 63), but these eternal objects – as ‘the 
pure potentials of the universe’ (Whitehead 1978, 149)342 – are 
never fully able to be contained or compressed within any one 
algorithm. These incomputable quantities are a non-linear 
‘second order’ of relation, as the algorithmic entity expresses a 
relation to various (but not all) potentialities.343
In Orgasmatron, each actualisation of a differential algorithm 
produced a specific and temporal mathematical process.344 Here 
actual ordinal sequences arose out of cuts in larger potentials 
Sacrificial RAM 217
(this watcher algorithm next accepted the data, rather than 
that watcher), potential ranges of numbers were expressed 
and prehended, and so on. The excess of ongoing relational 
potential to the virtual was never exhausted by any particular 
actualisation. An algorithm then had a ‘dipolar’ relationship, 
drawing prehensively on both relations to the actual, determined 
world, and conceptually prehending ‘the indeterminateness 
of the eternal world’ (Whitehead 1978, 45).345 This potential 
was irreducible data – inexpressible in its entirety – that again 
moved algorithms beyond being merely ‘systemization[s] of 
the possible’ (Massumi 2002, 137), and demonstrated that they 
were always infected with an indeterminacy of the incomputable 
(Massumi 2002, 62). Each enaction of code was a singular and 
limited nexus of both physical prehensions and prehensions 
expressing a particular relation to larger potentials, and a 
material and conceptual realisation of some of its potential to 
interact with other material and conceptual actualities – the 
electrical and mechanical components of the computer and 
data flows, and the mathematical concepts. Here it is possible to 
argue that each algorithmic event was engaged in feeling in the 
Whiteheadian sense, a spacing or patterning of sets of external 
and internal differential relations or contrasts that constituted 
its very becoming as an actualised event. This applied not only 
within each smaller algorithmic event (a ‘watcher’ or ‘differential’ 
or ‘triggering’ algorithm), but in the relations between these 
events that became further entangled and intensified through 
their effects on each other’s becoming (a collective individuation, 
producing both new relations between events and a shared field 
out of which such individuations emerged) (Grosz 2012, 42–3).
This was then a speculative logic of algorithmic process, 
acknowledging a vagueness in its operations,346 that 
positions the processing of data as an open expression of the 
concrescence of algorithmic entities, not because the code 
itself necessarily altered, but because there was a level of 
indeterminacy in the potentials and processes that governed its 
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operations (Parisi 2013, 144). This could never be fully positively 
accounted for in any iteration of the algorithm. Exploitation of 
prehensive potential in algorithmic processing of data enabled 
not a smooth modulation, subsuming all to a continuous 
whole (of design function) (Parisi 2013, 167), but a series of 
cuts that interrupted, contradicted and problematised. These 
cuts molecularised relations by creating further intensification 
or differentiation within the data-algorithm machine. In the 
materiality of actualisation, with its disruptions and rhythms, 
and in its continued non-linear relations to the further 
potentials, algorithms exercised particular capacities (ways 
of prehending), and became charged with indeterminacy. 
Here, algorithmic prehension was a parasitic action within the 
computer’s operations, in that it broke with clear and absolute 
transference of data between algorithms, inserting difference 
into these relations.
Systems modulating through disruption
In order to further articulate the intensive noise within 
algorithmic processes, in this next section I discuss the concept 
of multiple attractor systems. I want to explore how accentuated 
intensive disruption can drive an open-ended futurity through 
systems of attractors. In this, I want to move further into the 
concept of speculative transitions between software processing 
events to continue to think through the software patch 
developed for the Orgasmatron project.
Attractors
To begin this thinking through of attractors, I want to consider 
software patches as non-metric (that is, ‘projective, differential, 
topological’) (DeLanda 2011b, 18) ‘state spaces’– consisting of a 
system of ‘attractors’ that act on and organise the potential flow 
of force within the system.347 States are ‘meta-stable’, in that 
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they are capable of self-organisation through their interaction 
with forces to accommodate change. They also have a ‘tipping 
point’, at which they ‘bifurcate’ and move to a new, related state 
with a new set of organising parameters or potentialities.348 
Here it is important to remind ourselves that these state spaces 
are themselves only momentary cuts in ongoing processes 
of individuation of a system. That is, the system is involved in 
ongoing exploration and genesis of its potential, rather than 
any state representing a final or fixed organisation of forces 
and relations (DeLanda 2011b, 13).349 States organise through 
intensive differentiation, and the ‘attractors’ condition or 
influence the system and its modulations by influencing the long-
term tendencies of differential trajectories.350 States then are the 
outcomes of differential processes, with attractors implicated 
in the genesis of the system (DeLanda 2011b, 15), in that they 
condition or lure the potential of forces as potential becomings, 
or pulls towards change (Massumi and McKim 2009, 9).351 An 
attractor is a tendency towards a terminus of a trajectory, 
and, while real, is never reached or fully actualised (DeLanda 
2005, 29).352
The lure of attractors explains, without resorting to concepts 
of essences but instead through process, why different inputs 
can have a tendency to result in similar trajectories. Attractors 
propose a particular way of thinking through the dynamics 
of the modulation or differential negotiations of forces in a 
system in a non-prescriptive manner. They suggest, rather than 
prescribe, outcomes and relations. They are also impersonal 
or non-subjective tendencies that belong to the field and are 
therefore directly implicated in how events begin to gather 
within ecologies. Systems with multiple attractors ‘break the link 
between necessity and determinism, giving a system a “choice” 
between different destinies’ (DeLanda 2005, 35).353 That is, since 
multiple attractors might lure towards different becomings, 
the actualised differences or modulations in the system have 
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complex causes that remain relational but cannot be reduced to 
linear causality or replication.
Attractors themselves are not fixed. They might themselves 
be viewed as becoming-states, with their own set of attractors 
that condition their genesis. While some attractors are steady 
(that is, a constant lure), others can be cyclical or chaotic. Thus, 
states can move periodically between relatively stable and 
far-from-equilibrium conditions. An attractor itself might also 
develop or modulate the way it pulls within an event. Multiple 
attractors here create open, problematic and never more than 
partially resolved states composed of the contrasts (intensity) 
of contradictory potentials354 and, as such, are of use within 
thinking through of open-ended algorithmic processes.
Each state might then be seen as a machine, modulating flows 
according to the play of the intensive dynamics of its competing 
attractors on forces. They are also potentially capable of moving 
from one particular self-organising solution into another related 
state that is therefore not fixed. DeLanda warns, however, that 
in order to actively engage with the virtual – and therefore 
exhibit non-linear behavior – a system of attractors also needs 
to maintain a far-from-equilibrium state. That is, a state in 
which intensive difference, as a continuous flow of energy, or 
data ‘traverses the system…acting as a constraint maintaining 
intensive differences alive’ (DeLanda 2005, 75).355 Such non-
equilibrium causing flow ‘reveals the potentialities hidden in the 
non-linearities, potentialities that remain dormant at or near 
equilibrium’ (DeLanda 2005, 75). In other words, such systems 
depend not only on the pull of multiple attractors to move 
beyond the predictable, but on the high degree of intensity that 
makes the system sensitive to switching between the various 
lures of the attractors (DeLanda 2005, 76).356 A dynamic system, 
as DeLanda suggests, also needs high degrees of connectivity, 
which, as with parametric systems, allows the potential for 
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various component parts to mutually influence each other’s 
relationship to attractors (DeLanda 2005, 65).
When the Orgasmatron system was ‘activated’ by the incoming 
differentials provided by a participant’s body,357 it moved from 
a state of high stability to one in which the increased flows of 
data from sensors became intensified (more differentialised), 
shifting rapidly between ranges of numbers. This data was 
processed by a differential algorithm, and was then subject to 
the ‘pull’ of multiple watcher algorithms. That is, the data had 
a potential to become through interaction with a watcher that 
drew it towards that watcher’s particular modulation of the flow. 
Here the watcher algorithms were the collective potential futures 
of the data, multiplicities towards with which it could engage 
and actualise its transduction. The tension of the potential for 
the data to be drawn instead towards relationship with one 
of the other watcher algorithms, or to be split and interact 
with two or more simultaneously was always inherent. These 
watchers were constant attractors for a flow, and the data could 
oscillate between the potential pulls of them because it was a 
set of unstable or changing numbers.358 As with the prehensive 
capacity of the algorithms, the lure of attractors was here 
automated,359 yet it retained its dynamic potential through the 
unresolvable tensions of multiple attractors.
While these watcher actors were stable attractors operating 
throughout the Orgasmatron’s processes, the ‘triggering’ 
algorithms could be considered to be cyclical attractors. That 
is, they counted interactions before triggering a further event; 
luring interactions with data flows until a limit point was 
reached. Then the cycle of attraction effectively reset and began 
again, creating multiple and overlapping rhythms of operation 
within the system.
Alongside this, the cross-links between the parameters of 
watching attractors’ inputs and other watchers’ outputs meant 
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that a gate parameter of an algorithm, acting as an attractor for 
a flow of data, was itself attracted towards realising a potential 
in its continued development.360 A more complex system 
arose here that moved towards concretisation, as potential 
was intertwined and co-produced. That is, it was a system of 
causality that was irresolvable into a linear chain, as attractors 
effectively nested inside each other by co-producing each other’s 
parameters: ‘A’ nested in ‘B’ while ‘B’ was also nested within ‘A’ 
simultaneously. This was a parasitic mode of operation, with 
each attractor held together by the dynamic and potentially 
disruptive pull of the forces of other attractors on it. The relation 
between an attractor and the system or field within which it 
nested was ‘charged’, as attractor and field became implicit in 
each other’s production.361
Limits and bifurcations
State systems can move further away from self-preservation 
by incorporating the ability to undergo phase transitions or 
bifurcations. Phase transitions ‘are events which take place 
at a critical value of some parameter…switching a physical 
system from one state to another’ (DeLanda 2005, 18). That 
is, these bifurcations shift a system from one particular set 
of attractors to another set, though this may include the 
attractors of the previous system as well as new attractors. As 
such phase transitions are another potentiality with which a 
system might engage. They are instigators of, and meaningful 
to, the emergence of new relations within systems, rather than 
necessarily changes to individual component parts (Prigogine 
and Stengers 1996, 45). Besides occurring within a system as 
a whole, a bifurcation might occur within an attractor, causing 
an evolution to its affectual capacities.362 Thus systems might 
potentially bifurcate in multiple directions at once, without 
dissolving the assemblage.
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In the Orgasmatron software patch, some of the triggering 
algorithms had the potential to trigger the activation of new sets 
of attractors that operated in addition to those already active. 
These algorithms were triggered into action when a certain 
limit of intensity of a particular activity was reached363. As there 
were multiple triggering algorithms counting and multiple new 
attractors waiting to be activated, this had multiple potential 
outcomes. These limits were relative thresholds of the system, 
‘above which [it] cease[ed] to be itself but [got] a new lease on 
life in a different mode’ (Massumi 1992, 36). Thus, the bifurcatory 
potential created limits that became creative factors, drawing 
new potential from the field.364
These transitions of both the whole state and parts that made up 
a state were always a partial expression of its many potentials, 
both of the system as a whole, and the parts that exceeded 
this actualised state. Once again, increased excitement of the 
system primed it for change, through a system of potential shifts 
and disruptions to chains of causality as new relational factors 
arose in the system365. This was not a smooth modulation of the 
system, but an ongoing potential of sudden shifts, interruptions 
to established tendencies, and renegotiation of relational pulls. 
As algorithmic prehension demonstrates a way that such process 
engaged selectively and creatively with that which preceded it, 
concepts of attractors and bifurcations here indicate a creative 
and open engagement with a futurity.
Towards an ecology of patching
Within her concept of the ‘minor gesture’, Manning poses the 
question of how technology might be able to ‘activate a field 
event without making the field about the technology itself’ 
(2016a, 18). The challenges implied in a process-driven approach 
to software design might be seen here as twofold. Firstly, this 
might involve taking Whitehead’s expanded empiricism seriously, 
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and seeking to explicate how all components of a work, including 
any computer operations, can be viewed as entities or events 
emergent within a relational system, capable of exercising some 
of their potential to affect and be affected. Secondly, as Manning 
suggests, there is always a need to consider the ethics of not 
only what emerges, but also how it emerges. In the computer 
processes, this must then be concerned firstly with how the 
computer’s operations affect the gathering of the larger artwork-
ecology – its minor potential to move beyond predictive control 
and representation. Secondly attention must be given to how 
these operations are able to move towards an intensively minor 
state; a concretisation of a ‘machine ecology’ (Penny 2011, 100) 
that preserves potential as it draws algorithmic processes into 
collective individuation.
The tactics explored here begin to suggest ways in which a 
software patch might remain intensively problematic: always 
irresolvable as a whole, while also immanently offering partial 
solutions. For Simondon, the ontogenetic power of a system 
– its capacity for emergent novelty – depends on this ability 
to generate problems that force the actualisation of partial 
solutions as new sets of relations that establish a milieu (Vollrath 
2013, 46). Thus the role of intensity is crucial here in gathering an 
emergent ecology within the software patch while still keeping 
the system open to the disruptive pull of multiple eternal entities 
that it can then draw from. The Orgasmatron system attempted 
to provide this intensity through the multiple tipping points 
that were always cycling: through the constant unresolvable 
pull of the stable attractors; through the entanglement of 
parameters with algorithmic actualisations; and, through the 
strain of the cut of negative and positive prehensions. In this, it 
was an assemblage of ‘non-linear combinatorics’ – various self-
organising structural operations negotiating to produce novel 
structures (DeLanda 2011a, 16, 277 n.5), producing algorithmic 
processes through a differential or parasitic approach, or ‘new 
ways of folding the world into itself’ (O’Sullivan 2006,143).
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Clearly, an ethics of computer process needs to do more than 
just consider ways to make complex relational webs that move 
beyond linear causality, and allow new software modes of 
thinking to arise. It also needs to avoid the trap of creating 
topological or autopoietic systems that, in their ability to 
anticipate and influence future modulations, enhance rather 
than curtail the predictive and controlling potential of the 
digital.366 Here, again, the intensively parasitic has a role to play. 
The proposed tactics are a gathering, but also a splitting of 
data or force – a continuity of becoming, rather than a smooth 
modulation that can be predicted and controlled. They involve 
a concretisation of the assemblage of the various algorithmic 
and analogue data, but not necessarily a preservation of the 
assemblage over other relational potential. Instead, such systems 
have component parts and processes that remain larger than 
any actualised whole. Through their relation to eternal objects, 
and through the dynamics of bifurcation, these systems are 
always on the verge of exceeding their limits, and become 
the gathering, generative collective force that catalyses new 
ecologies of relation.
Once again, these tactics are, to a certain extent, about 
enabling drift: forgoing control over outcomes, and instead 
concentration on the setting of conditions for events to emerge 
from. If it is an automated emergence, then this is because it is 
an algorithmic mode of thought that needs to be given its own 
space, style and rhythms. Algorithms are events in themselves, 
co-emergent with and co-causal ecologies of relation that 
begin to gather. Their actualisations are digital becomings that 
begin to draw the collective expression beyond not only the 
biological, but also outside of the analogue. Perhaps here, a 
software patch can approach a diagrammatic meta-modelling, 
‘strategically return[ing] its process to the quasi-chaotic 
field of its own emergence, in order to regenerate itself as it 
generates new figures, forms and contrasts, for itself and others’ 
(Massumi 2011, 103).
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Coda: Towards a gathering ecology
In Orgasmatron, participants entered an intimate environment 
designed for one or two, where their presence within the 
space contributed – through disruptions and additions – to the 
generation of rhythmic pulses of coloured light, sounds that 
surrounded them, and vibrations that coursed through the base 
of the structure (see Figure 9.2).
Participants lay in the Orgasmatron, relinquishing, to some 
extent, the possibility of feeling in control, and accepting this 
new posture that emphasised the pull of gravity and what at 
first might have felt like ‘passivity’ within the event. Movement 
shifted in register, being restricted to small, seemingly 
inconsequential gestures – eye movements, breath expanding 
the torso, a fractional turning of the head, reflex reaction to 
vibration under their body, a hand raised, subtle shifts in weight: 
small adjustments and micro-movements in sympathy with the 
rhythms of sound, light and vibration affecting the participant. 
This was a rearrangement and testing of the potential of the 
body that perhaps began to challenge habitual ways of moving 
through an interactive work, as the spatial configuration 
and the shift in postural schema constricted movement, 
bringing to attention the way forces challenged the body’s 
freedom of action.
Lying in the Orgasmatron, connection to the ecology of operations 
in process was slowed down. There was nothing productive 
to ‘do’: no obvious action that would activate events, with a 
clear or immediate pay-off or resultant change in the work. 
Here participants were given the time to tune in to the events 
building around them, allowing such minor forms of bodies to 
be noticed and evolve. This was less a space to command, and 
more one to listen with one’s body, to seek new connections and 
open out to an awareness of the gathering rhythm of events 
in which participants were becoming implicated. This required 
a new sensitivity to the prehensive pull of the event that was 
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activated at the surface of bodies. Textures, the pressure of the 
base of the structure, and the vibrations building and coursing 
through the base of the Orgasmatron brought attention to the 
skin and the activated shared space in between, beginning to 
combine body, equipment and space. This was a listening with 
the whole surface: the body an expanded listening machine (an 
ear). The experience conflated senses, as it was perhaps also a 
new reflexive listening to or doubling of experience, a reflexive 
consciousness of this disruption of habits. Micro-perceptive 
vibrations addressed various sensory organs; pulses of light, 
sound and the participants’ own bodily rhythms combined 
and syncopated in this surface-to-surface interfacing. Thus 
the body itself was reconfigured in a minor form as a ‘sensor’ – 
transducing different vibrational forces from the event – testing 
and opening up its affectual capacities to new intensities.
The Orgasmatron itself was a combined ‘sensor’, its components 
tuned, not only towards the presence of the participant’s body 
entering, and their micro-movements that reflected slight 
shifts in attention, but also always tuning towards the multiple 
expressions of its own machinations. While the Orgasmatron was 
sensitive to a participant’s weight, vibrations, gestures, sounds 
and shadows that were a source of disruption to the systems, it 
also had sensors capable of interacting with its own expressions 
of light, sound and vibration. Here, in a complex series of 
feedback circuits, some sensors fed data from changing pulses 
of light into the development of sound events, others collected 
vibrational permutations that then affected lighting, while others 
sensed pressure changes in the floor of the pod that caused 
further expressions of vibrations, sound and/or lighting. This was 
a constantly shifting web of parasitic actions – a molecularisation 
of components: as pressure differentials disrupted light; light 
differentials disrupted sound (cutting, layering spatialising); 
and sound differentials altered vibration. The actions of bodies 
within this environment provided further parasitic disruptions 
to these emerging causalities: further variations in pressure, 
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light or vibration as the Orgasmatron listened to and fed on (in 
its own way) its own constant permutations and exploratory 
combinations.
These sensory capacities (capacities to feel) of the machine 
(bodies and technical components) folded into one another, 
to begin the collective individuation of the event: a mixing and 
shaping of a shared potential and responsibility. Such a turn 
towards a collective listening and expressing might be a tending 
towards a ‘self-tuning’: the will of the event to emerge and to 
carry forward. This questioned the position of the participants as 
the focus of the gathering of forces, as the work perhaps began 
to trouble distinctions between the subject of the event and the 
field from which it drew its energies. Rather, participants shared 
responsibility for this gathering, adding their own attention, 
care and potential to the attention and sensitivities that the 
Orgasmatron was itself able to generate. The concern here was 
less with being, and more concerned with a communication or 
engagement across a vibrational plane: a collective feeling for 
the gathering that was distributed throughout the components 
of the event.
The system disrupted the representation and comprehension 
of causal chains – how a particular rhythm, sound or pulse of 
light was connected to previous actions or events – as both 
participants and work were immersed in the ongoing collection 
of sensations (relationality in its own right). The engagement with 
affectual forces – both the collectively engagement of the event, 
and individual engagement by various components with different 
appetites or capacities – split, folded and remixed causality. 
The dynamic, complex and qualitative interfacings and parasitic 
actions cultivated a suspension in the gathering of relation – 
creating a pull towards further relational iteration. In this, the 
parasite forced an opening to further expression, connectivity, 
and an ability to affect and be affected. This was a turning 
towards immanent construction of relation taking precedence 
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over its stratification (that is, an opening of sense experiences – 
of both the participant and other components).
The ‘working out’ of these relational disruptions moved the 
system towards a concretisation. The components of the 
event were no longer as dependent on ‘outside’ intervention 
to facilitate communication between them – whether the 
participant’s body providing this interfacing or the work of a 
computer that stood outside of the mobile parameters of the 
work itself. Instead, the components were able to utilise their 
transductive sensitivities to create their own local relational 
interactions and to produce affects ‘that [were] independent of 
the design plan’ (Simondon 1980, 31). But it was a concretising, 
in that this was never resolved to a fixed state of intertwined 
sub-systems, fully subsumed to the functioning of the whole 
(Simondon 1980, 30), but any move towards resolution continued 
to be challenged by the disruptions that forced a re-gathering.
There was always some further potential for agitation, for the 
continued parasitic disruption allowing new connections to 
be performed. This was an agitation that was not reliant on a 
human participant for its energy, but was able to activate itself, 
to generate the minor gestures from within the event. This 
further potential was the tension that drove the transduction 
of the system, its provisional resolution of multiple potentials, 
and the ongoing working out of the problem of disruption and 
reconnection.367 This was the conversation between the various 
interferences of one force on another that formed a collective 
individuation located in the event as it gathered.
Orgasmatron proposed a field of potential sensitivities and 
potential disruptions from which provisional connections and 
disconnections might begin to form a relational web. Here, I 
term the act of the Orgasmatron tuning into this potential – to 
begin to become an event – a ‘gathering ecology’. A gathering 
ecology implies a particular attention to the event’s own ability 
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to prehend the potential of the field and gather or implicate 
components’ individual and shared capacities for connection 
and disruption into a collective event, and to give attention to 
the ‘minor gestures’ that are the event’s own intensive drivers of 
individuation. This focus on a gathering ecology shifts interaction 
further, from the fixed or linear sets of relations between 
technical objects and bodies, towards what might be thought 
of as an ethics of relation, in that it places a focus not just on 
the flexibility and complexity of relations, but squarely on the 
opening of conditions for the event’s emergence.
A potential politics of interactive art might be an ethics that 
addresses not the representation of relation, but its immanent 
construction, enabling an opening to further expression, 
connectivity and an ability to affect and be affected: to affirm 
both the singular nature of events and openness of relational 
Figure 9.2 Andrew Goodman, Orgasmatron (detail), Blindside, Melbourne, 2013.
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potential (Simondon cited Combes 2013, 65).368 It might seek to 
encourage ‘the suspension of normal co-ordinates of sensory 
experience’ (Rancière 2009, 25), that is, an opening of sense 
experience towards the new – the preservation of difference 
(Murphie 1997, 163–5) in a gathering ecology.
Conclusion
Now more than ever, nature cannot be separated 
from culture; in order to comprehend the interactions 
between ecosystems…we must learn to think 
transversally.
Felix Guattari
Parasitic friends and enemies
The parasite disrupts and creates; it ‘makes life and kills’ (Serres 
2007, 168). It is the instigator of the new, it is ‘an expansion; 
it runs and grows’ (Serres 2007, 253). It causes disruption to 
gather and multiply. It bifurcates all, driving systems towards the 
novelty of new connection as it makes new systems. It is the best 
friend of complex emergent relation.
The parasite ‘invades and occupies’ (Serres 2007, 253); it troubles 
orders, disrupts connections. It is a noise that ‘destroys and 
horrifies’ (127), pulls things apart, confuses and obscures (Serres 
2007,12), lays waste to plans. It is the worst enemy of the clear 
and simple relation.
Parasitic procedures trouble totalities, creatively disrupting clear 
communications, orders, hierarchies and dichotomies. Parasites 
can be thought not only as a third factor in relation, shifting 
the already established, but also as a difference that might be 
original, thrusting us always in to the middle of things going 
on. In the interactive art event, parasites fragment the simple 
causal relationship of a participant’s intentional action and 
comprehendible change in the work. They coax into existence 
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minor interactive potentials that are situated within the major, 
problematising interactivity’s boundaries, questioning both its 
definition and its mechanisms.
The parasite is a noise that, though disruptive, is far from 
being chaotic. Rather it is intensely and complexly relational, 
implicating elements of systems into each other’s ongoing 
individuation. In this, it is potentialising – saturating the 
actualised with an inbuilt ability to continue to grow, modulate 
and add to itself.
The parasite is the friend of noise and the noise within 
friendships, but it is never friendless and never outside 
of relation.
Parasitic feelings
To feel, for Whitehead, is to be involved in processes of the 
becoming of novelty, and it is also to be involved in processes 
of ingression and entanglement. In feeling, an emergent entity 
grasps datum from the world as a selfish and parasitic activity 
(reaching into and feeding off not only the actualised world, but 
also ingressing into the virtual plane of the eternal objects). At 
the same time, and in the same action of feeling, the world ‘steals 
in’ ( Jones 1998, 3)369 or ingresses into the entity as its very core 
of becoming. This enfolding or nesting is problematising: entities 
parasite for their own selfish means, but are in turn subject to 
the parasitic ingressions of others.
Feeling produces a resonance that is both intensive (valuated 
and patterned contrasts) and extensive (a differing from what 
already is and a selection from the larger potential). It utilises 
the tensions involved not to homogenise and consolidate, but 
as an adventure that explores potential in novel combinations 
that intensify difference. In this feelings are always transductive 
– reaching forward, moving beyond the realised, turning many 
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things into one new thing, again to be folded into another 
eruption of novelty.
The parasitic actions of feeling on the ‘world-as-it-is’ to 
individuate the ‘world-as-it-will-be’ suggest an interactivity of 
occasions and potentials that is never going to be contained 
in simplistic viewer-to-artwork conversations, but that is an 
emergent and parasitic ecology of ingressions, transgressions, 
interruptions and additions.
Parasitic ecologies
The gathering of an ecology is a machinic act, that is, the 
immanent production of a symbiotic entanglement,370 no more 
a bottom-up phenomenon than it is top-down. It is a system-
wide productivity (though not totalising), passing through scales 
and dimensions, a becoming that is a qualitative increase in 
intensity (Braidotti 2002, 147). It is a gathering (not resolving) of 
difference, and therefore a gathering of an ecology that is auto-
parasitic. The generation of its minor gestures is ‘in the wind’, as 
the affectual force of the event, an evolving capacity to prehend 
or tune to the potential of the field (to gather on the level of the 
virtual). These gestures that produce and drive the ecology are 
the will of the event. As a gathering ecology is an ‘immediatory’371 
process, it might not be known through any predetermined 
configuration, but only through the field’s continued exercising 
of self-productive expressions. A gathering ecology retains this 
capacity to gather in its connection to the virtual. It is never 
‘gathered’ as a final act that exhausts potential or resolves 
beyond the provisional differentiation of forces and relations, but 
is always a question of process (Stengers 2010, 33). In this sense 
there is never ‘an’ ecology, but only the transductive process of 
becoming-ecology or gathering.
‘Ecologies’ here do not submit to exterior truths but produce 
and are produced through continued experimentation. Thus 
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the ecological could be described as inherently minor, as it is 
concerned with ‘the production of new, immanent modes of 
existence, and not the recognition of a more powerful interest 
before which divergent particular interests would have to 
bow down’ (Stengers 2010, 35). Neither is this a question of 
the identities of components, which cannot be reduced to, 
nor deduced by the role each plays in the ecology (Stengers 
2010, 34–5). For interactive art this might suggest a move 
away from the reinforcement of identity of the experimenter 
and components (what are they, how have they related?). 
Instead interactivity might be better served to invent ways 
to embrace the ecological with its ‘disparate causalities’ and 
‘unintentional creations of meaning’ (Stengers 2010, 34) (how 
could it become?). This then might move towards an interactive 
system that creates relation without having the nature of those 
relations fully prescribed, or the manner in which they might 
individuate. Nor need the design prescribe the scale or extent 
of those interactions, or the outcomes for either components 
parts (participants, affects, sensations, technical objects), or 
the system as an evolving whole. Thus it is concerned with an 
‘ecology of the virtual’ that can ‘engender conditions for the 
creation and development of unprecedented formations of 
subjectivity that have never been seen and never been felt’ 
(Guattari 1995a, 91). For this to occur a work needs to be rich 
with minor gestures as lures towards novelty that ‘seed’ the 
potential for further gathering of ecological force. Here we 
might seek an art that operates as a field through system-
level dynamics, parasitically inserting difference into such 
relations, and through this held intensity allows for relations to 
arise and gather.
Parasitic politics
One might argue that our contemporary world already offers 
unparalleled connectivity through the globalised economy and 
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the collapse of time and distance through the so-called ‘virtual’ 
world of the internet (and of course the effects of this on art 
have been momentous and neither entirely negative or positive). 
It is also possible to argue that there has been a proliferation of 
difference and experimentation – one that can be seen in the 
post-millennium art world with its furious multiplication of styles, 
diverging trends and voices. Perhaps too there has already 
been an unprecedented blurring of human and non-human 
life and the technical, with increasing incursion of algorithms 
into the political, social and personal sphere, to name just 
one example.372
However a closer examination of these conditions of 
contemporary living shows little to be enthusiastic about. As 
Braidotti has so eloquently pointed out, the connectivity offered 
within neoliberalism is principally one of a shared precarity 
(2014, 40). That is, it is an ecological and political vulnerability 
that we share in across borders with other social groups, with 
other animals on whose lives global capitalism encroaches on 
and into for its own purposes, and with the greater ecology that 
is also commodified and exploited. This vulnerability is evident in 
terms of the increasing precarity of a global environment under 
ecological crisis that affects and connects us all in a decidedly 
negative manner.373 If advanced capitalism produces difference, 
it is only for the sake of further commodification. If it encourages 
experimentation, it is to harness this potential within a 
subjectivity based on passivity and individualism (Braidotti 2014, 
58, 61). So too, if capitalism blurs the human and non-human 
it is to further advance networks of control in order to exploit 
and profit from them (Braidotti 2014, 63). Capitalism, for all its 
relational flexibility, has no ethics, no care for or interest in the 
potential of the events that emerge beyond their vulnerability to 
be exploited. It is a ‘steamroller’ enforcing ‘capitalistic subjectivity 
– the subjectivity of one-dimensionality, generalised equivalence, 
segregation, and deafness to true alterity’ (Guattari 1995a, 91). 
The connectivity offered in this world tends towards a greater 
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surveillance and biopolitical control of life that now grips the 
social/political, the personal or psychic and the ecological 
planes to an unprecedented extent. Ultimately such processes 
of connectivity collapse difference as they subjugate: they are 
operations of power that are restrictive and repetitious rather 
than productive of any larger sense of novelty. Why then would 
we want an interactive art experience that merely mimics this 
precarity, one that at once instrumentalises our bodies as it 
reinforces subjectivity and our separation from the field and its 
further collective potential?
I say all this not to make any great claims for the artworks 
discussed in this book, but to suggest that they all exhibit, in 
various and modest ways, the beginnings of different ways 
of operating. They point towards transversal and immanent 
practices or technics of becoming-with ecologies of relations that 
embrace complexity, disruption and novelty. It will be evident 
that none of these artworks directly address the ecological and 
political crises we face. These are not ‘issue’ based works seeking 
to explore the negative aspects of our situation. This is not to 
argue that such messages do not have a place in our thinking, 
but that art, and perhaps interactive or relational artworks 
in particular, might have a different and more affirmative and 
forward-reaching or speculative role to play.
Affirmation, as Manning articulates, is a very particular type of 
positivity that is propositional (2016b, 196). That is, it enables 
invention rather than compliance, and in this it opens up events 
to further evolution rather than collapsing difference in relational 
consensus (Manning 2016b, 196). An affirmative relational 
artwork might seek to move away from a capitalistic model of 
self-organisation to ‘imagine a form of self-organization that is 
not exploitative’ but a ‘genuine novelty’ (Shaviro 2009, 128 n.16). 
This is an affirmative ethics that extends care towards the quality 
of expression of a system. It seeks to nourish the potential 
for creative movement or exploration within an event, with 
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attention to and care for the conditions of emergence as well as 
what emerges.
This is not the artwork of grand gestures and political 
sloganeering, but of attention to what else is going on beyond, 
beside and throughout events of relation. It requires that we 
develop capacities to listen and give care to the resolutely 
non-human and the more-than human: to the diffractions and 
conversations of sound waves with spaces, to the algorithmic 
appetites, to the rhythms of collaborations between bodies and 
spaces, bodies and bodies, bodies and technical objects, and 
within bodies themselves. In this it might seek to experiment 
with technics that move us beyond shared precarity (and 
the capitalisation of emergence) and begin to bring new and 
affirmative potential ecologies into being.
Technicity, as Manning states, is ‘the associated milieu of 
technique’. That is, it addresses the generation or gathering 
of a field of potentiality as much or more than the individual 
technique (Manning 2013a, 34). Technicity therefore speaks to 
the gathering ecology in the realm of the political, a realm that 
permeates relational or interactive art, which always expresses a 
politics (whether productive or repressive). Affirmative technics 
addresses the construction of an ethics of immanence: an 
ethics of experimentation with the construction of the contrasts 
and differential intensities in relations that enlarges collective 
potential rather than reverting to individualism or negativity.374 
This must be an emergent ethics that operates transindividually, 
at a collective and ecological level. In this positivity one might 
seek to move beyond a criticism of the state of interactivity and 
to seek to generate new concepts of what might constitute an 
expanded notion of interactivity: that is, to begin to generate 
new potentials and futures for the genre itself.
Such ethics must remain firmly grounded in the ‘how’ of 
collective enunciation (Manning 2013a, 35), in the questions 
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of the individuation of the field or ecology, in order not to 
simply replicate the neoliberal repressive responsibility of the 
individual towards the state or the status quo (Braidotti 2014, 
116). That is, energy and attention needs to be invested in the 
pre-relational gathering of ecologies – into the nurturing and 
tentative feeling-out of the minor gestures that emerge from a 
complex ecology’s own feeling of potential and that tend towards 
a feeling of events in the beginnings of formation (Manning 2013, 
6–7). These gestures – as a series of differential events within a 
field that catalyse a collective tuning towards the field’s potential 
concrescence into a dynamic and enmeshed ecology – are the 
seeds that ensure that ecologies adventure into the unknown 
as they individuate. That is, they are performative and belong 
to the ecology’s gathering. The ‘how’ of this gathering must 
of course always be open in itself. There can be no definitive 
answer to this but only a series of practices that continue to 
explore the problem – that meta-model or ‘stay with the trouble’ 
to quote Haraway (2016, passim). In this each well-thought and 
constructed interactive event can contribute (in its own tentative 
way and within its own area of concern) to the collective thinking-
through of the problem of not only how to live in this world, but 
how to begin minoritarian transformations of it.
Politics, or even ethics, may still seem a heavy burden for such 
simple relational works. But it is, I would argue, a politics of 
dissention, of reconfiguration and extension, of etching out 
further space or potential no matter how slight. I have contended 
that the programmatic tendencies of interactive artworks 
contain difference and universalise experience – a politics in 
itself, albeit an oppressive one. Aesthetic acts that extend and 
prolong contrasts can be seen instead as ethical politics, making 
felt novel relational connections and new collective capacities 
(Massumi and McKim 2009, 12). The capacity for these aesthetic 
acts to produce ‘mutant percepts and affects’ gives them an 
important role in the liberation from the merely possible: the 
cannibalistic moves of capitalism to reiterate and mutate existing 
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relations and subjectivities (Guattari 1995a, 91, 131). Aesthetic 
acts are transversal, operating through ‘affective contamination’. 
They have the potential not only to operate as the ‘nuclei of 
differentiation’, but also to operate ‘between the different 
domains in order to accentuate their heterogeneity’ (Guattari 
1995a, 93–4). The ‘beauty’ of the aesthetic act is in its ability to 
sustain contrasts, to extend differentials.
Such aesthetic politics need not be conceived of as necessarily 
earnest. Rather, they may be better situated in play and the 
disruptive power of such unproductive action that proposes 
starting rather than endpoints of relations. Here, again, my 
argument seeks to arrive not at any solution, but rather to build 
conceptual machines with which to allow a working through both 
of the potential of parasitic actions, and a questioning of the 
limits of interactivity.
This book has intentionally examined works that cover a broad 
range of relational experiences, and that move somewhat away 
from easy classification as ‘interactive’, while still involving 
many elements of such systems. Near these edges or limits, 
the question must always arise: ‘But is this still interactive?’ 
This, I would suggest, is in itself productive, capable of 
always provoking some uncertainty as to what does or does 
not constitute an interactive work. It is an interactivity that 
by its existence challenges interactivity from within, injects 
tentativeness into its identity. It is a questioning that is 
productively disruptive to the very concept of interactivity: a 
parasite. As such, the thinking as a whole might perhaps be 
positioned as both parasitic and a minor practice; a gathering 
of an ecology, a rethinking of interactivity that seeds further 
potential disruptions, always attempting to take it beyond the 
re-emerging majoritarian forms.
Notes
1. For an extended discussion of the concept of immanent critique, 
see also Manning (2016b, Chapter One).
2. Various authors give different names to this approach, it might be 
termed organic, relational, performative or anti-representational, 
or one of radical, deep or expanded empiricism. All these terms 
are put to use in this research – here broadly grouped under the 
term ‘process’, with an implication that, as Ilya Prigogine says, 
an open-ended futurity requires understanding that the laws of 
nature are based on possibilities not ‘certitudes’ (Prigogine and 
Stengers 1996, 183).
3. This emphasis an on an ‘additive’ approach, Massumi states, 
as the ‘key to an expanded Empiricism. There is always enough 
room in the world for more, more modulation, more “belonging”’ 
(2000, 216).
4. This ‘creative advance’ of the universe is, as Whitehead sees it, 
the driving force behind process (1978, 21). See also Stengers 
(2011, 257–9).
5. While a sustained critique of the term new media is outside the 
scope of this discussion, it is, as a number of writers note, a prob-
lematic term. The ‘newness’ in new media, as Fuery notes, is lim-
ited to technical rather than artistic invention and creates an arti-
ficial stabilization of investigations that are ongoing processes of 
innovation (Fuery, 2009, 9). This, as Munster says, calls attention 
to the medium as the definer of artistic outcomes (2006, 154), and 
it might, as Murphie claims, leads to a fetishisation of the techno-
logical invention for its own sake, rather than a measured consid-
eration of their interactive and ethical potentials (2005b, 31).
6. Relation here concerns a much broader span and range of forces 
than most interactive works acknowledge. It would, I believe, be 
possible to argue that many more ‘traditional’ art forms success-
fully exploit a wide range of relational forces in ways that are 
often more subtle and complex than many prescribed interactive 
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artworks. On painting and relation, for example, see Irwin (2011); 
Manning (2009, 55–63); and Massumi (2011, 127–30).
7. This ontology is ‘abstracted’ in that Whitehead, like James, is at 
pains to make it an ontology applicable to all occasions without 
exception. ‘Becoming,’ in the sense that Massumi uses it, ‘open(s) 
up spaces and maps new virtual landscapes’, it is a movement of 
invention, necessarily always an emergent model, in the process 
of being (re)invented. Therefore a ‘becoming’ model would be 
one that continually adapts to new information, heads in multiple 
directions: a kind of rhizomic ‘anti’ model (1992, 101–2).
8. This is a secondary meaning of ‘parasite’ adopted by Serres in The 
Parasite to explore the productive disruptions to relation.
9. Feelings, for Whitehead, are also part of a parasitic system, both 
in their drawing of datum from other, objectified, events, and in 
that each feeling is divisible into other feelings, with differenc-
es preserved.
10. In forming relations an entity ‘expresses’ or performs some of its 
capacity to affect and be affected by other entities and forces.
11. That is to say, the expressive capacities of technical components 
must be taken into account and enabled, but at the same time 
their own particular (and non-biological) potential must be allowed 
to emerge, rather than seeking to consider their operations as bio-
logical equivalents as in some cybernetic modelling. See Chapter 
Nine for some discussion of this issue, and Parisi.
12. Later in the same essay Simondon writes: ‘transduction, as op-
posed to deduction, does not search elsewhere for a principle 
to resolve the problem of a domain: it extracts the resolving 
structure from the tensions of the domain themselves, just as 
a supersaturated solution crystallises using its own potentials 
and according to the chemical species it contains, not using 
some foreign form added from the outside. Nor is transduction 
comparable to induction, because although induction retains the 
characteristics of the terms of reality that are contained within the 
studied domain, extracting the structures of the analysis of these 
terms themselves, induction only retains that which is positive – 
that which is common to all of the terms –eliminating that which is 
singular to them’ (2009, 12).
Notes 243
13. Guattari’s concept relates directly to his idea of schitzoanalysis as 
an alternative to conventional psychoanalytic models. This is pro-
ductively expanded in Fibreculture, vol. 12, 2008, an issue devoted 
to metamodelling. See also Massumi (2011, 87–104), for further 
extrapolation of the concept relevant to embodied experience 
of the world.
14. The meta-model, Manning and Massumi argue, is necessarily vir-
tual as it remains at a point of emergence and therefore perishes 
in actualization (2010, 25). See: Lynn on the virtues of complex-
ity as an escape from both identity and dialectic contradiction 
(1998, 161).
15. See also Shaviro (2009, 148–9). It is worth noting, I think, that 
Serres’ own philosophical writing is one of the best examples I 
know of metamodelling within philosophy. In The Parasite he takes 
the problem of ‘noise’, and, beginning with a short fable from 
Boursault, dissects the story multiple times from different angles, 
each time bringing in new conceptual material and propositions in 
a way that both builds on the original concept and layers and frag-
ments it with new and inventive potential. As Cary Wolfe writes in 
the introduction to the English language version, Serres’ writing is 
‘not analytical but experimental…not linear but meandering, dou-
bling back on itself to remind itself of stones left unturned, details 
too readily smoothed over, conclusions too well varnished’ (Wolfe 
in Serres 2007, xiii). Similarly, in the writing of both Whitehead and 
Simondon, one can see a continued return to problems from new 
angles, with new examples and workings-through that complicate 
rather than resolve.
16. At its most simplistic, rather than reflecting genuine parallel 
enquiries informing and enriching one another, this results in 
exegetic writing by artists that seeks to veneer over the cracks in 
a practice, or worse still artworks that essentially illustrate theory. 
Practical investigations of course outstrip or spill over outside the 
scope of theoretical discussions in the way that art always does. 
Art perhaps does itself a disservice in trying to articulate theory 
or tie itself too directly to conceptual frameworks. Perhaps, for 
an artist, writing might be considered a creative act that creates 
texts as ‘little bombs’ that might be productive in their scatter-
ing of ideas and establishing of new linkages (Grosz 2001, 58; 
Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 66), as art might be a method of 
‘thinking’ through embodied participation Here the speculative 
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and propositional nature of the theoretical discussions is, I would 
argue, both a philosophical choice in line with process philoso-
phy, and a practical technique for dealing with the necessarily 
open-ended nature of propositional art events – bringing to 
attention that ‘theory-making itself, [is] a messy, fleshy practice’ 
(Loveless 2012, 95).
17. Such criticisms are also leveled by Barad at a system such as 
Newtonian physics that assumes the existence of objects prior to 
their interaction. (2007, 197 and passim)
18. Whether we even sustain such a category of art as ‘interactivity’, 
and why we would want to – when one considers the contempo-
rary collapse of traditional boundaries – between painting and 
photography, sculpture and drawing, no longer seem justifiable 
or useful – is a debate deflected here by the adoption of a wider 
relational model, with its acknowledgement of the participatory 
aspects and the potential of any art event.
19. See also Claire Bishop’s critique of the focus on participatory art’s 
social rather than aesthetic qualities that tend to flatten all artistic 
social experience to the same level (2009, 240).
20. In something of a widening of the parameters of the interactive, 
Stern proposes a number of types, some of which imply a rela-
tional mode of thinking: navigable, reactive or responsive environ-
ments, participatory and collaborative interactions (2012, 28–9). 
See also Pierre Levy for a discussion of a number of types of 
interactivity (2001, 61, 115–s6).
21. ‘Free will’, as Valentine Moulard-Leonard argues when discuss-
ing the philosophies of Henri Bergson, could in itself be seen on 
some levels as a ‘false problem’, presuming a preformed, singular 
subjectivity from which to deliberate on the world – whereas, in 
reality, deliberate and spontaneously arising actions might not be 
so simply divisible (2008, 18–19). See also Jones on freedom as a 
falsely conceived force (1998, 147).
22. Lev Manovich describes the rise of interactive art as a shift 
from representation to manipulation (1996, 1), and Florence de 
Mèredieu likewise warns that ‘we should not delude ourselves: 
interactivity can conceal programmed actions and predetermined 
pseudo-choices’ (2003, 230).
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23. Barad defines ‘representationalism’ as ‘a system where represen-
tations mediate between independently existing entities’, and ‘es-
sentialism’ as ‘a metaphysics that takes for granted the existence 
of individual entities. Each with its own roster of non-relational 
properties’ (Barad 2007, 47, 55).
24. In a similar discussion of this dynamic, de Mèredieu gives a perti-
nent example of an ‘Ageing Machine’ that was first developed as 
an artistic project but whose program is now used by the FBI to 
help trace criminals (2003, 172).
25. We must remember that ‘interactivity’ has in itself become a mar-
keting tool for a whole range of games and other electronic de-
vices (Fuery 2009, 41–2), as it has been sold for its ‘novelty’ within 
the art world (Penny 2011, 72–109, 99), while the rise in digital arts 
funding could be linked to the potential future commercial appli-
cations of such artistic research, thus funding structures privilege 
a focus on learning, results and quantifiable changes (Manning 
and Massumi 2010, 2). For discussion of the links between indus-
trial culture and interactive technologies, see Birringer (2005, 153).
26. See also Levy’s critique the difference between interactivity 
modelled on communication systems, whether consisting of 
‘monologue’, ‘dialogue’ or ‘multilogue’ as being in opposition to an 
interactivity co-producing its subjects (2001, 115–6).
27. This is certainly not to imply that less programmatically interactive 
works can easily escape the commodification of the art market. 
As the history of performance art processes has shown, over 
time such immaterial practices can easily be accommodated into 
the gallery and funding systems, and indeed may have helped to 
spark further areas of entanglement with government and busi-
ness through the development of funding bodies, creative PhD 
programs and the accompanying training of generations of artists 
in the self-management and shaping of their careers around the 
carefully curated statements of intent, budget management and 
interactions with gallery and educational bureaucracies necessary 
to achieve funding and exhibition space.
28. Interactivity’s representational issues tend to have, as discussed 
in the next section, more to do with representations of its dynam-
ics and/or mechanics.
29. By which I mean that an interactive work might, for example, 
literally generate new combinations of sound and visual data out 
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of the participant’s movements. The term ‘mechanical’ is not here 
used to infer negative connotations to such processes.
30. And, we must remember, the very production of subjectivity itself 
has become ‘the immaterial gross product of the neoconserva-
tive state’ (Massumi 1992, 201, n.66). On the broader problems of 
exchange value in the digital realm, see Pasquinelli (2008, 72–90 
and passim).
31. My argument here is less intended as a critique of gaming and 
museum culture than of the limitation of interactivity within art 
events to such models. Anna Munster, for example, has argued 
for the positive aspects of the use of multi-media in interactive 
museum displays, which can allow for ‘affective experience’ that 
emphasises relations rather than objects (2006, 56–8).
32. See Massumi for a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s interpre-
tation of the shift in capitalism from use-value to exchange-value 
and the rise of new forms of surplus value (1992, 199–202).
33. Even generative models utilised within software programming for 
‘evolutionary’ art, such a fractal or fitness based systems, while 
potentially divergent in the paths, still involve linear dynamics of 
cause and effect (alternative, ecological approaches are specu-
lated on in Chapter Nine).
34. Stern describes such systems as operations of a ‘passive trace’, 
utilizing gesture and response (2012, 68).
35. For example, Lozano-Hemmer optimistically attributes these 
types of systems to the early developments in interactivity, stat-
ing that greater ‘sophistication’ developed later as artists began to 
consider the question of how to include more ambiguous and less 
productively orientated relationships (Lozano-Hemmer, Boucher 
and Harrop 2012, 152).
36. See also Manning’s critique of linearity (2009, 62–4), and Stern’s 
critique of representational modes within interactivity (2012, 10).
37. In Whitehead’s system of perception, for example, ‘causal effi-
cacy’ and ‘presentational immediacy’ (as the factors are named) 
are two intertwined components of any experience. However the 
emphasis in interactive art has often been on demonstration of 
its mechanics of relation. See Brian Massumi’s discussion of these 
concepts (2008), and Chapter Six of this book for a discussion of 
these terms in detail.
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38. See also: Karen Barad (2007, 46–50), Meeting the Universe Halfway, 
on the naturalisation of representationalism.
39. In a discussion of his work Very Nervous System, Rokeby outlines 
the problematics of this issue, and the need to balance emergent 
and potential relations with a certain level of demonstrable con-
nection in order to encourage the participant to continue to en-
gage. Here he explains how the complex and multiply interwoven 
relational parameters built into this work caused participants to 
feel as if they were not in fact interacting and to then lose interest 
in participating (NDb).
40. If we read the ‘possible’ as that which is already contained within 
the actual then it is, in a sense, tautological. The possible is de-
fined retroactively and offering no forward movement from a po-
sition – rather it acts to contain and limit (Deleuze 1994, 211–12).
41. As Dery does points out, the concept that reuse or re-purposing 
of equipment is necessarily a radical act against capitalist models 
can be wishful thinking. Software producers often encouraging 
innovative ‘misuse’ of their technologies, and building potential 
for adaptation into the product as part of an extension of its 
modes of production and as a marketing asset (Dery 1996, 78). 
See also Pasquinelli’s discussion of the tactical alliance between 
free software development and corporations as ‘macroparasit-
ic’ (2008, 48).
42. Penny also notes the irony that the ‘harnessing of the flesh to 
the machine [of the military] was clad in the rhetoric of libera-
tion in the heyday of interactive multimedia’ (2003, 268; Cf. 
Grau 2003, 169).
43. For example, Lozano-Hemmer’s claim that his work, reliant as it is 
on technologies of surveillance – and potentially complicit in their 
construction through the use of custom software that extends 
the scope of their ability to productively map bodies within space 
– operates as a ‘perversion’ of these technologies (Gorschluter 
2009, 103). Potentially, they both pervert and critique as they also 
employ power relationships, and perhaps some of his works are 
more successful than others in achieving his aims.
44. Though it would be incorrect to link this control simply to vision 
or the visible as is often implied ( Jay 1988, 2–23). Contemporary 
surveillance and interactive technologies show us that movement, 
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sound, vibrations, infra-red waves, pressure, heat, and so on, can 
be mapped and plotted alongside the visible.
45. For example, the use of X-Box or Wii to interface between bod-
ies and software means that movements are mapped onto a 
Cartesian grid in a simplified manner that not only erases the 
subtlety of actions but ignores the larger field within which the 
bodies are situated (as of course they must for the games the sys-
tems are design for to function correctly). This is not a criticism of 
the games themselves or gaming in general, but a concern about 
their easy adoption and cooption of the potentially more complex 
fields of interaction that artists may wish to create.
46. As Massumi notes, ‘bodies that fall prey to such transcendence…
[have] their corporeality…stripped from them, in favour of a sup-
posed substrate – soul, subjectivity, personality, identity’ (1992, 
112.) See also Brad Epps on interactivity as ‘exercises in control’ 
(Cited in Braidotti 2002, 253).
47. On the first point, Pasquinelli notes, for example, that while the 
unstoppable sharing of digital music files has freed one aspect 
of the music industry from capitalist exchange, the real winners 
from this are the producers of the material support products 
such as mp3 players and tablets – thus the market has shifted its 
sphere of capitalisation rather than collapsed (Pasquinelli 2008, 
176). On the second point, he argues that, seen in a wider context, 
the battles over the ‘cognitive’ work of the internet must be seen 
as an internalization of social systems of stratification and exploi-
tation, which have now been ‘inoculated and “securitized” into the 
individual’ as an ‘immaterial civil war [that] is the internal border 
(indeed biopolitical border) of a broader immaterial class conflict ’ 
(Pasquinelli 2008, 110, emphasis in the original).
48. Pasquinelli argues that this new form is parasitic in operating as 
‘rent’ that extracts a surplus and further adds to the precarity of 
labour conditions (2008, 91–3).
49. See also Penny’s advocation of a ‘performative ontology’ as 
‘exploration of embodied interaction’ rather than an exploration 
of content (2011, 94–5). This might be described as a process of 
‘subjectivation’, which, ‘although operating within social machines, 
uses processes of these social machines to form lines of escape 
from them’ – as opposed to ‘subjectification’, which ‘implies a 
thoroughly stratified or captured position. One’s subjectivity is 
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aligned with the major, one’s flows contained within its antipro-
ductive maneuvering’ (Murphie 1996, 17).
50. See, for example, Whitehead’s demonstration of how the problem 
of Zeno’s arrow can be solved through a shift to organic mod-
elling (1978, 68–79). See also Stengers (2011, 16–17) and Jones 
(1998, 120).
51. Similarly, Manning describes interaction as an ‘encounter between 
two bounded entities’ (2013a, 28).
52. An ‘actual entity’ is anything that is actualised: object, person, 
atom, feeling, sound, etc. Whitehead also uses the term ‘occasion’ 
as interchangeable with entity, and this perhaps expresses the 
eventness of things more overtly.
53. The self here still exists, but as ‘a modality – a singularity on the 
plane of individuation’ (Manning 2013a, 2–3). For Simondon rela-
tion is the ‘non-identity of a being to itself’, it expresses ‘more 
than a unity and more than an identity’ (1992, 312).
54. However relationality and interactivity are perhaps better not de-
scribed in simple binary opposition. Rather, relation, as Manning 
notes, is ‘active to the tendencies of interaction, but not limited 
to them’ (2013a, 29). In this line McCormack proposes, after Di 
Scipio, that interactions are byproducts of smaller interdependent 
relations within ecological systems (McCormack & d’Inverno, edi-
tors, 2012, 48).
55. Perhaps one could go back further in artists’ writings, and quote, 
as Manning does in Relationscapes (2009), from the futurist 
Boccioni, who calls for a ‘fusion of environment and object’, and a 
‘sculptural simultaneity’, a ‘form-force’ that expresses a continuity 
of becoming, and the abolition of subject matter replaced instead 
by the ‘reality’ of experience (Boccioni 2000, 40–51).
56. See also Andrew Pickering (2010, 324).
57. See also Haque (2006, 4) and Fernadez (2009, 2).
58. For a good description of some of Pask’s artistic projects see 
Fernandez (2009, passim).
59. Clark’s work might be seen to encourage a felt experience of the 
forces making the body and to privilege ‘relations across differing 
modalities’ (Osthoff 1997, 286). See also Manning (2008, 12).
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60. It could be argued that in many artists’ work there remains a gap 
between the thinking and proposing of work as relational and the 
works themselves. Lozano-Hemmer’s work, while it includes many 
interesting experiments in multi-layered relation (the ongoing 
Relational Architecture series, for example, discussed in Chapter 
Eight), also includes works that fall back into an object-orientated, 
demonstrative and fairly linear approach (such as Tape Recorders, 
2011). In Penny’s writing, despite his advocacy for relation, he fails 
to make the leap to a model in which force is primary, ignoring the 
distinction between relation preceding form and relation between 
the already formed, and such an issue could perhaps be seen to 
arise in his artwork, with a similar dependence on the demonstra-
tion of connection. This is less intended here as a criticism than a 
pertinent reminder of the difficulty within practice of actualising 
theoretical material that interrupts the ‘normative’ understanding 
and use of objects and bodies within art.
61. See: Arakawa and Gins (2002; 1997). See also Reversible 
Destiny (www.reversibledestiny.org/#!bioscleave-house-
%e2%96%91%e2%96%91-lifespan-extending villa) for the 
Bioscleave House, an example of their ‘procedural architecture’.
62. Dery criticises the ‘cyborg’ model for preaching ‘transcendence 
through technology’ (1996, 161). For a succinct discussion of 
Simondon’s critique of cybernetics see Combes (2013, 79–83). 
See also Manning’s distinction between the cybernetic and the 
prosthetic use of technology (2009, 63; Cf. Massumi 2002, Chapter 
Four, for an alternative reading of Stelarc’s work that emphasises 
his ‘tweak of the human body-object into a sensitivity to new forc-
es, or neglected aspects of familiar forces’) (112). Perhaps Stelarc 
is his own worst enemy in the transcendent language of his writ-
ing used to describe his experiments. The artworks themselves 
present the possibility of more nuanced and complex readings 
(for example, Stelarc’s proposition of the ‘obsolescence’ of bodies 
(http://stelarc.org/?catID=20317).For a balanced discussion of the 
relational pros and cons of Stelarc’s work and writing and the gap 
between the two, see Murphie (1997, 147–8).
63. To move relationally, Manning says, is ‘to harness the preaccelera-
tions, becomings, futureness of movements’ (2009, 26).
64. ‘Co-causal’ is the term favoured by Manning and Massumi to 
describe this mutual emergence of the new through the flux of 
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the forces of relations (2010, 42, n.2). As Francisco Varela argues, 
such events of relation between the world and bodies are always 
events of mutual creation – neither wholly internal nor exter-
nal (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1992, 198–205). In a similar vein, 
Karen Barad uses ‘intra-action’ to describe a system where cause 
and effect emerges as the differential materialisation of bodies. 
Barad writes that ‘intra-actions are non-arbitrary, nondetermin-
istic causal enactments through which matter-in-process-of-be-
coming is iteratively enfolded into its ongoing differential materi-
alization’ (2007, 176, 169). This Barad terms a system of ‘agential 
realism’ (2007, 132–88 and passim). Lone Bertelsen uses the term 
‘trans-subjective’ after Ettinger, to move beyond interactivity and 
describe responsibility as a shared concern between all emergent 
aspects of an event (2012, 31–71).
65. That is, to be further immersed in a field rather than to emerge 
out of the field.
66. An assemblage is a productive network of variable, contingent 
connections that produce something more than the individu-
al components.
67. Into the Midst was a five-day collaborative research-creation 
workshop in the SATosphere, the Society for Art and Technology’s 
interactive immersive projection environment. The workshop 
featured hands-on experimentation toward exploring the poten-
tial for the SAT building to host the emergence of new forms of 
experience. The experimentation was preceded by online philo-
sophical explorations over the previous year aimed at fashion-
ing a shared vocabulary and understanding of the concepts. Key 
issues the workshop attempted to address were: how interactive 
movement within the space could modulate the experience of 
the projected space (and vice versa) in ways that altered habitual 
modes of perception; how the relationship between inside and 
outside spaces might be modulated, using the SAT building and 
its immediate urban surroundings as raw material; how frustra-
tions of expectations regarding the responsiveness of interac-
tive systems might lead, positively, to new qualities of aesthetic 
experience. The results were presented performatively to the 
pubic in the SATosphere – a space constructed as a large, high 
ceilinged dome designed for 360-degree interactive video and still 
image projection, with thirty two-channel surround audio built 
into the walls of the room – over a two-hour period at the end of 
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the workshop. (This description is adapted from the blurb on the 
project on the Senselab site, available at: senselab.ca/wp2/events/
into-the-midst/).
68. In addition, the gallery delineated very clear and problematic divi-
sions between the interior presentation space and the physical 
and social realities of the gallery’s geographical position within a 
politically charged area of downtown Montreal.
69. Specific tactics utilised included: creating relational play between 
artists and audience members with yarn that was crocheted 
between bodies; improvised movement procedures and gener-
ated sounds that sought to activate the perimeter of the dome; 
projections of images and videos that disturbed clear spatial 
representation; and sudden shifts between centralised, immer-
sive images and sound and multiple smaller images; a sudden cut 
to projected imagery; and a soundscape that attempted to locate 
viewers back into their specific spatial configurations by playing 
words whispered softly through individual speakers in a random 
pattern (these consisted of movement prompts in a number of 
languages), and that could only be understood by walking around 
the perimeter of the space more subtle and directed sounds. As 
part of the project, a number of parallel experiments in relation 
were carried out around the site of the SAT and then folded back 
into the space. Chapter Five discusses one such experiment – an 
iteration of Nathaniel Stern’s ongoing Compressionism project.
70. Beyond the physical structuring of a clear divide between the 
technical machinations and the viewers, perhaps the history of 
the use of the space for spectacle had naturalised a certain type 
of expectation in viewers of particular type of relationship that 
denied for many of them the possibility of thinking beyond these 
modes of interacting, preemptively modelling and limiting the 
potential of the event. The cost of the construction of the SAT’s 
immersive dome has led to the need to hire it out for events of 
mass spectacle, and therefore to configure the technology to pri-
marily provide this over other forms of engagement. This perhaps 
was not its intended primary use when first envisaged, as the SAT 
previously had been known for much more open and experimen-
tal uses of media technologies.
71. As Penny says: ‘We appear to have advanced little in our ability 
to qualitatively discuss the characteristics of aesthetically rich 
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interaction and interactivity and the complexities of designing 
interaction as artistic process’ (2011, 72).
72. Here it may be that the power of the ‘weak’ and the almost silent – 
that Serres identifies as the parasite – is precisely the tactic of the 
minor revolution, agitating change through the unseen gesture 
that disturbs the balance rather than the grand act that incites re-
action, as it ‘multiplies wildly with its smallness; it occupies space 
with its imperceptability’ (2007, 194).
73. In taking this stance perhaps it is possible to avoid viewing 
the major and minor as essentially positive or negative. In this 
Meagan Morris is somewhat right, I think, to critique the use of 
the ‘minor’ as a default position within certain contemporary 
thinking (1990, 29). Certainly, as noted in the arguments about 
relationality, it does not seem enough to promote the so-called 
‘minor’ as necessarily radical in itself; rather attention must 
always be paid to what alternatives are being created. The limita-
tion to Morris’s argument (though not necessarily her intent) is 
perhaps in misreading the ‘minor’ as a position, rather than a 
tactic that is all in the making. That is, the minor does not lead to 
a better place, the freedom it provides is only in-process, through 
the agitation and disruption: it is in its production of movement 
that is radical.
74. De Certeau’s concept of the tactic can be closely aligned with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the minor, being also concerned 
with performative reconfiguration of a stratified form (101–2). 
See Chapter Five for a discussion of the tactic of walking as a 
minor practice.
75. See Braidotti (2002, 147–8).
76. Despite the terms, the molecular/molar divide has nothing here 
to do with scale, but is defined by the way relation is controlled or 
opened up (Massumi 1992, 55).
77. Guattari writes: ‘It is precisely this singular, minor production, 
this singular point of creativity, that will have a maximum impact 
on the production of mutation of sensibility, in all the different 
fields, that I call molecular revolution’ (Guattari and Rolnik 2005, 
161). See also Michel De Certeau on the ‘swellings, shrinkings and 
fragmentations’ of totalities that allows new spatial systems to 
arise (1988, 101–2).
254 Notes
78. As DeLanda states, ‘in many respects the circulation is what 
matters, not the particular forms that it causes to energize’ 
(2011, 104).
79. This might be an increased self-production (autopoiesis), and/or 
the production of something other than themselves (allopoiesis). 
See Guattari (1995a, 39) and Maturana and Varela (1980, 68).
80. See DeLanda (2011, passim), for a detailed examination of the city 
as a machine processing flows of energy and biomass.
81. For example a machinic body that also contains machines/ organs 
that process light, sound, food, etc.
82. Machines here are ’proximity grouping[s]…[of] man-tool-animal’ 
(Murphy 1997).
83. Such machines are ‘about symbolic alliances and fusion…about 
viral or parasitic interdependence’ (Braidotti 2002, 254).
84. Similarly Whitehead shifts philosophical discussion from ‘ques-
tions of essence’ (what is it?) to questions of manner (how is it 
possible?) (Shaviro 2009, 72).
85. Here, in DeLanda’s example, a piece of ground may have a slope 
as an intrinsic property, but this ground also has a capacity to af-
fect the production of a style of movement of a walker in a body-
ground-gravitational pull assemblage (2005, 72–3).
86. While internal differentiation moves the system away from a 
molar expression, this increased movement or molecularisation 
of the system leads not to the destruction of coherence, but is the 
very logic that provides coherence through emergent co-causality 
– the implication of components in each other’s individuation. 
That is, it is difference as a unifying element (Deleuze 1994, 56).
87. For example, an eye and a light sensor are both affected by light 
modulations in a space, but express different capacities to react 
to this light. Light level or colour variations might also create shifts 
in affectual tonalities that then alter the mood and affect bodies 
in other ways as well. Here the machine operates not as a homo-
geneous processor of flows of forces, but rather its component 
parts produce singular modulations of forces, producing a further 
internal molecularisation through creating difference within 
both the transduction of force and the components. Difference 
is both actualised and maintains a virtual difference or potential 
to continue to produce further differentiations through ongoing 
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modulation and interaction and the ongoing tensions between 
the modulating affectual capacities of parts on the force.
88. A Chorus of Idle Feet was completed in 2010 and exhibited in a busy 
walkway outside Allan’s Walk ARI in Bendigo as part Metasonic II 
curated by Jacques Sodell, as a satellite event of the Australia-wide 
2010 Liquid Architecture festival. A number of analogue move-
ment, proximity and light sensors were placed along a section of 
the walkway and within the adjoining gallery spaces. The walkway 
was chosen both for its proximity to the main gallery space, and 
because it was a busy corridor between a main road and the cen-
tral city Mall that would then provide a richly varying flow of data 
for the sensor systems. These sensors used the movement of 
both gallery visitors and those using the passageway to go about 
their daily business to generate changes in a soundscape that was 
broadcast into the walkway. In this the work sought to harness 
the energy of all the people walking the space, with the potential 
for their different speeds, paths and intentions to generate more 
complex data for use in the system. The soundscape generated 
by this system consisted of eight layers of five simple notes that 
pulsed at approximately eighty pulses per minute. See www.
andrewgoodman.com.au/a-chorus-of-idle-feet/.
89. The sensor’s silicate material has the capacity to modulate its 
electrical resistance in affectual response to changes in light. this 
produces variation in the flow of electrons through the sensor.
90. In Whitehead’s terminology, when an entity or event reaches 
‘satisfaction’ it ceases to become, having achieved resolution of its 
bonds with the universe into ‘one complex feeling’ (1978, 44).
91. Whitehead uses the term ‘prehension’ to include both positive 
feelings (the incorporation of some data into an entity’s becom-
ing), and negative feelings (to actively not incorporate some 
data). ‘Feelings’ in the sense of prehensions, are not necessarily 
anything to do with conscious thought. See Chapter Three for a 
detailed explanation of the concept of prehension. In Whitehead’s 
schema, while the ‘satisfaction’ or resolution of an event of be-
coming of an entity is singular and terminal in the actual plane, it 
is not prescribed, as the entity is a multiplicity on the virtual level, 
having always the potential for further actualisations.
92. These circumstances include those selected by the artist (layout, 
software, sounds, images, shapes), plus what the participants 
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bring (physical capabilities, tastes, moods), plus the worldly 
circumstances surrounding the art event (culture, politics, ge-
ography, art histories, weather), which all co-create the event’s 
virtual milieu.
93. In Whitehead’s schema, while entities themselves continually 
perish and are replaced, the things we experience as enduring 
actualities, such as art objects or people, are termed ‘societ-
ies’ (Whitehead 1978, 34–5, 89). The ‘society’ that is the artwork 
assemblage can endure because new entities emerging within 
the art-assemblage conform to common feelings – their emer-
gence is shaped in part by their relation to the society – ‘con-
ditions imposed upon prehensions of other members of the 
nexus’ that is a ‘positive feeling’ (Whitehead 1978, 34). See also 
Stengers (2011, 47).
94. As Manning writes, ‘The challenge is to create the conditions for 
the work to work in an ecology of relation that does not privilege 
the interactive but seeks to open the way for the activation of the 
more-than the work has to offer’ (2013a, 132).
95. See Varela, Thompson and Rosch for a relevant critique of neo-
Darwinism (1992, 185–207). See also Glanville (2001, 660–1); 
and Bak (1997, 120–123). For a discussion of the difference 
between neo-Darwinist and co-causal models, see Lamarre (in 
Combes 2013, 56).
96. See also Pickering on drift as ‘evolving within fields of agency in 
dialectics of resistance and accommodation’ (1995, 247–8).
97. That is, it does not preference certain possible outcomes or types 
of outcomes, rather outcomes or connections arise through non-
prescriptive processes. See Priogogine (1980, 189).
98. See also McCormack and d’Inverno (editors, 2012, 45); and 
Chapter Nine, note 308, of this book for a critique of fitness based 
generative programming.
99. Causing, for example, a change in the flow of electrons through 
the larger sensor-wiring-computer interface assemblage, and 
potentially affecting the MIDI code-sampler patch assemblage in 
the computer.
100. Such diffractive events, where two or more waves become 
catalysts in each other’s differentiation is an example of what 
DeLanda terms an ‘autocatalytic loop’ (2011, 63). See also Chapter 
Notes 257
Seven of this book for an extended discussion of diffraction as a 
generative differential force within a system.
101. It becomes evident that the entities are all connected, whether 
directly or in various smaller and less direct relational routes: 
degrees of prehension. These new prehensive potentials must 
enter into a conversation with other propositional pulls in order 
to affect individuation of an entity. See Whitehead on the relation 
between all actualised entities (1978, 226–9).
102. Again, the increased potential is at a system level: individual com-
ponents have not necessarily increased their expressive poten-
tial, but the system as an ecology has created further expressive 
pontentialities.
103. Drift could imply, to some extent, that a system is ‘autopoietic’. 
Humberto Maturana and Varela define an autopoietic machine 
as one capable of generating its own organisation (1980, 79) by 
producing a ‘relationship between processes of production of 
components’ (80). Such a relationship is the evolution of a shared 
potentiality, as much as any actualised co-causality, an implica-
tion of relation on a virtual plane. However as drift is less about 
self preservation than self generation ‘autopoiesis’ is a term that 
perhaps should be approached cautiously.
104. Though this remains possible, dynamic systems can exhibit the 
ability to bifurcate and shift from one system of propositional 
pulls to a new (if related) system – a ‘phase transition’ – when they 
move beyond a limit to which they can accommodate relational 
agitations. See DeLanda (2005, 70); and Chapter Eight and Nine 
of this book for some discussion of the creative potential of 
such delimiting.
105. DeLanda terms this a ‘meshwork’, a system with an ability to 
adapt to local differentiations without losing productive relation 
that exists because such systems are complexly interdependent 
but remain heterogeneous (1998, 275–85). Assemblage processes, 
DeLanda states elsewhere, are adaptive, giving them the ‘capacity 
to further differentiate differences’ (2005, 73).
106. ‘A dynamic open whole, never fully given as it is always creat-
ing new connections and new potentials for further connection’ 
(Massumi 1999, 52).
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107. In the interactive example given, the components function not 
only to produce vibrations in relation to changes to light, pres-
sure and movement, but are drawn into a system where they also 
function to moderate each other’s individuation.
108. For Simondon concrete systems contrast with ‘abstract’ systems, 
where each component is designed to perform a ‘determined 
function’, ‘has no intrinsic limits’ and requires external input or 
organisation (Simondon 1980, 22).
109. That is, it is not that components themselves such as sensors sud-
denly gain greater access to the virtual, but that the larger assem-
blages they combine to make can access (and create) this virtual.
110. The more simplistic notions of drift concentrate excessively on the 
establishment of actualised feedback loops – rather than enabling 
the conditions for feedback loops to evolve – without an under-
standing that these can in themselves become rigid and program-
matic. See McCormack (McCormack and d’Inverno, editors, 2012, 
45) and Dery (1996, 309).
111. None of this is to necessarily promote autopoiesis as an answer 
to rethinking interactivity, as machinic modelling disrupts any 
discrete boundaries. Rather, there might be degrees to which a 
machine is capable of intensively becoming: of organising itself 
within a field of potential. The potential of transduction and 
feedback in systems of drift to modulate the intensive relational 
forces, suggests that they are important elements in thinking a 
system capable of generating and sustaining rich potentiality. 
Moreover, such modelling provides a path towards thinking dif-
ferentiation as an intensively generated process, rather than one 
purely reliant on extensive stimuli. See Parisi for a critique of the 
turn towards autopoiesis in second order cybernetics as a false 
‘solution’ to the problem of the quantitative nature of computer 
software (2013, 10–13); and Gordon Pask on the lack of any truly 
autopoietic systems other than the universe taken as a whole 
(1980, 272).
112. See Shaviro (2009, 128, n.16).
113. As Simondon states, relation is not primary in that it arises as ‘as 
aspect of the internal resonance of a system of individuation’, 
which is both the individuations of an entity, and its participa-
tion ‘as an element’ in greater system-wide individuations which 
exceeds itself (Simondon 2009, 8).
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114. For a critique of the various types of posthumanism see Rosi 
Braidotti (2014). Braidotti identifies three strands of posthuman-
ism: reactive (from moral philosophy), analytic (from science and 
technology) and critical (from Spinoza). She criticises ‘reactive’ 
posthumanism for its ‘universalistic belief in individualism, fixed 
identities and moral ties that bind’ (Braidotti 2014, 39). Braidotti 
finds ‘analytic’ posthumanism problematic, as although it ac-
knowledges deep interconnectedness between human and non-
human this is an interconnectedness based largely on ‘a shared 
sense of vulnerability’, and because the sense of global proximity 
promoted often breeds ‘a xenophobic rejection of otherness’ 
(Braidotti 2014, 40). The ‘critical’ posthumanism Braidotti advo-
cates is ‘an eco-philosophy of multiple belongings’ resting on ‘the 
ethics of becoming’ (2014, 49). This third type of posthumanism 
is both in sympathy with the term trans-human as I use it here, 
and with the ethics of becoming in process philosophy. Trans-
humanism, in this sense, is neither the negation of human experi-
ence nor an attempt to anthropomorphise the non-human.
115. This might suggest a different slant on the issue from some other 
philosophical attempts to think beyond the human, such as new 
materialism, object orientated ontology (OOO) and actor network 
theory, in its stronger emphasising an ontogenetic approach in 
which relation cannot be limited to conversation between things, 
but must be acknowledged to be intrinsic to the becoming of any 
such object or event. See, for example, Steven Shaviro’s pertinent 
critique of Graham Harman and OOO in relation to Whitehead 
(Shaviro 2014, 27–44). See also Tim Ingold’s discussion of the 
limitation of relation to interactions between stable entities in 
actor network theory (including a discussion of the mistransla-
tion of acteur réseau as actor-network and the resultant misplaced 
emphasis on objects (2011, 84–6, 89–94).
116. Whitehead’s ontology is much more complex than the few aspects 
I will briefly to outline here, detailed analysis of these and other 
aspects can be found in Stengers (2011), Judith Jones (1998), and is 
discussed in much of the recent writing of Erin Manning, Andrew 
Murphie, Brian Massumi and Steven Shapiro.
117. ‘Actuality is in its essence composition. Power is in the compulsion 
of composition’ (Whitehead, 1968, 119).
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118. In Whitehead’s terminology, when an entity or event reaches 
‘satisfaction’ it ceases to become, having achieved resolution of its 
bonds with the universe (Whitehead 1978, 44).
119. ‘Prehension’ is Whitehead’s term for both positive and negative 
feeling (positive and negative prehensions), while he reserve ‘feel-
ing’ for the positive prehensions.
120. The terms are somewhat interchangeable in Whitehead’s philoso-
phy, though perhaps in some ways event or actual occasion are 
better terms since they emphasise the ongoing nature and avoids 
any slippage back into hylomorphic thinking. It should be remem-
bered that such ‘events’ include not just concrete objects and be-
ings, but all occasions, including thoughts, emotions, ephemeral 
forces (wind, heat, and so on), and the atomic and subatomic.
121. It is a ‘local expression’ of the field (Stengers 2011, 102) – a monad 
perhaps, though it is not exactly a continuity of relation but the 
continuity of becomings that Whitehead proposes.
122. ‘Every item in [an entity’s] universe is involved in each concres-
cence’ (Whitehead 1978, 22).
123. The feeling, Whitehead states, ‘is an episode in self-production’ of 
an entity (1978, 224).
124. Positioning intensity as the key brings Whitehead’s work more 
clearly in line with Deleuze’s thinking as expressions of ‘dif-
ferential relations and their corresponding distinctive points’ 
(1994, 252).
125. Thus ‘every realized contrast has a location, which is particular 
with the particularity of actual entities. It is a particular matter of 
fact’ (Whitehead 1978, 230).
126. Here in using the term ‘pattern’ it must be emphasised that 
this is a topological rather than Euclidean patterning or spacing 
(Simondon 1995b, 225).
127. That is, relation of same-to-same is not a relation at all. See Jones 
(1998, 56), Serres (2007, 79) and Massumi on zero sum intensity as 
a point of no determination (1992, 70).
128. That is, the subject (or ‘superject’ in Whitehead’s preferred term) 
is this satisfaction of a concrescence – the feeling and ordering of 
energy from the world, rather than, as Murphie notes, a Kantian 
notion of world energy emanating from the subject (2016, 11). Nor 
is there a ‘mind’ as a singular entity. As Jones states: ‘mentality 
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is not linked to a singular form of experience, nor is it linked to a 
singular mode of organized being that performs a variety of func-
tions’ (1998, 134).
129. As Jones notes, ‘much consideration of Whitehead’s system 
seems influenced by an abiding habit of seeking subjects to which 
important “predicates” such as existence, agency, immediacy, and 
character may be attached’ (11998, 01).
130. Actor network theory or new materialism at their most program-
matic end, for example, or Andrew Pickering’s language in The 
Mangle of Practice of ‘resistance and accommodation’ and the 
‘capturing’ of agency, staged as a kind of epic battle of wills be-
tween scientist and material world (1995, 65, 92). As Karen Barad 
says, Pickering’s concept ‘takes for granted the humanist notion 
of agency as a property of individual entities’ (2003, 807, n. 7). 
Pickering’s work is, however, of interest for the fact that it begins 
to head towards a process-based understanding of physics and 
scientific practice, but comes to this from a different direction 
than most philosophically based texts on the subject. Barad’s 
own work (2007) is perhaps a more thorough investigation of 
this approach.
131. Such a position ‘begs the question of the nature of existence, 
deciding beforehand what type of entity we are looking for’ ( Jones 
1998, 177) See also Ingold (2011, 16–17). It should be noted that 
some writers, such as Jane Bennett (2010), attempt to redefine 
‘agency’ in ecological terms, and it is not these attempts that I am 
here critiquing.
132. See also Stengers on the importance of negative prehension 
(2011, 308–10).
133. Though one might perhaps less facetiously argue that complex 
feelings such as ‘lust’ may be better thought of as societies of 
events in themselves, composed of the concrescence of feelings 
drawing on multiple sensations, concepts and affects.
134. Although an entity only relates to some eternal objects, it still 
creates positive and negative relations in that it is only one actu-
alised, selected possibility of hardness or redness, not any of the 
other so far undefined and inexhaustible possibilities of these 
qualities (Whitehead 1978, 227).
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135. Again, in such a statement that clearly positions force as pri-
mary and form as secondary it becomes clear just how different 
process philosophy is from object orientated ontology. Despite 
some superficial similarities in discussing the autonomous and 
subjective ‘life’ of objects there are very real differences between 
Whitehead and Graham Harman, as Shaviro outlines clearly in his 
book The Universe of Things. To pick up just a few key points from 
Shaviro’s argument, whereas for Harman all entities are ontologi-
cally equivalent because they are ‘equally withdrawn from one 
another’, for Whitehead their equivalence is based on the fact 
that entities are constituted through prehension of other entities, 
thus arguing against the philosophy of substances that Harman 
embraces (2014, 29–31; Jones 1998, 95). Here Whitehead’s pre-
hension always involves an active and subjective take on other 
entities that brings novelty into the world through the singular 
combination of these prehensions into a pattern of contrasts, 
whereas OOO posits a passive reception of datum and a stability 
of objects, and thus cannot fully account for the rise of novelty in 
the world (2014, 38). Further, while Harman, according to Shaviro, 
argues that one entity can never fully ‘know’ all aspects of an-
other entity, this does not mean that one entity cannot affect all 
aspects of another object, and thus knowledge is not necessar-
ily the defining aspect of the relationship (106). Shaviro sums up 
the difference between the two philosophies as being between 
‘the aesthetics of the beautiful and the aesthetics of the sublime’ 
(2014, 42). Thus while the former describes Whitehead’s view of 
beauty as intensive experience based on patterns of contrasts 
that conciliate differences without erasing them, Harman’s 
concept of the ‘allure’ between objects positions difference at 
the point of the inaccessibility of one object for another (Shaviro 
2014). Here Whitehead’s world is one of a constant intermesh-
ing and negotiation between forces and appetites for becoming, 
whereas Harman’s world is one of strange isolation.
136. Whitehead’s use of the concept of ‘mediation’ is specific and 
outside many definitions of the term. Perhaps it might be bet-
ter described as ‘immediation’, an enrichment through en-
folded differentiation whereby ‘fields of relation agitate and 
activate to emerge into collectivities’ (Brunner, Manning and 
Massumi 2013, 136).
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137. ‘Appetition is immediate matter of fact including in itself a prin-
ciple of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be…All 
physical experience is accompanied by an appetite for, or against, 
its continuance’ (Whitehead 1978, 32).
138. Though, as Whitehead points out, it is a ‘misconception’ to think 
that the creative advance of the universe ever ‘involves the no-
tion of a unique seriality’, which is not sustainable as an ‘ultimate 
metaphysical principle’, and truly would contradict direct experi-
ence of the world (1978, 35). As Jones states, novelty is not neces-
sarily ‘wild diversity’, but a ‘new perspective arrangement of the 
qualities proffered by the world’ (1998, 69).
139. Thus what appears as the persistence of a ‘thing’ that is the so-
ciety’s continued expression of a relatively stable form is rather 
the continued recreation of shared patterns of intensity: shared 
valuations of feelings, not evidence of transcendent matter 
(Whitehead 1978, 107–8, 145).
140. This is, at least to some extent, counterintuitive, as what we (or 
for that matter the river) might experience of the rock seems to 
suggest that it is an enduring object, not a series of overlapping 
and atomic events of becoming. But each event of the becoming 
of each fragment of the rock (and the becoming of each atom and 
molecule within this fragment, and so on) is always singular: its 
own unique cut, its own subjective synthesis of the actual (all ob-
jective datum) and the virtual (select eternal objects). The fact that 
it may appear stable from our perspective (as a speck of silicate 
embedded in the rock, for example) does not contradict this but 
can be explained by the force of the patterning of the objective 
datum of the society within which the entity’s concrescence takes 
place, and by the relatively small degree by which this inanimate 
entity is able to modify the force of this patterned objective da-
tum through acts of conceptual prehension or ‘valuation’ of this 
datum (Jones 1998, 60). Thus the fault in assuming the stability 
of the rock lies in mistaking an effect or ‘extensive quanta’ (the 
seeming endurance of an object) for the categorical basis (the 
object as a mere fact that is necessary for an explanation of the 
universe) ( Jones 1998, 127). This is a ‘fallacy of misplaced concrete-
ness’ that mistakes ‘a certain mode of abstraction about reality 
for the complete or definitive account of that reality or our knowl-
edge of it’ (Whitehead 1978, 7–8; Jones 1998, 7).
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141. Remembering that prehensions always include the negative 
prehensions that enrich through the pressure of ‘relevant alterna-
tives’ ( Jones 1998, 68; Whitehead 1978, 249). Thus we might say 
that the rocks have ‘a life’.
142. Amongst other subjects in this book, Darwin demonstrates the 
significance of the worm on the becoming of rocks through the 
production of carbonic acid and its erosive capacities; through the 
digestion of rock fragments and their abrasion in the alimentary 
canals of the worms; and through the burying of rocks and boul-
ders both undermined by worm tunnels and covered (surprisingly 
quickly) by worm castings (Darwin 1881, 235, 246, 230–58 passim). 
From this evidence Darwin extrapolates the supreme important 
role of worms in the burying and preservation of ancient artifacts 
and the importance of their actions ‘in the [human] history of 
the world’ (Darwin 1881, 313). See also Ingold on the difference 
between a geological study of rocks as ‘formless lump[s] of mat-
ter’ and an anthropological or archaeologist’s viewpoint ‘in which 
stones are caught up in the lives of human beings, and given form 
and significance through their incorporation into the social and 
historical contexts of these lives’ (2011, 31). Here perhaps we can 
see an example of the significant nesting or folding of one occa-
sion into another across seemingly insurmountable scales, and 
the echoes of prehensive choices on future events. See also Eileen 
Crist (2004,162–4) and Bennett (2010, 55–60).
143. See Shaviro on Whitehead’s theory of life as a ‘theory of desire’. 
Shaviro states that ‘an entity is alive precisely to the extent that it 
envisions difference and thereby strives for something other than 
mere continuation of what already is’ (2010, 143).
144. In fact here neo-Darwinist approaches are ultimately nonsen-
sical: were any creature to be perfectly adapted to exploit an 
environment it would quickly perish, as the environment itself is 
never static, but presents a constantly shifting set of challenges 
and interactive possibilities for any entity. Thus ability to change 
and adapt and to make do under a variety of conditions is what 
helps an entity to survive, not perfect form. Here again capacity 
to prehend (and thus incorporate) aspects of one’s environment 
can be seen as key. See Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1992, 196), 
Shaviro (2010, passim) and Bak (1997, 120–3). On Darwin’s empha-
sis on both the drive towards novelty of nature and its ‘cruelty’ 
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in regards to a lack of care for any particular individuation, see 
Adams (2000, 38–42); and Ingold (2011, 77).
145. See also Massumi (2014, 13–14).
146. Feelings are a prehensive resonance with other entities 
(Whitehead 1978, 220).
147. This could be seen as the worms’ ability to harness an ecological 
intelligence, which in Darwin’s time (if not today) might be seen as 
politically important in its emphasis on realigning our concept of 
creativity and power (in a Nietzschian sense) from the transcen-
dent to the organic. See Adams (58–61).
148. ‘How little of the movements of the bodies of octopuses frolick-
ing over the reef, of guppies fluttering in the slow currents of the 
Amazon, of black cockatoos fluttering their acrobatics in the vines 
of the rain forest…of humans, are teleological!’ (Lingis 2003, 168).
149. Though it should be noted that this ‘augmentation’ is not that of 
the individual but of that which is produced in supplement to the 
individual: further individuation. As Braidotti states, ‘the Life I 
inhabit is not mine, it does not bear my name – it is a generative 
force of becoming, of individuation and differentiation: apersonal, 
indifferent, and generative’ (2010, 224). See also Elizabeth Grosz 
on Simondon’s definition of ethics as the inclusion of more of the 
pre-individual potential of an entity (2012, 50).
150. It should be noted here that Whitehead’s own use of the term 
‘morality’ is clearly in line with this definition of ethics, not moral-
ity as I define it here with its negative connotations.
151. A video demonstration of this work can be viewed at www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=AQRHon2eiKc.
152. Faraday’s Law is expressed as: ε = -N(ΔΦ/Δt) Where ε is the EMF, 
Φ is the sum of the field strength and the area, and t is the speed in 
change of flux.
153. That is, the electromagnetic field changes its strength, and/or 
its distance from the induction loop, and/or its area. From the 
position of the (presumed) stationary induction loop all these 
possibilities will be felt as a variation in electromagnetic strength, 
but such a feeling is specific to this one entity, not a universal or 
transcendent experience.
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154. ‘Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is condi-
tioned. Every diversity and every change refers to a difference 
which is its sufficient reason.’ (Deleuze 1994, 222).
155. And, on a quantum level, each atom is a pattern of waves. See 
Laughlin (2005, 31).
156. Stengers notes the importance of Faraday’s work in the nine-
teenth century for Whitehead in its thinking of the independence 
of the event over stable objects with fixed and reversible prop-
erties (2011, 101), as they might appear in the earlier work of 
Kirchoff on conservative loops. Faraday’s discoveries position 
conservative fields as merely special cases of fields, not as the full 
sum of potential, as classical physics would intuit (Lewin 2002). 
See also Prigogine and Stengers (1996, 73), on dissipative struc-
tures and the ‘arrow of time’ and the importance of irreversibility 
for non-linear physics.
157. This is not to suggest that a work with these interests necessarily 
must be slow, quiet or meditative to achieve such an attention.
158. As Serres says elsewhere, ‘existence is a derivation from equilib-
rium’ (ND, unpaginated).
159. As Simondon argues, notions of form must be ‘saved two times 
from an all too summary technical paradigmatism: first, in relation 
to classical culture, the notion of form must be saved from the 
reductive manner the notion was used in the hylomorphic schema; 
and a second time, in order to save information as signification 
from the technological theory of information in modern culture, 
with its experience of transmission through a channel’ (2009, 12). 
Emphasis in the original.
160. See also Gibson on the differences between Shannon and 
Weaver’s concept of information (1967, passim) and an ecological 
approach to information and perception (1979, 231–2).
161. ‘Differenciation’ is a virtual difference that can then actualise into 
individual instances of ‘differentiation’ (Bracken 2002, 92).
162. Exchange, Serres argues, ‘does not mobilize things, it immobilizes 
them’, whereas the parasite is always interrupting exchange and a 
‘derivation from equilibrium’, in essence parasitism is ‘taking with-
out giving’ (2007, 156, 221, 16). The parasite is, however, ‘politically 
ambivalent’, and, as Matteo Pasquinelli explores, the concept of 
‘rent’ within the digital realm can be seen as a parasitic form of 
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‘cognitive’ capitalism exploiting immaterial labour relations, mul-
tiplying modes of exploitation and reaching across many dimen-
sions of production (Pasquinelli 2008, 97, 91–104, passim). See 
also Massumi on exchange-value (1992, 199–201).
163. See also Mark Amerika on the ‘hyperimprovisational’ state of 
the digital VJ in an ‘asynchronous realtime’ as an ‘investigation of 
complex event processing where the VJ artist becomes a multitude 
of flux identities nomadically circulating within the networked 
space of flows’ that ‘oftentimes produces a feeling of being both 
avant-garde (ahead of one’s time) and time-delayed (the stutter of 
media consciousness losing self-awareness) while simultaneously 
playing the role of a nomadic net artist’ (2005, 7–8).
164. As Massumi says: ‘the virtual is the mode of reality implicated 
in the emergence of new potentials…its reality is the reality of 
change: the event’ (1998, 16).
165. This might, as Varela proposes, create a hyper-awareness of 
temporality within one’s body in relation to the event, making 
a participant hyperconscious of posture, disrupting their image 
of themselves. Varela argues that shifts in the affective tonality 
cause bodily functions, which were operating at a sub-conscious 
level, to suddenly rise to ‘transparency’ (i.e. consciousness), creat-
ing in their hyperawareness a sensation of slowed or stretched 
temporality (1997, 300).
166. Beyond these more concretely ‘designed’ aspects, it pays to 
remember that there is always a multitude of incidental parasitic 
disruptions – the way a sound bounces off a wall to diffract and 
interfere with other sounds for example, as discussed in Chapter 
Seven – and that a propositional interactive design might also 
consider working to enhance the potential of these other layers of 
parasitic action.
167. Components of these individual sounds were also constructed as 
micro-perceptions – not necessarily capable of being individually 
recognised, but layered in combinations of tones, timbres, over-
tones, rhythms and textures, to produce a ‘society’, the perceived 
sound, while retaining difference and their atomic nature. See 
Chapter Seven for an extended discussion of the parasitic poten-
tial of sound as micro-perception.
168. In an example such as this the artist proposes a multiplicity of 
potential sound events, in excess of possible actuality. With 
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causality dispersed, notions of an artist as ‘agent’ are replaced by 
a co-causal conversation between competing forces. Within such 
simple tactics, we begin to understand that sounds within the 
system become free floating events, inhabiting a virtual sound-
scape: sounds as societies, vibrating internally and externally with 
the tensions of relation – they begin to hum with difference and 
potential. Here it can be seen that in a system that in many ways 
was a relatively simple construction (utilising twenty or so basic 
sensors and a dozen sounds), it is possible to design the potential 
for a move towards greater complexity. The artist’s role might be 
less to design the complex relations that might occur, but more to 
focus on setting the preconditions for these developments. And, 
while such a design shift certainly increases component events’ 
implication in each other’s various actualisations, this is not in 
any way presented as a definitive example of the scope of the 
parasite. Such tinkering represents both small, seemingly incon-
sequential moderations, and at the same time, a paradigm shift: 
the death of the (software) author to be replaced by the proposi-
tional event.
169. On this conception of walking Tim Ingold comments that ‘the en-
vironment is a world that continually unfolds in relation to the be-
ings that make a living there. Its reality is not of material objects, 
but for its inhabitants’ (2011, 30, emphasis in the original).
170. In this sense, it is potentially a process of ‘becoming-other’, even 
if the outcome is ostensibly similar. The emphasis here is squarely 
on shifting the awareness of ‘becoming’ – the immersion in the 
emergent process – not on the ‘other’ (individuation not individu-
alization). As Lygia Clark says of her own work, its function is to 
encourage the spectator to ‘rediscover the meaning of our routine 
gestures’ (cited in Frieling 2008, 104).
171. See also Ingold on the ability of walking to break the imposed con-
formity of the modern engineered environment (2011, 115).
172. ‘Thus, for Lavery, the walker sees the city as ‘a boundless stage 
where the self can be sacrificed and shattered, and where new 
ecstatic intensities can be experienced’ (Mock 2009, 43).
173. While de Certeau names these differing concepts of an environ-
ment ‘place’ and ‘space’ respectively, confusingly many authors 
switch these terms around, using ‘space’ to denote the abstract 
form and ‘place to denote an embodied and emergent relational 
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engagement between bodies and environment (de Certeau 1988, 
117–18; Ingold 2011, 145–55; Gibson 1979, 35, 93).
174. See also Ingold (2011, 84–8, 92–3) for more on the concept of 
meshwork. Ingold, like de Certeau, considers this as a ‘storied 
knowledge’ (2011, 141–76; de Certeau 1988, 118–26).
175. I am aware of the somewhat simplistic and potentially problem-
atic image of the walker in de Certeau’s writing, who at times does 
come perilously close to the image of the flâneur with its impli-
cations of (at best) idle dandyism. De Certeau’s walker remains 
untroubled by social constructions of the actual city (race, class, 
gender) that would potentially constrain ‘his’ actions. See Driscoll 
(2001) and Langer (1988) for such critiques. (Cf. Brian Morris 
(2004), for a measured and sympathetic debate on this issue).
176. Roland Barthe’s essay ‘No Address’ explores such an experience 
in describing the attempted navigation through the streets of 
Tokyo, where there are no street names and directions take on a 
subjective, relational nature, shaped by the forces of rhythm, hab-
its, durations and memories – position enacted through discovery 
that is ‘intense and fragile’ (1982, 36, 33–7).
177. Indeed, the saccadic micro-movements of the eyes are an 
essential component of the ability to perceive the world 
(Gibson 199–202).
178. In Whitehead’s terms this is then an intensity of feeling through 
held contrast. Gibson, writing on the binocular quality of vision, 
argues that these doubled feelings are not ‘resolved’ in the brain 
into a single image, but are rather held in the body as a productive 
‘congruence and disparity at the same time’ (1979, 203).
179. See also Steven Connor on the assymetrical nature of the body 
and world: ‘The world is sensible because it lists, because it has 
orientation or laterality’ (1999, 2).
180. Here, as Lingis says, ‘things subsist not as givens, but as tasks to 
which perception finds itself devoted’ (1996, 35).
181. It should be noted here that a niche, for Gibson, is not phenom-
enal or private, subjective world of conciousness, but belongs to 
the objects as much as the animal as a set of complex relations 
and potential relations, including the physical and social registers 
(1979, 121–2, 130). While Ingold asserts that Gibson’s system of af-
fordances is ‘shot through with contradictions’ because it assumes 
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that the environment exists independently and prior to engage-
ment with inhabitants in some stable form (2011, 78), it seems 
clear from Gibson’s own writing on the subject that his intention 
is ecological.
182. A shifting level underfoot, as Manning describes it, makes pal-
pable to the walker the ground-gravity-body relationship, disrupt-
ing and reconstituting it as one stumbles: an ‘active prehending’ 
that ‘reconstitut[es the ground] as novelty, intertwining with the 
capacities of what a gravitational body can do’ (2009, 70–1). To 
begin to understand how gravity helps shape body-movement 
machines, think, for example, of the different movements that the 
lower gravity pull of the body in water produces.
183. ‘What mindfulness disrupts is mindlessness – that is, being 
mindlessly involved without realizing what one is doing’ (Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch 1992, 32). Varela’s conception of the mind 
here is one that is resolutely constituted from enaction of body-
world, and therefore, in sympathy with Manning and Arakawa and 
Gins’ ideas, despite the terminology that might suggest a return to 
privileging subjectivity over embodied experience.
184. The space ‘reconfigures ‘as the body recomposes ’ (Manning 2009, 
15, emphasis in the original).
185. Arakawa and Gins propose three categories of landing sites: ‘per-
ceptual’ that are ‘specific to what presents itself; ‘imaging’, which 
cast a wider and more diffuse net; and ‘dimensionalizing’, which 
combine the previous two categories to attach more fully to an 
environment (Arakawa and Gins 2002, 7–8; Manning 2009, 211).
186. ‘What stems from the body, by way of awareness, should be held 
to be of it’ (Arakawa and Gins 2002).
187. Landing sites work to enrich experience with a potential further 
fielding of body in the world, as, for example, landing sites at their 
‘imaging’ end (beyond the register of perceptual actuality) create 
the conditions (potential) for perceptual or dimensionalising sites 
(Manning 2009, 80). Such a moving and perceiving body is a kines-
thetic body that is always dispersing and reorganizing.
188. These are the kind of spaces Arakawa and Gins have proposed 
and constructed, where shifting levels, varying gradients, col-
umns of different circumferences, and so on, create a space that 
defers totalizing comprehension and demands considerable and 
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continual attention to negotiate (Arakawa and Gins 1997). The 
‘elastic point’ at which the body ‘culls from the movement’s po-
tential its becoming-form’ is extended through such propositional 
spaces that demand a clear and ongoing shifting beyond habit 
(Manning 2009, 35).
189. Landing sites are always tied to styles and techniques of bodying 
and moving – they are specific (even in their fuzziness) and singu-
lar – for example, a baby crawling or person in a wheelchair will 
create different landing sites, zones of attention directly relevant 
to their ambulatory procedures.
190. Landing sites are constituted both within the space around and 
within what we think of as the discrete body and mixtures of the 
two, in a way that fundamentally disrupt boundaries. ‘(T)he body 
is part of the external world, continuous with it. It is as much a 
part of nature as anything else there…we cannot define where a 
body begins and where external nature ends’ (Whitehead 1968, 
4). This is evident with landing site operations, thought in terms 
not of materiality – where it is also true (shared atoms or bacteria, 
for example) – but the production of an immanent world-body 
through moving and sensing.
191. De Certeau begins his meditation on walking the city with a 
description of the distancing and totalising effects of sight, and 
vision here separates from life and works to reduce the living 
complexity of the city to representation – ‘a projection that is a 
way of keeping aloof’. More recent technologies of vision (CCTV, 
GPS, and mobile phones with ability to immediately capture and 
send images from the street, and the ability they give authorities 
to trace users) perhaps confirm de Certeau’s fears of ‘the cancer-
ous growth of vision…measuring everything by its ability to show 
or be shown’ (1988, 92–3, xxi). Likewise the concept of occular-
centrism also examines the repressive functions of vision and is 
especially critical of the role normally assigned to perspectival 
notions of vision. While it would be foolish to argue that vision 
cannot operate in this manner – as Foucault has shown, vision 
has panoptic potential as an agent of control and separation, both 
Arakawa and Gins and Gibson suggest a role for vision that does 
not so clearly separate it from the functioning of the other senses. 
For a discussion on the merits and limitations of occularcentrism, 
see Martin Jay (1988, 3–28). Cf. Massumi’s discussion of vision 
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and perspectival painting for another way of thinking through the 
bodily implications of the system (2011, 127–30).
192. And, as we walk, we not only see the gravel on the road but also 
‘feel’ its texture through sight, Massumi says, as vision becomes 
haptic (2002, 158).
193. Although at any one instant we can see only one side of the tree, 
we experience it as a three-dimensional object – this is a ‘depth 
perception’ that is, Massumi argues, a seeing of the potential to 
move around, through or over the object – a kind of prehension 
of the possibilities of movement (1998, 23). See also Gibson on 
occlusion and vision (1979, 78). Manning states that even before 
we adjust our movement to accommodate for the tree in our path, 
vision activates in our bodies the ‘preacceleration’ that is the gath-
ering of energies, an opening up to potential (2009, 14).
194. Though, as Gibson argues, visual kinesthetics operate as more 
than feedback, as they also exist during passive movement (1979, 
175). For example, when sitting on a stationary train while watch-
ing an adjacent train leave the station, one can experience an 
illusory sensation of movement provoked by this vision.
195. The version of this work discussed in this chapter was performed 
as part of a larger project, Into the Midst, by the Senselab research 
group in Montreal in October 2012. Of interest in this iteration is 
that the work was performed within the city environment as an 
extension of a project within the immersive dome at the Society 
for Art and Technology (SAT), and that the work was enacted by a 
number of different bodies (including the author’s). Unlike some 
other iterations of Compressionism performed by Stern alone, here 
it was often collaboratively performed, with several people carry-
ing connected technical components to perform a larger coopera-
tive action. See Chapter One, ‘Bridge’ for further discussion of the 
Into the Midst project.
196. That is, in its intensive searching-out of the incidental and the 
singular, the body-scanner ignored the established networks of 
movement: paths, roads and doors. Gaps were also multiplied 
and troubled in the ‘proper’ space of art (in this case, the SAT 
Gallery), as the Compressionist act in the street extended and 
diffused the event into a larger, perhaps less passively receptive 
environment, requiring negotiation with a new, more complex set 
of parameters. The weather, hostile or friendly public, incidental 
Notes 273
noise, available light, traffic, and so on, all became factors folded 
into the event by the act of walking the performance beyond 
the gallery, disrupting or mutating the event itself through 
chance encounters, emotional tonalities, sounds heard, time 
spent on detours.
197. The surface, Gibson states, is ‘what touches the animal’ (1979, 23).
198. ‘Each time an organ – or function – is liberated from an old duty, it 
invents’ (Serres 2008, 344).
199. This embracing of the scanning/visioning technics was perhaps 
a ‘prosthetic gesture’, opening the body up again, troubling its 
perceived boundaries, and creating a trans-human assemblage, a 
new individuation (Manning 2007, 155).
200. As Deleuze and Guattari are at pains to emphasise, the minor is 
not a place of refuge, but an activation that involves becoming a 
‘sort of stranger’ within a known system (1986, 40, 26).
201. Psychopomp was exhibited at Kings ARI, Melbourne, November 
16– December 8, 2012. The work consisted of a nearly nineteen 
minute performance piece in which two performers moved 
collaboratively in a darkened space wearing ‘sound suits’ that 
generated and responded to sound and light. It was envisaged as 
a ‘voodoo ritual’ for an imagined future – a performance situated 
in a liminal space between spirit world and a dystopian science 
fiction otherworld. The soundscape utilised samples and effects 
reminiscent of 1950s and 1960s science fiction films (utilising digi-
tal versions of early analogue synthesisers and sound generators 
such as Theremins, and featuring heavy use of effects such as 
reverb, distortion and chorus). The suits themselves contained a 
variety of sensors (tilt, bend, light, touch and proximity) that then 
generated analogue data in response to movements, alongside 
light sensors responding to the embedded LED systems in the 
costumes. In addition, sound sensors – placed in front of each 
of the four speakers that were positioned around the perimeter 
of the performance space – generated data in response to the 
changes in volume emitted by each particular speaker. The data 
from all the sensors was used to generate sound events – both 
the playing and interruption of sound samples, changes in vol-
ume, tonal qualities, and the spatialisation of each sample. Some 
samples were looped, so that they played until an action caused 
them to be replaced by another sample, while others played once 
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when triggered through a complex chain of relations. At certain 
triggers, sounds from the performance were also recorded by the 
computer system and then looped into increasingly complex lay-
ers and replayed into the space, and the system was configured to 
emphasise the potential for disturbance to any sound event.
202. ‘The surface is where most of the action is’ (Gibson 1979, 23).
203. Manning uses the term ‘chunking’ to describe the ability to filter 
sense information. She describes the difficulty that autistics have 
in efficiently controlling and ordering the flood of information, 
and the special attunement to the field in its emergence that this 
gives – in a sense, an excess of receptivity to relation, rather than 
a lack that creates this experience (2013a, 172–83, 275).
204. See also Manning (2013a) and Manning (2016, 48–56). Manning’s 
recent artworks also experiment with this concept: Stitching Time 
(2012) at the Biennale of Sydney, and Weather Patterns (2012) 
at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Deakin University, 
Latrobe University VAC, and Bus Projects, Melbourne.
205. In Manning’s usage, the ‘environment’ – which includes what 
remains of the human – is pure ecological process, a system ca-
pable of self-modulation through the accommodation of internal 
difference and increased relational interdependence. This is in 
line with Felix Guattari’s concept of ‘ecosophy’, a generalised 
ecology that ‘questions the whole of subjectivity and capitalistic 
power formations’ (Guattari 2008, 34–6, 52). As Manning says: 
‘to feel ecologically is to directly perceive the relations out of 
which space-time is composed. Perceiving environmentally does 
not imply giving meaning to form, but forming environmentally’ 
(Manning 2009, 73).
206. See also Whitehead (2014, unpaginated, Chapter I: section 10).
207. Presentational immediacy and causal efficacy specifically inter-
sect in sharing elements of sense-data and locality, firstly in that 
the immediate that is given in sensuous perception is also always 
derived from the potentiality shaping it, and therefore has some 
relationship to causality; secondly in that the organs sensing are 
themselves spatially located within the environment (Whitehead 
2014, unpaginated, II: 5).
208. Conscious perception of course also includes an awareness of the 
act of perceiving as a secondary register. Although consciousness 
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perception and choice is only available to select organisms, 
Manuel DeLanda argues that even the earliest bacteria developed 
internal (that is, subjective) models of their relationship to the en-
vironment through combining a primitive sensory system with a 
motor-driven understanding of their relationship to space – which 
could be viewed as a germinal version of presentational imme-
diacy and causal efficacy, although he makes no direct mention of 
Whitehead’s two categories of perception (2011, 80).
209. Casual efficacy is ‘a direct perception of those antecedent actual 
occasions which are causally efficacious both for the percipient 
and for the relevant events’ (Whitehead 1978, 169).
210. While we might baulk at Whitehead’s terminology here, one 
could argue that his system is highly inclusive in that it resists any 
ontological distinction between organisms of differing capacities, 
particularly its resistance to placing human perception in a differ-
ent classification to other animals.
211. On its own presentational immediacy is ‘the perception of the 
contemporary world, whereas when combined with causal ef-
ficacy this is broadened to ‘the present moment of experience’ 
(Whitehead 2014, unpaginated, II: 4).
212. To give an everyday example, perhaps when standing on a beach, 
in the overwhelming brightness of sudden sunlight, the envelop-
ing monochrome of the sky, and surrounded by the roar of the 
ocean, one might, at least for an instant, find oneself immersed 
in almost pure immediate experience of brightness, blueness or 
loudness that is a glimpse of an experience of these eternal quali-
ties beyond their qualification into any discrete actualised event. 
It is thus our impression of that crystal point at which potential 
and actual meet: individuation in the making.
213. See also Claire Bishop’s critique of the disavowal of the aesthetic 
in relational works, where, after Rancière, she argues that the 
redistribution of the sensible is as politically a charged act as the 
redistribution of social relations (2009, 248–9). Though here it 
should be noted that Whitehead, in discussing the speed in which 
we habitually move from presentational immediacy ‘a coloured 
shape in front of us’, to its efficious comprehension as ‘a chair’, 
argues that such quick transition from sensation to the efficacy 
of an object ‘is a very natural one’ that requires ‘careful training’ 
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– such as an artist might have – ‘if we are to refrain from acting 
upon it’ (2014, unpaginated, I: 3).
214. Without the qualification of causal efficacy presentational im-
mediacy, Whitehead states, does not divide into truth and illusion 
(2014, unpaginated, I: 12).
215. See Combes (2013, 65). Ethics here, in allowing space for and 
giving attention to the ways in which novelty might arise, might in-
clude aesthetic acts that extend the emergent qualities of percep-
tion and thus a prehension of individuations-in-the-act.
216. That is, the event is a ‘mechanics of expression rather than a signi-
fying apparatus’ (Murphie 1996, 104).
217. This, for Whitehead is an extended prehensive resonance with 
other entities (1978, 220).
218. This, Manning says, is the ‘no-time of the decision in the present 
passing’ (2013a, 106).
219. In the middle, Massumi says ‘we become conscious of a situation 
always in its midst, already actively engaged in it. Our awareness 
is always of an already ongoing participation in an unfolding rela-
tion’ (2002, 231).
220. This relates to Manning’s terms ‘Body-worlding’, which, ‘is much 
more than containment, much more than an envelope. It is a 
complex feeling-assemblage that is active between different co-
constitutive milieus’ (Manning 2013a, 2).
221. Deleuze’s term agencement is usually translated as ‘assemblage’, 
however, as Manning notes, this inexact translation ‘does not 
convey [the] force’ of the act of assembling that is implied in the 
French term (Manning 2009, 237 note 71).
222. As Rancière also argues, an art that seeks to invest all compo-
nents of an event with a shared agency is deeply political, as the 
‘politics of domination’ rest on ‘sensory division’ of the world into 
the passive (object) and active (subject) (2009, 31).
223. ‘Technicity’, as Manning describes it, moves beyond ‘technique’ to 
touch again with its potential or virtual, a ‘more than’ of technique. 
In other words, it might be viewed as the way art can contract or 
synthesise a technique to bring new life to it (Manning 2013a, 33).
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224. Perhaps here one might argue that the immersive colour fields of 
James Turrell and Dan Flavin’s work have something to offer an 
expanded concept of interactivity.
225. Drawing imagery and sounds directly from the Anime film 
Nausicaä, of the Valley of the Wind (directed by Hayao Miyazaki, 
Topcraft studio, Japan, 1984), Pnuema created a windswept envi-
ronment of alien forms glowing and pulsing in the dark. The work 
was an interactive installation that consisted of translucent sculp-
tural forms hung in the centre of a small, darkened gallery space. 
A number of the sculptural pieces had internal lights, and speak-
ers were positioned within the mass of sculptures and around 
the perimeter of the space. Both the rhythms of light pulses and 
soundscape were generated by movement in the space, as sen-
sors captured data on the passage of participants around the 
space and the incidental movements of the lightweight sculp-
tures, and light sensors fed information on the pulses of light back 
into the generative system triggering further changes. The work 
had several ‘states’ through which it could move, from a relatively 
calm and quiet state (in which ‘singing’ sounds emanated from 
the sculptures and there was a simple blue pulse in the central 
pieces), through to increasingly more dramatic states where 
more complex pulses of blue, amber and/or red lights pulsed and 
stormy sounds enveloped the space. This work experimented with 
complex layers of manipulated sounds embedded into a sample 
as ‘unsounds’ (see Chapter Seven), in order to attempt to increase 
the affectual force of the samples. In these hidden sounds certain 
very high or low frequencies were emphasised and samples other 
than the dominant sound were hidden just below audible vol-
ume and/or frequency range, in order to experiment with ways 
in which sound might operate forcefully on bodies beyond aural 
cognition, in another layer of relational entanglement. See http://
www.andrewgoodman.com.au/pnuema/.
226. Here, in particular, one could say that the temporal and spatial an-
choring of events that causal efficacy can provide was disrupted.
227. Such gestures are ‘minor’ in that they allow an intensive reconfigu-
ration to occur (Manning 2016a, 48).
228. A parallel can be drawn here, I think, between the concept of the 
minor gesture and Simondon’s expanded concept of individua-
tion, in that for Simondon ontogenesis must be thought of as a 
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‘becoming of the being in general [that] produces both the indi-
vidual and its environment’ (Simondon 2009, 14, note 2).
229. Closely related to the star fish, brittle stars have a calcite struc-
ture that focuses light directly onto bundles of nerve endings, 
thus its whole surface functions as a multiple 360-degree eye. It 
too has no ‘brain’ with which to perceive such sensations, yet it 
responds to light (Barad 2007, 369–84).
230. See also Massumi (2002, 14).
231. In this process-based understanding of the universe, affect is a 
force existing prior to, and bringing into existence, object and 
subjects and relations between such entities. This has a basis 
both within ‘process’ philosophies and within non–Newtonian 
(quantum) physics. See Barad (2007), for an example of a process-
based approach from the perspective of quantum physics that is 
compatible with Whitehead’s philosophical schema. Affect can be 
distinguished clearly, in this definition, from emotion, which might 
be thought of more as the qualification or cognition of the effects 
of affect on a body (Bertelsen and Murphie 2010, 148).
232. We might think of this larger and perceptible sound event as a 
‘superject’, composed of ongoing and related smaller events and 
contrasts held together through a shared inheritance.
233. This concept of transduction holds not only for physical objects, 
Combes argues, but ‘for any domain’ including ‘matter, life, mind, 
society’. Further on Combes notes that relation as an aspect 
of the system of individuation has ‘a rank of being’. In this way 
it might be considered a radical empiricist approach (Combes 
2013, 6–7, 16).
234. The connection to a Whiteheadian concept of contrast is made 
evident in Adrian Mackenzie’s argument that, ‘transduction is a 
process whereby a disparity or difference is topologically and 
temporally restructured across an interface’ (Mackenzie 2002, 25). 
Becoming, for Simondon, resolves tensions of difference in that 
it is a ‘conservation of these tensions in the form of a structure’ 
(Simondon 2009, 6).
235. Here the individuation of the perception ‘mediates between two 
incompatible orders, inventing ways of bringing them together’ 
(Grosz 2012, 40).
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236. The play is Artaud’s ‘most intensive realization of his plan to 
atomize and recast the entire conception of the human body’ 
(Barber 1999, 6).
237. ‘The scream is the very sublimation of speech into the body’ 
(Weiss1992, 288–9).
238. This, Aden Evans considers as the balance between implication 
and explication that allows a flow forward of sound and listening 
(in Massumi 2002, 179–83).
239. ‘The ear is no more located in one place than the skin…the body 
itself is caught up in a process of hearing, which implicates skin, 
bone, skull, feet and muscle’ (Conner 1999, 4).
240. An ‘appetite’ as opposed to the teleos of an ‘instinct’, the former 
suggests potential multiplicity of future creativity, rather than the 
linear and prescriptive nature of the latter system of thinking.
241. See also Roads (2001, 7) for more detailed explanation of 
the physics.
242. Space-Shifter was first exhibited at Conical ARI in Melbourne 
in 2009. Details of the work can be found on the artists’ web-
site at www.waxsm.com.au/spaceshifter.htm, and a short 
video demonstration can be viewed at www.youtube.com/
watch?v=3c8gLZq1BQM.
243. See Manuel DeLanda (2005), for an extensive discussion of the 
role of attractors in modulation of forces within states; and 
Chapter Nine of this book for a discussion of attractors and force 
in a different context.
244. ‘Shifters’ are mythical tricksters, capable of changing appear-
ance, who disrupt semiotic order and are invoked by the artists in 
their explanation of the work. David Chesworth and Sonia Leber, 
Space-Shifter.
245. The soundscape of the work uses a choir singing nonsense 
sounds and part-words. Kristeva proposes the ‘Chora’ as a deposi-
tory of pre-language sounds in the body that work to disrupt sig-
nifications through bodily material presence. In this category, she 
includes such eruptions of sound as sighs, burps, yawns, sneezes 
and song (Grosz 1989, 43; Kristeva 1986, 95).
246. David Chesworth & Sonia Leber, Space-Shifter.
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247. For a detailed discussion of this approach to light and perception, 
see James J Gibson (1979, 41–103 and passim).
248. Pitch and rhythm, for example, as a continuum of the same wave 
phenomena of differing duration – 1/16” to 1/3200” for the former, 
and 6” to 1/16” for the later (Roads 2001, 55, 73).
249. The vibrational is felt as duration: change over time. This duration 
is then contracted in perception to a quality – in itself timeless.
250. See Barad (2007, 71–96) for a detailed explanation of 
the phenomena.
251. ‘Intra-actions are non-arbitrary, non-deterministic causal en-
actments through which matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is 
iteratively enfolded into its ongoing differential materialization’ 
(Barad 2007, 179).
252. In that each position operates as parasite on the other positions. 
Parasitic actions create an equivalence between positions, inter-
rupting orders and hierarchies (Serres 2007, 55–7).
253. As Connor states in reference to Serres’ work on the senses: ‘Just 
as the ear consists in part of a skin, so the skin itself is a kind of 
ear, which both excludes and transmits exterior vibrations’ (1999, 
5). Sound, as Goodman asserts, is synesthetic, ‘us[ing] the full 
body as ear, treating the skin as an extended eardrum membrane’ 
(Goodman 2010, 149).
254. Anzieu theorises a ‘sound envelope’ as one of a series of sensorial 
envelopes (also including olfactory and thermal envelopes) that 
extend the body into the world. These construct a ‘skin ego’ that 
both supports the construction of the psyche, and provides an ex-
tended space of exchange with the world. Some parallels might be 
drawn with the ‘landing sites’ of Arakawa and Gins that extend the 
body. Anzieu proposes the sound envelope as an initial primary 
envelope, drawing an awareness of the internal space through 
bodily sounds and the external space through environmental 
sounds, but also most importantly of the exchange between the 
two (1989, 157–71 and passim).
255. The skin ‘forms a hollow and becomes an ear…[e]verywhere else, 
be it ear-drum or drum, it hears more widely and less well, but still 
it hears, vibrating as though auricular’ (Serres 2008, 52).
256. An organ here is, as Serres says, ‘capacity for doing’, a potential 
for relating (Conner 1999, 3).
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257. A syncopated rhythm has two or more attractors (poten-
tial modulators of forces), while a simple beat has only one 
(Goodman 2010, 116).
258. Again, this is a complex ecology, each wave potentially both felt as 
a vibration in itself, and as a productive factor attracting modula-
tion of forces in which it implicates itself. Here we see that diffrac-
tion through the micro-perceptible is built into the various regis-
ters of the system as an intrinsic parasitic factor within relation.
259. Perception, as Bogue argues, is a ‘secondary, rational organiza-
tion’ of sensation. It contracts and abstracts through cognition the 
concrete sensation that is prehended in the immediate, physical 
connection of relation (2003, 116). Bogue draws on the work of 
Strauss, as he claims Deleuze also did in reaching this definition. 
Wilden, whom Bogue also cites as an influence on Deleuze’s think-
ing, equates sensation with the analogue, and perception with 
the translation of this into code, when he writes that ‘perception 
involves the transformation of analogue into digital messages to 
the brain’ (2003, 162). On sensation versus perception and the 
analogue and digital, see Massumi (2012, 97–99, 133–43).
260. Momo was exhibited in August–September 2011 at Paradise Hills 
Gallery, Richmond, Melbourne. The work drew from a text by 
Antonin Artaud of the same name, which formed part of the initial 
impetus for the work. Momo consisted of an installation of soft 
sculpture pieces utilising metallic and bright pink fabrics (with 
the walls of the gallery painted the same fluorescent pink), and 
with internal pulsing lights and generative sound. The sound was 
made principally of loops of words and phrases from Artaud’s 
text, reconfigured by being cut up and reconstructed through the 
participants’ movement. The central sculpture ‘conversed’ with 
people in the space, becoming more active as approached, and 
other sculptural pieces echoed these words and distributed the 
sounds through the space. Light sensors were embedded into 
the main sculpture, which then had bright lights projected onto it, 
and shadows formed by participants in the space then triggered 
sound events. See Chapter Eight, ‘Refrain’, for a discussion of the 
utilising of shadows as an interfacing between bodies and sen-
sors. See www.andrewgoodman.com.au/momo/.
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261. In Momo, these other sounds consisted of guttural and expressive 
mouth sounds, and sounds taken from the movie Alien 4 (Directed 
by Jean-Pierre Jeunet, Twentieth Century Fox, 1997).
262. See also Whitehead on the complexity within a single perceived 
sound (1978, 234–5). As Evans states, ‘every sound masks an en-
tire history of sound, a cacophony of silence. Even our bodies hum 
along with the noise of the universe’ (in Massumi 2002, 177).
263. Thus, one hears the roar of the ocean, a sound gathered from 
the individual potential combinations of all the waves and drops 
of water, but each listener from their singular position hears an 
ocean composed of different combinations of variously distinct 
and indistinctly expressed sounds. Each act of audition expresses 
the whole but in its own way. The multiplicity of micro-perception 
remains autonomous from individual expressions of it as percep-
tion – it is not defined by singular expression, but remains always 
open to further expressive potential. See also Whitehead (1978, 
294–301), on ‘extensive connection’ and Massumi (2002, 35).
264. It has no primary or ideal identity to which it refers – rather what 
it refers to is its virtual plane, its un-actualised potential – but can 
be understood only in relation to, and in the movement of, rela-
tion. (Murphie 1997, 326).
265. Here the skin is a sensual topological palette (Serres 2008, 79–80). 
The skin, Serres writes, is a sense organ, it ‘flows like water, a 
variable confluence of the qualities of the senses’ (2008, 52). It is 
synesthetic in that it enhances the more-than qualities of sound 
in a way that emphasises how these elements combine to provide 
a clearer zone of perception. More than simply demonstrating 
synesthesia, it opens one to the possibility of becoming a new 
synesthetic machine, hearing with an extended body – composed 
of both body parts and relations with other surfaces – it invites a 
fuller participation in a vibrational ecology. See Abram (1997, 59).
266. Writing about other art events in a similar context, Murphie says: 
‘Such performative interactivity tends to create a series of skins as 
planes of interaction’ (2005, 34).
267. The field of micro-perception is in this way propositional of percep-
tion, propositions being ‘not primarily for belief, but for feeling at 
the physical level of unconsciousness’ (Whitehead 1978, 186).
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268. This, Braidotti says, is an awareness of ‘the roar which lives on the 
other side of silence’ (2002, 155).
269. For a much more nuanced description of the different types and 
functions of the interface, see Matthew Fuller’s definition of the 
three levels or modes of interfacing (firstly as distributed and 
invisible within a system, secondly as the monitoring and control 
of mapped but separate elements, and thirdly as an ‘associa-
tive structure independent of processes and objects’) (2003, 
99, 103–13).
270. See Combes for a succinct discussion of Simondon’s critique of 
cybernetics (2013, 79–83).
271. Such concepts of ‘enduring substances’, Whitehead argues, while 
expressing an at times useful abstraction, nevertheless prove 
themselves mistaken when taken as a ‘fundamental statement 
about the nature of things’ (Whitehead 1978, 79).
272. For Lozano-Hemmer’s reflections on the significance of this event 
for his practice, see Barrios and MacSween (2005, 5–6).
273. This follows Deleuze’s tactic of utilising infinite verbs, not nouns, 
to escape representation (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 50). As 
Whitehead says: ‘if we start with process as fundamental, then 
the actualities of the present [derive] their characters from the 
process’ (Whitehead 1978, 99).
274. We might say that it has shifted towards the pole of concretisation 
(becoming-concrete), rather than conceiving of the terms abstract 
and concrete as absolute and exclusive.
275. As Deleuze states, ‘difference, potential difference and difference 
in intensity [is] the reason behind qualitative diversity’ (1994, 57).
276. Here the connection between the biological and technical as 
‘hydrid technical objects’ (Salter 2012, 126) was a tactic to gener-
ate difference, and must be differentiated clearly from a ‘cyber-
netic’ model, which, as LaMarre argues, seek to blur distinctions 
between the biological and the technical, collapsing difference (in 
Combes 2013, 79–80). Thus it produced ruptures or gaps in the 
processes of ‘dephasing’ in which a stable identity was delineated 
from ongoing processes of becoming.
277. See www.lozano-hemmer.com /repositioning_fear.php for short 
video sequences of various installations of the work.
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278. ‘Signaletic material’, as Deleuze discusses it, is one such exces-
sive expression of interfacing, a conditioning of force-form as it 
transduces. This can be found in the continual unfolding of pixels 
on a TV screen; a temporal event that is probably not consciously 
perceived but which nevertheless has an energy in itself, as a 
‘plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-syntaxic material’ – a kind of 
processual ‘grain’ (2005, 28). See also Thomsen (2011) on signa-
letic material.
279. See Whitehead on the place of conceptual feelings and hybrid 
physical feelings (1978, 239, 246–7).
280. These were individuations that were ‘mobile, strangely subtle, for-
tuitous and endowed with fringes and margins’, that were ‘no less 
capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than constituting 
them’ (Deleuze 1994, 257, 38).
281. Thus resonance is not simply a tension between disparate forces, 
but the productive structuring of this tension without erasure of 
difference (Grosz 2012, 41).
282. The technological event is necessarily the producer of these para-
sites, ‘gaps and remainders’ as Munster says, that mitigate ‘the 
failure of any fully technologically connected and serially stan-
dardized world’ (2006, 6).
283. Here the ‘first phase’ is the pre-individual, the second the in-
dividuated entity, but the pre-individual only comes into be-
ing as a phase post-individuation – that is they are co-evolving 
(Combes 2013, 46).
284. As Grosz points out, such collective individuations may often be 
‘mediated by technical objects, which elaborate and contribute 
to psychic cohesion’ (2012, 50). These technical entities operate 
as ‘the support and the symbol of the relation that we would call 
transindividual’ (Simondon cited Grosz 2012, 56 n.9).
285. Here the unresolved tension between the external and internal 
provided impetus for changes, its incompatability becoming 
‘an organizational dimension in its resolution’ (Simondon cited 
Manning 2010, 118) – forcing an evolution in the associated milieu.
286. The outside – seen as the ‘incompossible’ (Deleuze 1993, 60) – 
defined the limit of the event (Whitehead 1978, 45; Massumi 
1992, 57–8) – the dimensions and rules by which it operated. 
Re:Positioning Fear had limits defining its concrescence, both in the 
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types of performances it produced, and the potential from which 
it was drawn. The introduction of a whole new outside tactic of 
production, alongside the introduction or infection of the event 
with new intentions and tonalities of play, then delimited the 
Re:Positioning Fear event. The tactic initiated new performances 
and fields of potential to compose with, even as it continued to 
drive towards its previously instigated concrescence.
287. They are a ‘preconcious verging toward a coming-to-act that tunes 
to the relational milieu of experience’ (Manning 2013a, 187).
288. It enacted both the event of the joining of milieus (a contraction/
synthesis) and an expanding of potential – that is, the production 
of a new milieu: a ‘double process of amplification and condensa-
tion’ (Simondon 2009, 16 note 24). Chris Salter provides a lucid 
account of the process of the development of a common milieu 
through concretisation (2012, 117–8).
289. As Simondon states, the individual is relative not only to the field 
within and with which it individuates, but also to the process of 
individuation itself (2009, 5).
290. The system moved from a more ‘abstract’ configuration in 
Simondon’s terms (requiring the external input of the artist and 
the ‘feeding in’ to the system of chaotic elements – new bodies 
with their random actions – to initiate change), to a self-modulat-
ing model (where ‘effects are produced that are independent of 
the design plan’) (Simondon 1980, 22, 31).
291. If the folding in of the outside moves the system to a far-from-
equilibrium state, then this point at which the system shifts to one 
of self-organising criticality is a special ‘poised’ state, where the 
fullest range of events is potentialised, and where the organisa-
tion of the system is governed by an emergent global dynamics 
(Bak 1997, 48, 51 and passim). On far-from-equilibrium states see 
also Prigogene (1980) and Prigogene and Stengers (1996).
292. Perhaps one might propose that Lozano-Hemmer already con-
structed the work in a limited sense as metastable – as a kind of 
supersaturated solution primed for dephasing, sensitive to dif-
ference, but sensitive, on this meta-level, only to certain actions 
(LaMarre in Combes2013, 86).
293. Interfacing, in connecting and producing the machinic, actualises 
a potential – a paradox in that, prior to their co-joining, the two 
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systems shared no potential. Where does this potential, and the 
actuality of unfolding connectedness arise from? Simondon’s an-
swer, as Massumi explains it, is that it is brought from the future, 
from a point post-concretisation. Interfacing here is the catalyst 
that instigates both the actual assemblage and simultaneously 
creates a new potential, a new milieu created immanently with the 
assemblage on which it has somehow already drawn, a circularity 
possible only within a conception of time as non-linear (Massumi, 
DeBoever and Rolfe 2009, 39–40).
294. The power of the parasitic actions of the shadow play on Lozano-
Hemmer’s work can only be felt through some understanding of 
the ways in which these actions twist, complicate, complement, 
extend and oppose the original ‘givens’ of the installation, as for 
Deleuze it is the ‘givens’ of an event that are overcome by the 
diagrammatic ‘catastrophe’ (2002a, 81). In this sense, Lozano-
Hemmer’s future Relational Architecture work that drew on the 
improvised shadow play of Re:Positioning Fear and placed these 
actions at the centre of the installations machinations perhaps 
seems less dynamic, since there is some greater resolution of in-
ternal tensions, and the intentions of artist and public coincide in 
cooperative play more reminiscent of some of relational aesthet-
ics blander gestures.
295. That is, as LaMarre describes it, internal and external grounds, 
being different, ‘have to communicate…actively across their asym-
metry, and have to stabilise that communication. The result is a 
self-regulating individual’ (LaMarre in Combes 2013, 93).
296. To its credit, Re:Positioning Fear was an art machine capable of 
using interfacing-produced parasitic action to draw into relation a 
wider field of possible actions, affects and intentions, immanently 
rewriting its productive capabilities. Its power as an artwork was 
perhaps that this transformation led not to the collapse of its 
machinic structuring, but to its concretisation.
297. These light sensors triggered volume changes and the swapping 
of sound samples, while movement sensors also played a role in 
switching audio samples. See Chapter Seven for further descrip-
tion of Momo.
298. Exactly which sound had its volume manipulated on any particu-
lar track was dependent on a series of complex disruptions and 
swapping of samples, similar to the parasitic system described 
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in Chorus of Idle Feet in Chapter Two. The computer system also 
watched for the quantity of light variation within a set timespan 
that, once a tipping point was reached, could then trigger further 
shifts in the potential range of volume (so that louder volumes 
were made possible). See Chapter Nine for some discussion of 
limits and bifurcation within software patches.
299. No entity, Whitehead states, ‘can have an abstract status in a real 
unity’. The neglect of this, he argues, is ‘a prevalent error in meta-
physical reasoning’ (Whitehead 1978, 225).
300. In other words, an algorithm is a set of instructions for a com-
puter program to perform specific mathematical operations. 
Some algorithms can be split into smaller sets of instructions that 
perform parts of the larger algorithm, as they might also be com-
bined to perform larger such procedures. Algorithms differ es-
sentially from an algebraic formula – which might be a component 
part of an algorithmic sequence – in that they are non-reversible 
(Miyazaki 2012, 3).
301. This is not to imply at all that other artists have not attempted 
such design, as clearly there has been considerable work devel-
oped in this area. Both Parisi and Stamatia Portanova discuss, in 
the texts that inform this argument, a number of artworks that 
attempt to develop open-ended usages of software. These discus-
sions, like many theoretical examinations of algorithms, centre on 
the philosophical and examine only the general structure of the 
algorithmic processes and do not provide detailed examination of 
software patches. See also the writing and artwork of artists such 
as Jon McCormack and Andrew R Brown on their own software 
developments, and as two Australian examples of experimenta-
tion in this area.
302. Orgasmatron was exhibited in October–November 2013 at 
Blindside, Melbourne. This discussion concentrates on the 
technical details of the software patching. Orgasmatron con-
sisted of an inflatable ‘pod’ that one or two participants could lie 
down and move around in. The work drew on iterations of the 
orgasmatron from the films Sleeper (directed by Woody Allen, 
Rollins-Joffe Productions, 1973) and Barbarella (directed by Roger 
Vadim, Paramount Pictures, 1968), aesthetically quoting the soft 
machines and inflatables of the design of Barbarella by Mario 
Garbuglia. Projected coloured light pulsed within the interior, 
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changing colour and speed as the Orgasmatron became more 
excited; speakers surrounding the bodies whispered and spoke; 
and tiny speakers and a subsonic speaker sent ripples of vibra-
tions through the base on which participants were lying. Sensors 
embedded in the base captured data from the weight and move-
ment of bodies, light sensors captured shifts in brightness caused 
by both the projections and shadows from bodies, and vibration 
sensors captured the vibrations at various points in the base of 
both sounds and bodies. See www.andrewgoodman.com.au/
orgasmatron-spaces-to-make-love-in/.
303. Pairs of vibration, pressure, light and tilt sensors gather data on 
variations in force and direction of pressure, movement, volume 
and light from the Orgasmatron environment.
304. Isadora is a program for interactive media designed by Mark 
Coniglio (see troikatronix.com/isadora/about/). It is similar to the 
Max programs, in that it contains a number of prewritten ‘objects’ 
(Max) or ‘actors’ (Isadora) that perform certain functions or pro-
cesses on incoming data (for example, mathematical equations), 
with various programmable parameters. Both programs also al-
low new objects to be constructed out of combinations of existing 
objects, and allow for the flexible connection between objects. In 
total, the Orgasmatron computations operated across three patch-
es in three different programs: a Miditron patch (which converted 
data from the sensors to midi signals to be utilised by the other 
two patches); the Isadora patch (which controlled and modulated 
data and video output); and an Ableton Live patch (which played, 
rerecorded and modulated sound samples and sent these to the 
system of fifteen speakers). It was, however, principally within the 
Isadora patch that the parasitic potential of algorithmic prehen-
sions and competing attractors was explored, and thus it is the 
only patch described in detail here.
305. Beyond the more open-ended algorithmic processes discussed 
here, the patch itself contained more programmatic and mundane 
algorithms that controlled, for example, the starting up of the sys-
tem as a participant entered the environment, and the processes 
by which it returned to its original and relatively passive state 
after the participant exited.
306. In the discussion of the potentialising of software, it should be 
noted that the triggering of video and sound events by these 
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processes was in itself not a simple linear process, but also 
engaged with parasitic tactics. As with the example discussed in 
Chapter Two, these triggers interfered with and disrupted each 
other, replacing, for example, one sound event with another, 
or altering its tone, volume, and so on. As with the examples 
discussed in Chapter Five, within the actualised sound and light 
events, there were further potential processes of parasitic disrup-
tion, such as the ‘unsounds’ embedded in the sound samples that 
altered perceived sound events through diffraction, and the ex-
tended moments of transition between video projections where 
colours and rhythms diffractively combine.
307. This capacity to develop parameters was restricted to furthering 
the excitation of the system (that is, an increased capacity to be 
affected), in line with the concept of stages of increased excite-
ment and responsiveness during sex. However, the design had the 
capacity to both increase and decrease these affective capacities, 
and so could be utilised in a system that potentially becomes less 
responsive or in a system that oscillates in both directions.
308. It should be noted that a further tactic commonly utilised in 
generative software-based works (though rejected here), involves 
injections of chaos and the use of ‘fitness’ criteria to gener-
ate controlled novelty. Utilising fitness criteria involves the use 
of algorithms to randomly generate new outcomes, and then 
subjecting these outcomes to a set of prescribed criteria that 
determine which of these novel iterations (usually a series of 
small modulations on existing patterns) will survive and which 
will perish. Whether or not the initial generation of novelty in 
such systems is relational (caused by some processing of exist-
ing intensive factors) or random (through injections of unrelated 
data), such a process is clearly not open-ended. Rather, as Jon 
McCormack and Philip Galanter both argue, it is a top-down 
or teleological approach that drives the system towards a set 
outcome, even if it allows some movement within the processes 
that lead to this (McCormack 2003, 193; Galanter 329). In this, it 
clearly denies a relational modelling by subordinating explora-
tion to a single dominant form. Such systems might therefore be 
thought of as adaptive systems that are goal orientated, seeking 
new patterns or behaviors that ‘benefit’ the system (that is, lead 
to greater efficiency or growth within a set of defined param-
eters), whereas a truly generative system, as Oliver Bown argues, 
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disregards the benefits or costs to the system of its creativity 
(2012, 364). McCormack argues that fitness-driven evolutionary 
art is a contradictory term, being anything but evolutionary in 
nature (2013, 5). It does, however, fit neatly into goal-orientated, 
neo-Darwinist theories of transcendence – a working or evolving 
towards an ideal form, as discussed in Chapter Two in relation to 
drift. The secondary tactic – employed both within fitness-based 
systems and on its own – has been to use injections of chaos or 
external randomness to generate change. Such systems, whereby 
an unrelated set of parameters are used as raw data converted 
to some artistic output through computational processes (such 
as weather data converted to shifts in colours on a screen, for 
example), are, as McCormack and others argue, a poor ‘proxy’ 
for intensive complexity (McCormack et al 2014, 8). While fitness-
based systems concentrate on positive, directed connectivity at 
the expense of exploratory room to move, random data creates 
systems concerned with the superficial appearance of complexity 
rather than its actualization. See also Per Bak’s discussion of the 
misunderstandings of the operation of fitness within much scien-
tific discussion (1997, 142).
309. As Anna Munster states: ‘the technical element is always in a 
relation with elements outside itself, its form is therefore indeter-
minate and virtual’ (2006, 14). Munster argues that bodies are ‘the 
chaos and interruption with which the machine cannot dispense’ 
(2006, 185). See also Murphie and Potts (2003, 31–2). It could be 
argued that simply through the processes of flows of data trans-
lating from software platform to software platform within a com-
puter this data undergoes a transduction, shifting from one coded 
flow to another, with accompanied and somewhat unpredictable 
losses through the noise of translation (Newman 2012, 135–7). For 
example, in the movement of data through the series of patches 
utilised in the Orgasmatron system, numerical data is transduced 
from voltage flows (positive numbers between 0 and 5 volts), to 
midi in the first patch (positive integers between 0 and 127), then 
in the second patch to numbers between -100 and +100, then 
back to MIDI in the third patch. The social aspects of code provide 
another register in which any determinate nature of algorithms 
might also be disturbed. As Adrian Mackenzie charts in his discus-
sion of Java, the software operates more as an unstable ‘collec-
tion of resources with multiple potential machinic productions’ 
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than as a fixed object (2006, 95). Here Java, with its constant 
upgrades, user initiated fixes and modifications, independently 
operating layers of code and ability to work within other coding 
languages across platforms, operates as an indeterminate ‘virtual’ 
that is differentially actualised in each specific operational event 
(Mackenzie 2006, 96–102).
310. See Wilden’s discussion of the paradoxical operations of brain 
messages, which appear both as analogue and digital depending 
on the scale of the examination (1980, 175–7).
311. On signaletic creativity, see Brunner (2012, 7) and Thomsen 
(2011, 43–62).
312. For example, the fact that the digital can encompass both zero 
and negative numbers while the analogue contains only positive 
numbers shows that it has its own particular mode of operating, 
and, in this one respect at least, its own and potentially wider 
parameters (Wilden 1980. 167). On the loss of excess in the digital, 
see also Simon Penny’s statement that digital technologies ‘thin 
out’ experience, (2013, 269–70) see also Massumi (2002, 133–43) 
and Grosz (2001, 183).
313. See also Chapter Two. Roy Ascott has argued that the use of 
feedback as an organizing tactic ‘furnishes [a system with] its own 
controlling energy’, allowing an intensively ‘rich interplay’ (2003, 
128). See also Bateson (2000, 379–80).
314. This is only a partial example of the feedback loops established. 
In reality, data sensed from any one set of sensors affects all the 
other systems – pressure variation affecting sound events, spatial 
configurations, and light events, for example.
315. However, the model of feedback systems I have described in the 
Orgasmatron would seem to suggest that it is, at least, also pos-
sible to create feedback between the various technical entities.
316. McCormack has written and experimented extensively in 
this area. See, for example, his “Creative Ecosystems,” (2012, 
39–60). See also his artwork, Eden (2000–10) at jonmccormack.
info/~jonmc/sa/artworks/eden/. Accessed October, 2014. Gordon 
Pask’s early ‘conversational’ model might be seen to fit loosely 
within this parametric and ecological paradigm. Pask’s early 
experiments with electro-chemical systems, capable of creat-
ing their own sensors out of a field of solutions of chemical 
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components and electrical charges, is perhaps one of the most 
interesting experiments in ecological ‘programming’, concerned 
with how a field of potential is able to organise its own gathering 
into an assemblage capable of expressing relation (see Pask 1960; 
Cariani 1997). This is the type of evolutionary art that Galanter 
advocates, one capable of creating new sensing machines (and 
therefore evolving its own parameters) as well as operating ma-
chinically (2010, 6).
317. See also Bak (1997, passim) and Prigogene and Stengers (1996, 
42–4 and passim).
318. This, Parisi argues, is a system modifying through qualitative and 
local intensities (2013, 112).
319. Parisi argues that topology conflates points and singularities 
within the various inputs of a system into a continuous flow of 
infinitesimals, connectively subsuming atomic differences into a 
whole that, in this case, is also a modulating surface, turning ‘the 
potential effects of the future into operative procedures within 
the present’ (2013). Topological calculation, as Parisi states, now 
also allows economic factors to be calculated as parameters 
within architectural design, directly linking potential profit to 
aesthetic considerations, a tending towards creating a topology 
of networked capitalist control (2013, 103–5). Autopoietic systems 
are often referred to as topological, though they are not neces-
sarily so. Technically speaking, topological systems, according to 
DeLanda, operate specifically through a system of a single attrac-
tor, which explains both their erasure of negative relation and the 
simplicity of their operations. Multiple attractor systems, as will 
be explored later in this chapter, are capable of operating through 
intensive difference that creates both compossible and incompos-
sible relational pulls (DeLanda 2005, 24).
320. Parisi and Goodman continue: ‘We ask instead, what if the user 
is any actual entity whatever among the other components of an 
ecology, and therefore that novelty does not necessarily involve 
the activity of a human participant. Specifically, we wonder about 
the perpetual neglect to deal with the weirdness of mathematics, 
the potential of nameable, yet undefinable, infinitesimal, num-
bers to generate prehensive novelty’ (2009). Gilbert Simondon’s 
call for a philosophy of technology, as Paul Dumouchel describes 
it, also advocates for a move beyond approaches that describe 
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technologies’ inputs and outputs while ignoring their internal 
working structures (1992, 410).
321. Not only can second-order cybernetics assume that systems 
depend on the generative capacities of the biological environ-
ment to instigate change, as Parisi argues (Parisi 2013, 11), but, 
as Portanova writes, many configurations of generative software 
project biological modelling onto their design, viewing cognitive 
processes as the only model for algorithmic process (2013, 87).
322. In taking their models of self-generation and organisation from 
the biological, bottom-up learning systems and autopoietic 
feedback loops risk presenting digital architectures as merely 
representational of a ‘real’ world from which they are supposedly 
separate. For example, simulations of neural activity that conceive 
of computational activity as abstractions of brain activities. See 
Parisi on this ‘neurophenominology’ (2013, 169–85). At the other 
extreme, there have of course been attempts to reduce the bio-
logical world’s operations to algorithms, the ‘metadigital fallacy’ 
as Parisi terms it (2013, 36–47); see also Dery (1996, 232), for a 
critique of this approach.
323. Whitehead states that an entity’s relational matrix is composed 
of its abilities to interact with forces and to forcefully impact 
on other entities (1978, 220). As Parisi points out, it is the act of 
prehension that ‘allow[s] complexity to enter into existing sets of 
data’ (2013, 70).
324. ‘Any entity, thus intervening in processes transcending itself, is 
said to be functioning as an “object”’ (Whitehead 1978, 220). An 
entity, Whitehead states, ‘retains the impression of what it might 
have been, but is not’ (1978, 226–7).
325. See also Shaviro, who states that ‘there is always a glitch in the 
course of the “vector transmission” of energy and affect from past 
to present’ (2009, 86).
326. As Shaviro says, ‘multiple prehensions are combined or coordinat-
ed by their adoption to a particular subjective aim – even though 
this aim does not preexist, but itself only emerges in the course of 
this adaption’ (2009, 74).
327. That is, it autonomously acquires determination from indetermi-
nate conditions (Parisi 2013, 59).
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328. This essay of Chaitlin’s is recommended as an entry-level philo-
sophical and (relatively) lay-mathematical discussion of the topic.
329. ‘Ugliness’ is here opposed to ‘beauty’ in mathematics. That is, as 
Matthew Fuller points out, there is a direct and problematic link 
between the search for beauty and simplicity in mathematics 
(universal equations that express everything at some base level) 
and its aesthetic fetishisation in programming, and transcenden-
tal philosophies of pure abstract forms that the real world must 
then be ordered to conform with and which then collaborate 
with ‘hierarchies of every kind’ (2003, 15–16). Perhaps, with this in 
mind, the exploration of awkward mathematical and algorithmic 
work-arounds and deliberately incomplete and non-universal 
processes have an ethical role in thinking the processual, as a new 
and ‘speculative’ software.
330. That is, they resist acting as a proof that mathematics as a whole 
can be reduced to a universal or all-encompassing ‘theory of ev-
erything’ (Chaitlin 2011, 126). Turing’s work, according to Chaitlin, 
shows that ‘that there are things that no computer can calcu-
late’ (2011,127).
331. Expressed in the binary code of the computer 0 < W = 0.11011100 
. . . < 1, where the actual 1s and 0s are dependent on the calcula-
tion at hand (Chaitlin 2011, 136).
332. Thus, as Chaitlin states, ‘it looks like it is contingent’ despite being 
a necessary truth (2011, 137). See also Portanova (2013, 126–7).
333. They are ‘patternless’ in the sense that the virtual contains the 
undifferentiated potential for all patterns.
334. These uncontainable ‘infinite quantities of data…define the space 
of transition between algorithmic sequences’ (Parisi 2013, 240).
335. There is also, as Mackenzie notes, the practical spacing of algo-
rithmic processes within a computer that must juggle the simulta-
neous processing demands of multiple algorithms and software 
platforms (2006, 176–7).
336. See also Wilden (1980, 158) and Mackenzie on the instability of 
code that exists both as expression and operation (2006, 36–7).
337. Rhythm, as Manning states, is ‘a passage from one milieu to an-
other’ (2008, 5).
338. There were multiple cycles that occurred, establishing a se-
ries of potentialities of temporal scales rather than a uniform 
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temporality, and overlapping potentialities or temporal multiplici-
ties. See DeLanda (2005, 107–8).
339. A refrain is ‘any kind of rhythmic pattern that stakes out a territo-
ry’, a ‘point of stability, a property and an openness to the outside’ 
(Bogue 1991, 88). On algorithmic refrains, see Miyazaki (2012, pas-
sim) and Parisi (2013, 83–4).
340. While considered independently, the mathematical operations 
of an algorithm are rate-independent (1+1 = 2, no matter how 
slowly it is calculated). Within systems of interconnected paral-
lel processes, where the results of one calculation have potential 
influence over other processes, the temporal progression of all 
operations is crucial to the whole system’s actualisation, and 
these parallel temporal process allow novelty to arise in otherwise 
ordinally set and rate-independent procedures. See DeLanda 
(2005, 116–18); and Parisi (2013, 108), on overlapping temporal 
multiplicities.
341. A number as a concept has no causal efficacy, no definite rela-
tions that cut a determination from its pure potential, however, 
once it enters into the actuality of an equation, it becomes a 
definite (limited) event with specific relations or causal efficacy. 
For example, the number five has no definite meaning as a pure 
idea, but in its incorporation into an event – five apples, or ‘5’ in 
the number ‘50’ – comes to have specific connections delineating 
it from its other potential meanings – for instance, three apples, 
or five oranges, or the ‘5’ in ‘500’. See Portanova (2013, 107) and 
Whitehead (1957, 1). Similarly, a mathematical function such as ‘+’ 
is a pure idea that is then defined in its actual use – in conjunc-
tion with real numbers and/or other mathematical functions 
(Whitehead 2012, 54–66).
342. Eternal entities are ‘becomings without being’ 
(DeLanda 2005, 127).
343. Unlike other actualised entities to which it necessarily forms a 
relationship, it has only a relation to some eternal objects from 
which it selects its potential.
344. That is, the undifferentiated potentiality of ‘x’s and ‘y’s to express 
an infinity of equations was replaced by actual numbers that 
create a defined and limited relation to the larger potential. Each 
algorithm then might be said to have drawn prehensively on its 
own past and future potential iterations, other potential actions 
296 Notes
on a flow of data, either accommodating some of their potential 
(but in its own way, making it a new process), or differing from it.
345. This is the ‘eternal character of ideas’ that are the same for all 
entities, though ‘differently and infinitely actualized by them’ 
(Portanova 2013, 46). The number five, for example, is an eternal 
object that is actualised in many ways (groups of objects, beats, 
age, temperature, and so on). It has a relationship to all these 
entities, while never being exhausted by its various ingressions 
into actualities. Each entity has an actual or definite relationship 
to ‘fiveness’ as a concept and so represents a definite cut in its 
virtual, indeterminate status – it moves from the non-precise 
differential of the idea to the precision of a cut (ibid. 46), drawing 
a concept into spatiotemporal association (Portanova 2013, 38). 
Eternal objects are therefore ‘immanent to, and part and parcel of 
any actual entities’ (Portanova 2013, 63).
346. On excess and vagueness see Whitehead (1978, 111–12).
347. This is based on DeLanda’s work, most specifically Intensive 
Science, which draws direct links between state systems in physics 
and process philosophy. He draws extensively on Deleuze’s think-
ing, whose relation to non-equilibrium physics is perhaps most 
evident in evident from Difference and Repetition and The Fold: 
Leibniz and the Baroque.
348. DeLanda calls this ‘asymtomatic stability’, whereby shocks to the 
system – new forces or modulations to forces for example – can 
dislodge the system’s trajectory. It may also return to its defined 
stable state if the shock is not too great (2005, 29). A simple ex-
ample of these self-organising capacities can be found in the way 
water moves through a series of stable states as it is heated, re-
organising the molecules in a different way at each distinct stage. 
That is, the water will move from a frozen crystalline organisation, 
to conduction, then to convection, turbulence, and finally steam 
or a gaseous state – each state with its own particular organis-
ing parameters. The states shift at specific critical temperatures, 
as the system breaks a limit that defines a particular organising 
dynamic (DeLanda 2005, 19).
349. The state of a system is then a ‘single point in the mani-
fold’, where the manifold is the ‘space of [all] possible states’ 
(DeLanda 2005, 13).
Notes 297
350. The trajectories chart how difference differs over time, as can 
be expressed in a differential equation (DeLanda 2011b, 14). 
Trajectories are a direct consequence of the attractors that shape 
the dynamics of the field, though this can be far from a linear 
dynamic (DeLanda 2011b, 33).
351. In this sense, an attractor might be seen as a ‘will to power’: an ‘in-
ternal will’ that is ‘the differential and genetic element of a force’ 
(Deleuze 2002b, 51).
352. In other words, it remains an ongoing potential or virtual dimen-
sion to the trajectory.
353. Systems with a single attractor are relatively stable, in that they 
have a tendency to move towards a single potential end point. 
Such linear systems, however, are the exception rather than the 
rule, DeLanda argues, contra to what materialist or essentialist 
approaches to science might have one believe (2005, Chapter 
Four). ‘Non-linear models and their multiple attractors, as well 
as non-linear causes and their complex capacities to affect and 
be affected, define a world capable of surprising us through the 
emergence of unexpected novelty’ (DeLanda 2005, 187).
354. As it can never reach its multiple potential and contradictory 
attractors, the individuation of a difference is always a ‘par-
tial and relative resolution manifested in a system that con-
tains latent potential and harbours incompatibility with itself’ 
(Simondon 1992, 300).
355. DeLanda acknowledges that he takes this idea from the work 
of Ilya Prigogine and Gregoire Nicolis. See Prigogine (1980) and 
Prigogine and Stengers (1996) and Simondon (2009, 6) on the 
exclusion of becoming in stable systems.
356. For some discussion of the role of attractors in creating differen-
tial potential or intensity, see Massumi (1992, 58–61).
357. As noted before, excitement had a ‘roll-on’ effect on the 
Orgasmatron, stimulating more excitement throughout the sys-
tem. As such, the participant, though stimulating the initial rise 
in differential data flow, was only one factor among many that 
continued to stimulate the system.
358. Whereas when in its passive or unexcited state, the numbers 
were relatively constant, and thus remained attracted to the 
same watcher.
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359. It should be emphasised that the attempt here was not to make a 
digital system that mirrored or represented ‘real world’ chemical 
relations between molecules and forces acting on them, but – in 
sympathy with Parisi’s attempt to delineate a digital mode of pre-
hension and a digital relation to the virtual – to think further into a 
specifically digital mode of attractor and bifurcatory operations.
360. As explained earlier, the parameters of any watcher’s gate (the 
numbers it looked for in a data flow) were capable of being ad-
justed by triggers from other watchers.
361. Here, multiple attractor systems were self-organising, but not 
exactly autopoietic, since any stability evolved only as a result 
of negotiations, forces and potentials of forces, which in their 
virtuality remained larger than this ‘whole’. In situating such 
a system at a far-from-equilibrium state, where it was primed 
to switch between attractors with variations in data flows, the 
Orgasmatron software patch exhibited a connectivity that was 
more like an ‘open whole’ that selected and accessed multiple 
potentialities than an autopoietic system that ‘subordinate[d] all 
changes to the maintenance of [its] own organization’ (Maturana 
and Varela 1980, 80).
362. Such as a shift from operating as a stable to a periodic or chaotic 
mode (DeLanda 2005, 19).
363. These algorithms looked for the amount of a certain activity 
within a specific timeframe (such as the number of triggers sent 
by a particular algorithm or set of algorithms), and were triggered 
if a specified threshold number of such activities were noted. 
Again the threshold itself was a mutable number.
364. On the creative role of the limit, see Manning and Massumi 
(2011, 32–3).
365. This might be thought of as a ‘weak’ causality in the system, oper-
ating ‘by way of little frictions’ that ‘pull’ on existing causal chains 
(Serres 1995, 71–3).
366. As Andrew Murphie notes, ‘vigilance’ is required to ensure artistic 
practices concerned with technologies enable lines of flight rather 
than ‘align with…social axiomatics (particularly of control)’ (1996, 
101). See also Laura Lotti’s discussion of the evils of ‘algorithmic 
trading’ on the stock exchange (Lotti 2015, 28–9 & passim).
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367. This, Simondon states, is a characteristic of concretization or the 
intertwining of components in each other’s realisation, a ‘discov-
ery of the dimensions according to which a problematic can be 
defined’ (1992, 313).
368. Jacques Rancière describes ethics as including an ‘identity be-
tween environments…[and] a principle of action’, which perhaps 
could be seen in the concept of shared individuation, the emer-
gent or gathering of an ecology that this research has promoted 
(2009, 111). See also Bennett (2010, 14).
369. ‘Whitehead’s metaphysics could be described as an account of 
how the “greater world without” any entity “steals in” upon it, 
how one existent manifests itself in the very fabric of another.’ 
( Jones 1998, 3)
370. This is a symbiotic relationship where ‘every protagonist is inter-
ested in the success of the other for its own reason’ (Stengers 
2010, 35). Here ‘protagonist’ must be thought to include forces, 
events, and events within events.
371. On the concept of immediation, see Manning, Munster and 
Stavning Thomsen (Forthcoming, 2018).
372. For example, the automated algorithmic expressions of the stock 
market and larger economy, or recent use of algorithms by the 
Australian Department of Social Security in 2016–17 to automati-
cally generate speculative and often unwarranted debt notices to 
thousands of welfare recipients.
373. And here perhaps, as Braidotti notes, we also share a ‘defeatism’ 
or despair as to our powerlessness in the face of ecological disas-
ter and capitalist machinery (2014, 49).
374. See Braidotti (2014, 190–1).
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